The aim of this paper is to develop a theory of sharecropping with cost sharing after allowing for an explicit role of a creditor. In the tenancy literature, the prevalence of…
Abstract
Purpose
The aim of this paper is to develop a theory of sharecropping with cost sharing after allowing for an explicit role of a creditor. In the tenancy literature, the prevalence of sharecropping has remained an important issue. While most contributions have focussed only on output sharing, very few have studied the issue of cost sharing. Besides, the existing models have considered interactions only between a landowner and a tenant. The purpose of this paper is to extend this setup to a third player – creditor.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors adopt a static contract approach with full information and no uncertainty and model possible credit‐cum‐tenancy arrangements among a money‐lender, a landowner and a tenant under the restrictions that the money‐lender cannot charge a lump‐sum fee and the input choices are left with the tenant.
Findings
It is shown that all Pareto optimal arrangements between a creditor, a landowner and a tenant must involve interest rate discrimination between the tenant and the landowner and a share tenancy with cost sharing, or a fixed rent tenancy with cost sharing, or a mixture of the two. None of the polar contracts – wage or rent – is possible. Lending schemes that feature credit rationing or credit delegation can implement some Pareto efficient outcomes.
Originality/value
The model developed in the paper presents a framework for studying various tripartite arrangements observed in rural economies of developing countries. Also, it provides a benchmark for studying contracts under asymmetric information and uncertainty.
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Mokhalles Mohammad Mehdi, Nitesh Kumar, Manish Srivastava, Sunildro L.S. Akoijam and Tridib Ranjan Sarma
The case study aims to provide students with an understanding of the challenges a business faces when operating in India. In conclusion of this study, students should be able to…
Abstract
Learning outcomes
The case study aims to provide students with an understanding of the challenges a business faces when operating in India. In conclusion of this study, students should be able to know why franchising is such a common way of delivering services to end users, describe the “place” decisions of physical channels, and be familiar with the strategic and tactical location considerations and devise a growth strategy to expand the business.
Case overview/synopsis
Situated at Tito’s Lane in North Goa, Tito’s was the discotheque founded by Tito Henry D’Souza in 1971. The company offered restaurant, concert space and nightclub services to music and party lovers from diverse locations. Ricardo D’Souza and David D’Souza (both brothers) spearheaded the business. Ricardo understood the growth of markets and the factors driving the growth in India. The key factors driving the Tito’s and pub, bar, café and lounge business in India were rising disposable incomes among Indians, nightlife parties by young individuals and preference for quality food and alcoholic beverages among the customers. By seeing the opportunities in 2022, Ricardo considered expanding its business across India. How should Ricardo move to expand its business and offerings? What strategies should they devise for the growth of the business?
Complexity academic level
This case study is designed for use in undergraduate programs like Bachelor of Business Administration. It is ideal for strategy and services marketing. Theoretical frameworks like the Ansoff matrix are suitable for analyzing the case study to understand the growth of the business.
Supplementary materials
Teaching notes are available for educators only.
Subject code
CSS 8: Marketing.
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F. Scott Thomas and John C. Jaye
The article seeks to outline the requirements under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company Act”), the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) and…
Abstract
Purpose
The article seeks to outline the requirements under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company Act”), the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) and related US Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) rules and interpretive guidance for structuring performance‐based fees for investment advisers and sub‐advisers to registered investment companies (or mutual funds).
Design/methodology/approach
The article discusses the appropriate structure and timing for performance fees and describes in detail how SEC standards for structuring performance fees have evolved over time. The article explains recent SEC enforcement actions against investment advisers for improperly structured performance fees, and notes that the use of performance fees has once again become a focus of SEC scrutiny.
Findings
The article concludes that, despite a common perception that performance fees create an effective incentive to improve fund performance by more closely aligning the interests of the adviser and fund shareholders than traditional fee arrangements, there is minimal empirical evidence proving that the use of performance fees translates into superior fund performance. Investment advisers who charge performance fees to mutual fund clients should consider reevaluating the structure and payment process for the performance fees in light of recent SEC scrutiny and enforcement actions, adviser compliance obligations under Rule 206(4)‐7 of the Advisers Act, and fund compliance obligations under Rule 38a‐1 of the Investment Company Act.
Originality/value
The article provides a concise overview of the regulatory requirements for structuring performance fees charged by mutual fund advisers.