Trifin J. Roule and Jeremy Kinsell
Begins with the undoubted benefits of suspicious activity reports (SARs) in identifying and indicting terrorist financing schemes and detecting money laundering trends like abuse…
Abstract
Begins with the undoubted benefits of suspicious activity reports (SARs) in identifying and indicting terrorist financing schemes and detecting money laundering trends like abuse of telephones card sales and money order transmitters; but comparative analysis of anti‐money laundering efforts in over 20 jurisdictions shows that use of SARs is routinely hindered by legislative and bureaucratic deficiencies. Outlines legislative impediments, of which the most common is the lack of safe harbour protection for financial personnel who report suspicious transactions; another is the absence of a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in a country to oversee the collection and investigations of SARs, and a third is failure to share SAR information with foreign regulators. Moves on to bureaucratic impediments, including failure to train and staff FIUs properly; FIUs also often lack necessary computer systems for effective information exchange, while many jurisdictions put time or other limits on FIU investigation of the huge numbers of SARs generated by banks and other institutions.
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Trifin J. Roule and Michael Salak
Introduces the status of money laundering control in Ukraine: in 2001 the country was placed on the list of Non‐Cooperative Countries and Territories by the Financial Action Task…
Abstract
Introduces the status of money laundering control in Ukraine: in 2001 the country was placed on the list of Non‐Cooperative Countries and Territories by the Financial Action Task Force, and the authorities pledged to intensify their enforcement efforts. Outlines the new Criminal Code and its comprehensive anti‐money laundering legislation, which has been accompanied by establishment of a new State Department of Financial Monitoring which is responsible for all anti‐money laundering implementation, and intensified efforts by the National Bank of Ukraine and other existing agencies; despite this, Ukraine will remain on the list until effective implementation is judged to have occurred.
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Reviews current laws and regulations: predicate offences, cross‐border currency exchange, anonymous accounts, reporting information and confiscation regime. Moves on to domestic…
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Reviews current laws and regulations: predicate offences, cross‐border currency exchange, anonymous accounts, reporting information and confiscation regime. Moves on to domestic bureaucratic structures and responsibilities: the Anti‐Money Laundering Section, the Hungarian customs authority, the National Bank of Hungary, the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, and the Anti‐Money Laundering High‐Level Policy Co‐ordination Body. Concludes that the Hungarian financial sector remains vulnerable to money laundering, partly because of the country’s geographical location and also because of the presence of powerful organised criminal groups, while its modern communication and transportation give easy access to smuggling networks.
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Trifin J. Roule and Michael Salak
Describes how Nauru was put on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list of countries which are centres for money laundering; in response to this, the Nauruan Parliament passed…
Abstract
Describes how Nauru was put on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) list of countries which are centres for money laundering; in response to this, the Nauruan Parliament passed the Anti‐Money Laundering Act of 2001. Mentions its provisions: it criminalised money laundering, established the Financial Institutions Supervisory Authority, and introduced know‐your‐customer obligations. Points out, however, that this failed to meet all the FATF 40 Recommendations, mainly because it did not mandate oversight of over 400 offshore centres or “shell banks”, so that FATF members applied sanctions to Nauru. Outlines the Republic’s existing financial services regime; the Evidence (Confidential Information) Act 1976 established Nauru as a safe haven by defining individual rights against disclosure, and its banking and company law were similarly deficient from the FATF’s point of view. Concludes that Nauru has made progress towards effective anti‐money laundering regulation, but serious issues remain unresolved in the ongoing political and economic turmoil.