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This study aims to test whether the attributes developed via qualitative or conceptual approaches link to the concept of luxury when measured using a quantitative approach. Given the critical role price has in the definition and identification of luxury products, this research measures whether the use of different attributes is exclusively associated with the highest price points in each category or whether there is some level of sharing with lower price points.

A total of 431 respondents sociodemographically representative of the Australian population were screened for familiarity with the category and then randomly assigned to one of three product categories (wine, spirits and perfume). Best–worst scaling was used to measure the associations between different attributes and the concept of luxury, while the pick-any method was used to measure the association of different attributes to different price points.

The findings are consistent across the three categories investigated, i.e. “premium quality”, “authentic/trustworthy brand” and “good brand reputation/status”, are much more associated with luxury than with regular brands. “Luxury”, “premium”, “antique/old vintage”, “limited production/edition” and “premium price” consistently cluster around the highest price point in each category, while the other attributes tested did not.

Despite the plethora of research about attributes associated with the luxury concept, this is the first study attempting to measure the size of the association. The consistency of the results across the three product categories is encouraging in terms of the generalisability of the results for future research.

Purpose – Institutional investors are facing increased pressure and threats of legislation from the European Union to abandon passive ownership strategies. This chapter investigates the legal prerequisites for active ownership among institutional investors in two Scandinavian countries to highlight differences in the legal framework that potentially account for apparent dissimilarities in the practice of shareholder activism.

Design/methodology/approach – Data on shareholder proposals from Danish and Swedish annual general meetings from 2006 throughout 2010 suggest that institutional investors are approximately a thousand times more active in Sweden than in Denmark.

Findings – The comparative study of the legal framework for shareholder activism shows diminutive legal distance in general, however, we find that the shareholder-based nomination committee employed in Sweden constitutes an exception. This is relevant, as such a setup transfers power from the board of directors to the owners. Presumably, this reduces the impact of free-rider and collective action problems, and increases the shareholders’ inclination to make proposals, which is also what we find. Moreover, we find other differences in the legal framework that support the transfer of power to the owners.

Research implications – We contribute to literature by investigating the importance of local governance mechanisms created by the legal framework – an area where research is scarce. The chapter discusses how two classical theoretical dilemmas – free-rider problems and collective action problems among shareholders – can be reduced by the implementation of local corporate governance elements.

Originality/value – The chapter outlines the actual practice of shareholder activism, in terms of proposals, in Denmark and Sweden, and highlights divergent legal elements which theoretically transfer power to the shareholders. Thus, regulators should be aware of the impact by local governance mechanisms, and how shareholders react under different legal prerequisites.

Purpose – This chapter introduces this book’s topics, purpose, and key themes. It summarizes the purpose of the book which is to explore through both descriptive and conceptual means the use of power by institutional investors in bringing about changes to corporate behavior, so that corporations engage in improved environmental, social, and governance actions.

Methodology/approach – This chapter reviews literature and chapters and offers conceptual development.

Findings – The forces driving the actions of institutional investors are different from many other shareholders being determined by a unique set of costs, benefits, and objectives. As such three general categories of institutional elements constrain and guide this behavior: regulative elements which include constitutions, laws, and property rights; normative elements which include informal norms, values, and codes of conduct; and cultural-cognitive elements which include shared beliefs, identities, and mental models. It highlights the role of regulation and “soft” law, the impact of values and customs, and the way sense-making and cognition impacts on decisions and actions.

Practical/social implications – The chapter highlights the interplay between hard and soft law in progressing the agenda. It seems that hard law is a hygiene factor forming the base on which initial gains can be made in the application of institutional shareholder power. Moreover, the use of soft law such as the Global Reporting Initiative and the newly founded Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, institutional investors can gain improved disclosure of sustainability performance to incorporate into their investment decisions. Moreover, it highlights the gaps in the use of the power that exists. The movement is still emerging with the focus on corporate governance and environmental considerations primarily. There are still improvements to be made for institutional investors in the social aspects of the responsibility agenda as well in pushing companies to be more transparent, improve reporting, and engage in more long-term decision-making.

Originality/value – The chapter contributes to the debate on governance convergence between liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). It is important to look beyond national characteristics alone and demonstrate that organizations, even though they are impacted by institutions, are not necessarily passive acceptors of their fate. Hence this chapter highlights that in expanding from a dyadic approach comparing LMEs and CMEs, the strategic choice of decision-makers, the power of the actors, and the processes used by institutional investors in changing corporate behavior are important considerations.