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The Federal Reserve regulates U.S. commercial banks using a system of risk-based capital (RBC) regulations based on the Basel Accords. Unfortunately, the Fed’s mis-rating of several assets such as mortgage-backed securities encouraged the build-up of these assets in the banking system and was a major contributing factor to the 2008 financial crisis. The Basel system of RBC regulation is a prime example of a Hayekian knowledge problem. The contextual, tacit, and subjective knowledge required to properly assess asset risk cannot be aggregated and utilized by regulators. An effective system of banking regulation must acknowledge man’s limited knowledge and place greater value on individual decisions than on top-down planning.

The purpose of this study is to replicate Avery and Berger’s (1991) analysis using data from 2001 through 2011. Although risk-based capital (RBC) regulation is a key component of US banking regulation, empirical evidence of the effectiveness of these regulations has been mixed. Among the first studies of RBC regulation, Avery and Berger (1991) provide evidence from data on US banks that new RBC regulations outperformed old capital regulations from 1982 through 1989.

Using data from the Federal Reserve’s Call Reports, the authors compare banks’ capital ratios and RBC ratios to five measures of bank performance: income, standard deviation of income, non-performing loans, loan charge-offs and probability of failure.

Consistent with Avery and Berger (1991), the authors find banks’ risk-weighted assets to be significant predictors of their future performance and that RBC ratios outperform regular capital ratios as predictors of risk.

The study improves on Avery and Berger (1991) by using an updated data set from 2001 through 2011. The authors also discuss some potential limitations of this method of analysis.

This introduction summarizes each of the papers in Studies in Austrian Macroeconomics. It begins with a brief overview of the core ideas and development of modern Austrian macroeconomics, focusing on its theory of the business cycle. The papers are then discussed by parts, starting with the papers on Austrian monetary and business cycle theory, followed by those addressing the relationship between the US and Canadian economic performance, and concluding with the three papers on the political economy of regulation and crisis.

This paper investigates the impact of the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) merger in Australia on existing and potential clients of the new merged firm. From prior theory it is expected that some existing clients may have an incentive to switch away from a newly merged firm as the same larger firm now audits close competitors once audited by separate firms. Prior theory also suggests that another group of potential clients should be attracted to the newly merged firm where the merger enhances or creates industry specializations. The expectation is that in both of these instances there will be increased switching activity associated with the newly merged audit firm. Contrary to expectations, a significantly lower level of switching behaviour was observed for the newly merged firm compared with that of the other Big 5 firms, suggesting that an advantage of enhanced specialization may not be the attraction of new clients but the retention of existing clients. When comparing the nature of the switches, some support was found for the view that the switches to the new firm were likely to be in enhanced areas of specialization, but no evidence was found to suggest that close competitors would switch away from this firm. The greater rate of retention of clients compared with other Big 5 firms was not associated with a more competitive audit pricing policy.