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The purpose of the paper is to find out which incentives are present for persons who are taking care of financial regulation in practice, and how these incentives impact their attitudes towards complexity of financial regulation.

Based on recent contributions, reasons behind the increase in complexity observed in financial regulation are discussed. The role of actual incentives for the persons involved in setting up and enforcing regulation is detailed.

Incentives for persons that impact drafting and implementation of financial regulation produce a bias towards excessive complexity. Additional complexity reduces the risk for being exposed to aggressive journalism and pressure from populist politicians. Increasing complexity of regulation will also benefit large players since the costs are largely fixed.

Careful studies measuring the costs of increased complexity in terms of increased resource requirements are needed.

To reduce the bias towards excess complexity, a body consisting of knowledgeable persons with high integrity is required with an explicit mandate of scrutinising regulation in order to reduce, or at least not increase, complexity. This body must be empowered with sufficient discretion to tackle cases that lack precedents.

The paper introduces an explicit discussion of existing incentives on the regulator side of financial markets to increase the understanding of the issues involved in the increased complexity that we observe in the rules that are implemented to guide behaviour in financial markets.

This paper aims to discuss factors that affect the socially optimal jurisdiction of financial supervision in the presence of economies of scale in banking.

Analysis of the trade-off between likelihood of “regulatory capture” of supervisors in a small jurisdictions and benefits of greater rates of financial innovation in a less-bureaucratized and more diverse supervisory organization.

The challenge is to create a financial supervisory institution that should be powerful enough to close down even the largest financial institutions within its jurisdiction, while at the same time not becoming so large and omnipotent that it would stifle further development of firms in financial services.

Deeper understanding of minimum efficient scales in financial intermediation required, and of regulatory capture vs efficient information acquisition from regulated units.

Basis for international (regional) cooperation in facilitating efficient delivery of financial services, in particular in smaller countries.

Developments in information technology have fundamentally changed the ways financial intermediaries operate paving the way for giant units that in key areas are able to outcompete smaller business units. The financial crisis that started in 2008 revealed that these large and interconnected organizations are in a position to extract implicit subsidies from the rest of the society. The organization of financial supervision must adapt to these changing conditions.

The purpose of this paper by the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) is to provide an account of the financial crisis in Europe during the period 2010-2013 and an analysis of how the relevant authorities reacted to the crisis.

These actions included measures taken by central banks, governments or fiscal authorities, and by regulatory or supervisory bodies. In a previous study covering the regulatory developments during the financial crisis up until 2009, issues such as the implementation of Basel III rules in Europe and the (mostly ad hoc and unilateral) resolution mechanisms set in most European countries to fight the crisis were covered. This study focuses on developments since 2010 with a focus on the concerns and actions that emerged with the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. In particular, the transition from the European Financial Stability Facility to the European Stability Mechanism is assessed. The focus after 2012 has progressively turned to the challenges of the European banking union.

These issues are jointly covered, along with some updates on the views of the ESFRC on recent advances in other areas, such as solvency regulation. All in all, the authors find that the weaknesses of the global financial system remain to be addressed, and they believe that the banking union is one of the main tools and opportunities for an improved and efficient crisis management in Europe.

The paper aims at contributing to the study of financial regulation after the banking crisis. The experience of the euro zone in this context is assessed in this article from a wide range of perspectives.

We investigate institutional investors’ trading behavior of acquiring firm stocks surrounding merger activities for the period 1992–2001. We label investment companies and independent investment advisors as active institutions and banks, nonbank trusts, and insurance companies as passive institutions. We analyze the trading behavior of active and passive institutions surrounding merger announcements and their eventual resolution. Our results indicate that active institutions significantly increase their holdings of acquiring firm stocks for mergers with higher announcement period abnormal return and this increase is more pronounced for stock mergers than cash mergers. Active institutions display preference for stock proposals at the merger announcement on the basis of their prior beliefs and this is explained by the “overreaction phenomenon.” However, they update their beliefs between announcement and final resolution as more information arrives into the market. Finally, active institutions appear to correct their overreaction behavior by displaying their greater preference for cash proposals as compared to stock proposals at the quarter of eventual outcome. The trading behavior of passive institutions suggests that these institutions disregard the market response of merger announcement in trading acquiring firm stocks at the announcement quarter. The passive institutions gradually update their beliefs and utilize the information released at the announcement in rebalancing their portfolios at the final resolution.

Between 1988 and 1994 ten European countries introduced or modified their regulations on insider trading. We evaluate in this article the impact of such regulatory changes on the risk, return, and some other characteristics of these ten markets. After extensive testing, we find that the evidence suggests that these regulations have had little (if any) impact on the market characteristics we examine, and briefly speculate about the reasons that justify our findings.

This study aims to analyze the impact and effectiveness of the regulation on the European sovereign Credit Default Swap (CDS) market. The European sovereign debt crisis has drawn considerable attention to the CDS market. CDS have the ability of a speculative instrument to bet against a sovereign default. Therefore, the Regulation (EU) No. 236/2012 was introduced as the worldwide first uncovered CDS regulation. It prohibits buying uncovered sovereign CDS contracts in the European Union (EU).

First, this paper measures spread changes of sovereign CDS of the EU member states around regulation specific event dates to detect whether and when European sovereign CDS reacts to regulation announcements and the enforcement of regulation. Second, it compares the CDS long-term stability of the EU sample with a non-EU sample based on 44 non-EU sovereign CDS entities.

The results indicate widening CDS spreads prior to the regulation, and stable CDS spreads following the introduction of the regulation. In particular, sovereign CDS of European crisis-hit entities are stable since the regulation was introduced.

The results show that since the regulation of uncovered CDS in the EU has been enacted, the sovereign CDS market is stable and less volatile. Based on the theory about speculation on uncovered sovereign CDS by betting on the reference entity’s default, the introduction of Regulation (EU) No. 236/2012 appears to be an appropriate measure to stabilize markets and reduce speculation on sovereign defaults.

The change in the technological environment within the macro-environment factors in recent years affects states, businesses, societies and individuals and concerns not only technology-based sectors but also many fields. In particular, trends such as artificial intelligence, metaverse, robotics, advanced connectivity, the Internet of Things, big data, small data, blockchain, cloud technologies and reality technologies, which are called new technology, are developing very quickly compared to the past and expanding their global usage areas. Creating strategies and policies without considering these factors creates problems in many areas. These problems are marketing, competition, cost, efficiency and productivity.

Reality technologies, which are the research area in this chapter and enable users to interact with the digital world, have a wide application area in the tourism industry. With technological tools such as smartphones and virtual reality (VR) glasses; personalisation, interactive experience, information gathering and decision-making; many different solutions are produced in areas such as education, service and security. Along with its many advantages, the disadvantages of reality technologies and the negative outputs of this transformation are significant for the understanding and future of the subject.

Entrepreneurship is ubiquitous, but it is not unequivocally a human force for social and economic good. Critical perspectives of the entrepreneur, entrepreneurship, and entrepreneurial success (and failure) are evolving in the scholarly literature. Dark side theory has emerged as a language for critiquing the dominant narratives of entrepreneurship portrayed in scholarship, education, planning, policy, and other forms of practice. This chapter draws from dark side entrepreneurship theory, Baumolian entrepreneurship, and exemplars of counterculture to craft language for an emerging theory of misfit entrepreneurship, which consists of misfit entrepreneurs and alternative enterprises. Alternative enterprises and misfit entrepreneurs are conceptualized, and literary examples (i.e., Robin Hood and Song Jiang) and modern-day examples (i.e., Hacker groups) are supplied. The unique actions and impacts of misfit entrepreneurs and alternative enterprises are offered for discussion. This new theory of misfit entrepreneurship leaves readers with exploratory questions that enhance critical perspectives and modern understandings of entrepreneurship today.