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Defaults in corporations, financial institutions and semipublic organizations have resulted in (corporate) governance Codes and Law provisions that aim to improve governance, risk management and policy making by executive and non-executive directors of involved boards in The Netherlands and across the globe. The aim of this chapter is to discuss how semipublic organizations deal with public interest and the contribution of multiple stakeholder team production theory (MSTP) to effectively deal with the issue of how to include interests of different stakeholders and the general public interest in the governance of and policy making by boards of semipublic organizations. This includes the identification, raising awareness and analysis of various interests and their implications.

The authors use a literature review and their own experience.

Based on our literature review and experience converging in a case study design, we hold that a semipublic organization’s exposure to public interests and how it deals with that will remain a critical issue.

We develop a research approach for dealing with stakeholders’ and the public interest and conclude that a governance perspective grounded in team production theory allows for a much better focused incorporation of possibly conflicting stakeholder interests, including public stakeholder interests and stakeholder commitment and cooperation than the dominant control perspective that is currently prevailing.

We contribute to the literature by arguing that the combined MSTP approach offers a pre-eminent approach to influence and shape board behaviour, an increased awareness of interests of different stakeholders coalescing in the public interest and an alternative, complementary view on decision-making by boards viewed as a team.

GUEST editor of this South African issue of THE LIBRARY WORLD is Hendrik M. Robinson, Director of Library Services, Transvaal Provincial Administration, Pretoria.

The paper seeks to analyze to what extent the contents of corporate governance codes of countries in the European Union are driven by external (internationally accepted corporate governance best practices) or domestic (institutions, culture, etc.) forces.

The paper compares the contents of codes with the priorities set by the European Commission with respect to modernising company law and enhancing corporate governance in the European Union.

The analysis shows that the majority of the codes of the European Union countries are not in full accordance with the priorities of the European Commission. This may reflect that codes are driven by both external and domestic forces. Whether there is a difference between Western European and Central and Eastern European countries in this respect is also investigated, but no difference, at least at the aggregate level of the codes of both groups of countries has been found.

The analysis excludes five (prospective) European Union members. The analysis does not provide a comprehensive overview of domestic determinants of why codes of individual countries diverge from the European Union communication. Future research should systematically explore whether and to what extent domestic forces are indeed determining the contents of codes and, if so, which country‐specific forces have an impact on establishing code contents.

This paper is the first comprehensive attempt to analyse the contents of corporate governance codes. Such an analysis is important to understand the underlying forces that shape the diffusion of codes and their contents.

The purpose of this paper is to compare and contrast the corporate governance standards of Cyprus, Russia, and Kazakhstan to those of the UK to facilitate investment decisions. The paper aims to discover governance gaps creating a potential for alignment to UK standards.

The paper is a qualitative case study of four countries based on the OECD criteria of 118 corporate governance measures.

The findings indicate that the corporate governance standards in Cyprus match 92 per cent of the UK standards, Russian standards match 75 per cent, and Kazakhstan ones 63 per cent. The greatest contrast to the UK standards were for Cyprus in the area of disclosure and transparency category, Russia's was in the area of responsibilities of the board, and Kazakhstan's was highest in the two areas mentioned above and low overall.

The paper identifies areas of governance that could be aligned to UK standards. Further research is needed to compare the governance standards of the countries studied to international standards other than those of the UK's.

The paper provides insight on governance for investors in the three countries and aids effective investment decisions.

The paper identifies areas of governance needing regulatory adjustment in the three countries and could influence government and industry policy.

The originality of the paper lies in identifying gaps in governance among the four countries. Thus the paper provides information for investors as to the corporate governance they are likely to experience, and facilitates development in governance regulation.