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This article seeks to examine approaches to combating the “scourge of international terrorism” by targeting the financial resources of terrorist organizations and their supporters.

The article begins with the disputed issue of how to define a “terrorist”, “terrorism”, “terrorist organizations” and “acts of terrorism”. In a global financial system, differences between the definitions of those terms could have significant implications because terrorists have the means and will to operate their financing infrastructure from the least effectively regulated jurisdictions. There are many methods by which terrorists finance both their organizations and specific attacks. By concentrating on three examples of recent terrorist activity, namely the 9/11 attacks in New York, the 7/7 bombings in London, and the transfer of funds from the “Union of Good” to Hamas to fund terrorist attacks in Israel by means of a certain charitable association, the article illustrates the problems facing legal regimes seeking to limit terrorist funding.

The article notes a broad convergence in the methods of those jurisdictions when combating the financing of terrorism.

The paper provides a discussion of financial resources of terrorism from a legal professional in an area where terrorism is a real danger.

The existing literature on Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has thus far focused on the group’s contemporary or previous financing activities. However, there has not been an analysis of the ways in which ISIS’ funding is likely to change moving forward now that it has come under international scrutiny. The purpose of this paper is to assess the ways in which ISIS’ funding is likely to evolve in the future and to also suggest methods for combating its financing activities.

The paper is theoretical in nature. By assessing the existing literature on terrorist financing, it is apparent that terrorist organizations alter their funding sources and methods after coming under intense international scrutiny. Therefore, two hypotheses are put forth for the future of ISIS’ funding activities: the group will become more effective at building social support among its local population, thereby consolidating is funding sources and methods within Syria and Iraq; and the group will increasingly branch out, searching for sources from a transnational network, as its base in Syria and Iraq begins to deteriorate.

Community support is essential for sustaining a terrorist network. As a result, it is likely that ISIS will increasingly seek funding from a transnational network as its base of support in Iraq and Syria begins to deteriorate. There is also a distinct third possibility that the group will be able to consolidate its base while also moving abroad for financial support. This third option presents the most complicated outcome for the international community in its fight against ISIS.

This study fills a gap in the literature on terrorist financing, particularly with regards to ISIS, to assist the international community in its fight against the group both now and moving into the future.

Terrorism finance (TF) has been aptly termed as the lifeblood of terrorism. TF provides funds for terrorist activities. Terrorists mobilize funds by using the formal banking system, informal value-transfer systems, hawalas, Hundis, and the oldest method of asset transfer. They may raise funds from legitimate sources, such as personal donations and profits from businesses and charitable organizations, as well as from criminal sources, like the drug trade, the smuggling of weapons and other goods, fraud, kidnapping, and extortion. Countering the financing of terrorism is a far greater challenge throughout the world. The objectives of the chapter are as follows: (1) to identify the different sources of terrorism financing, (2) to analyze various ways of moving terrorism funds globally, and (3) to examine the initiatives taken to counter terrorism financing.

The purpose of this paper is to give a better insight to the legal society, practitioners and legislators of the working mechanisms of money laundering activities, as well as the functionalities of the Anti‐Money Laundering and Anti‐terrorism Financing Act 2003 (AMLATFA) in Malaysia, in curbing money laundering and terrorism funding activities. At the same time, the paper provides an overview on the applicability and practicability of the enforcement mechanisms in Malaysia by exploring legislations from different jurisdictions that are more developed.

The paper achieves this by having a cross‐sectional analysis onto the legislation in Malaysia such as AMLATFA and also similar legislations found in countries such as the UK. A complete insight is further gained by having interviews with experts in the judiciary, Bank Negara, as well as the experts from the Attorney General's Chamber in Malaysia regarding their insight into the subject matter. Last but not least, the authors also surveyed into the different points of view from journal articles in Malaysia and globally.

Malaysia has a legal framework for curbing money laundering but the current AMLATFA provisions are considered to have failed to be effectively enforced. A more comprehensive, specific and well elaborated legal framework will have to be laid down in order to create a better platform for the prosecutors to bring a good case against these money launderers.

This paper will give a deeper insight to the legal society of the capability of AMLATFA and the lack of it, in curbing money laundering in Malaysia and, at the same time, creating awareness among policy makers of the difficulties faced by the enforcement bureaus in prosecuting these money launderers due to the lacunas in the current law.

This paper could be useful source of information for practitioners, academics, policymakers and students and a guide for any possible future amendments to the current insufficiency.

This paper aims to examine whether from a factual standpoint, it is sufficiently reasonable to address the suppression of terrorist financing by analogy with money laundering.

The process of terrorist financing will be examined in regard to the funding requirements of terrorists and the methods and tools that terrorists use to raise, move and store their funds. The process of money laundering will be compared with terrorist financing. The role of money laundering in terrorist financing will be discussed. In the core part of this paper, the assumptions justifying the inclusion of anti-money laundering measures to terrorist financing will be challenged.

What terrorist financing and money laundering share in common is money. However, there are fundamental differences between them with regard to the sources of funds and the direction of financial flows. None of the elements –“accumulation” and “legitimization”– involved in money laundering are necessarily engaged in the process of terrorist financing. This questions the authenticity of the assumptions which underlie the adopted approach. It also requires further investigation on the effectiveness of the integrated counter-terrorist regime, which will not be covered by this paper.

This paper provides a comprehensive introduction for those dealing with the greater question of whether the terrorist financing can and should be tackled by anti-money laundering measures.

The independence of India from the British Empire was marked by its partition into two countries, viz India and Pakistan. As a corollary to independence and partition of India, 500‐odd princely states which had direct relationship with the British Empire were required to integrate with either India or Pakistan — the successor states. The process of integration of princely states was not without its highs and lows. Some of the princely states, like Hyderabad, Junagarh and Jammu and Kashmir, posed quite a few problems at the time of integration for several reasons, namely the inclination of its rulers, the religious component of the local population and the competing interests of the two successor states, India and Pakistan. Hyderabad and Junagarh were favourably resolved in India's favour. Integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India was not a smooth affair. It was only after Pakistan‐aided forces including the Pakistan army had invaded Jammu and Kashmir that the then ruler of Jammu and Kashmir signed the instrument of accession in India's favour. With the instrument of accession, India had a locus standi to protect its territory in Jammu and Kashmir by military means. The salvage operation of throwing the Pakistan‐aided forces and Pakistan military out of Jammu and Kashmir could not be accomplished fully, because India agreed that the United Nations, to which the Kashmir dispute was to be referred, would help in the resolution of the Kashmir issue within the accepted legal framework which was in India's favour. However, India's experience with the United Nations was a great disappointment. In fact India had put so much faith in the United Nations that it even agreed to a plebiscite in Kashmir for resolving the dispute, subject to the condition that Pakistan vacated the illegally occupied areas of Jammu and Kashmir. India need not have agreed to a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir, but it did so because of its abiding faith in democratic principles, notwithstanding the legal framework on the basis of which the integration of other princely states with the successor states was carried out. To date, Pakistan has not vacated what is today called ‘Pakistan‐occupied Kashmir’. On top of that, in 1962 China gobbled up a large part of Kashmir in the north‐east, on the basis of a boundary dispute which it raised with India and which has yet to be resolved. To make matters still worse and more complicated, Pakistan ceded a part of Pakistan‐occupied territory to China. Thus the situation, as of today, is that 45.7 per cent of the 222,336 sq. km area of Jammu and Kashmir is with India, 35.1 per cent is with Pakistan and 19.2 per cent is with China. Apart from a war with China, two more full‐scale wars have been fought with Pakistan over Kashmir; the 1965 war, which was confined to the western theatre, and the 1971 war. The 1965 war was a short one and through the Soviet Union's mediation, an agreement was arrived at which was to no one's advantage and more or less restored the status quo ante. Following the 1971 war with Pakistan, India was in an advantageous position, because East Pakistan had ceded from West Pakistan and emerged as an independent country, the two‐nation theory to which Pakistan subscribed as the basis for partition of India into two successor states of India and Pakistan had been exploded; India had 90,000 Pakistan prisoners of war and it had also made large gains on the western front by occupying certain strategic positions. It was from this position of strength in 1971 that India decided that the Kashmir dispute had to be resolved bilaterally by India and Pakistan without any foreign intervention; a doctrine to which Pakistan subscribed at that point of time. In fact, India approached the bilateral talks between the two countries in a spirit of magnanimity. As a first step, India decided to return to Pakistan 90,000 prisoners of war. It agreed to a fresh demarcation of the Line of Control (including withdrawal from several strategic positions) on the unwritten understanding that this Line of Control, over a period of time, based on good neighbourly relations with Pakistan — supplemented by economic ties — would ultimately result in its becoming a de jure border from a de facto border with Pakistan; though the officially stated position continues to be that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. The 1971 agreement with Pakistan, which is also called the ‘Shimla Agreement’, thus constitutes the principal plank for the settlement of the Kashmir issue with Pakistan on a bilateral basis.

This paper aims to examine whether the money laundering/terrorist financing (ML/TF) model excludes important aspects of terrorist resourcing and whether the terrorist resourcing model (TRM) provides a more comprehensive framework for analysis.

Research consisted of case studies of resourcing activities of four listed terrorist organizations between 2001 and 2015: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hamas, a grouping of Al Qaeda-inspired individuals and entities under the heading “Al Qaeda inspired” and Hezbollah.

The most prevalent resourcing actors observed were non-profit organizations/associations, and the most prevalent form of resourcing was fundraising that targeted individual cash donations of small amounts. Funds were pooled, often passed through layers of charitable organizations and transmitted through chartered banks. The TRM is indeed found to provide a more comprehensive framework for identifying sources of resourcing and points of intervention. However, it does not in itself recommend effective means of response but it has implications for counter-resourcing strategies because it identifies resourcing actors and nodes where counter-resourcing could occur.

This paper advances the state of knowledge of terrorist resourcing activities in Canada and about the value of doing so through the analytical lens of the TRM as opposed to the predominant ML/TF model.

This study aims to investigate the Federal Government’s failure to combat money laundering and terrorism financing and the various hurdles to enforce the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2012 (as amended), effectively, which prohibits illegal earnings criminally induced investments in and out of Nigeria. This has had an impact on the country’s economic potential and its image in the international community. Despite many anti-corruption laws criminalising money laundering and terrorism financing, it is rated among the nations with the highest poverty index despite its immense natural resources.

This study uses a conceptual legal method to help a doctrinal library-based investigation by using existing material. This study also makes use of main and secondary legislation, such as the Constitution, the Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amended) Act 2012 and the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2013 (as amended), as well as case law, international conventions, textbooks and peer-reviewed publications. A comparison of anti-money laundering legislation in Canada, the UK, Hong Kong, China and Nigeria was conducted, with lessons learned for Nigeria’s anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing laws. According to the findings, the Act is silent on the criminal use of legitimate earnings to fund terrorism and cultism.

There is no well-defined legal framework for asset recovery and confiscation. In Nigeria’s legal system, this evident void must be addressed immediately. To supplement existing efforts to prevent money laundering, the research develops a hybrid model that incorporates the inputs of government representatives and civil society organisations. This study suggests a complete revision of the Act to eliminate ambiguity and focus on the goals of global anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist funding restrictions.

One of the limitations of this study is the paucity of literature and data on money laundering and terrorist financing in Nigeria due to the secrecy around the crimes, which do not give room for the collection of statistical data and due to the transactional nature of the crimes. This is not to submit that no attempts have been made in the past or recent times to quantify the global value of money laundering and its effects on Nigeria’s economy. Such attempts have been inconclusive and inaccurate.

The dearth of records on the magnitude of money laundering in Nigeria has limited generalising the research findings due to the limited access to some required information. However, this study is suitable for adoption in other sectors of the economy in dealing with clandestineness in money laundering and terrorism financing. Future researchers are commended to use the quantitative assessment method to appraise the effects of money laundering and terrorist financing laws and policies in Africa to supplement the current literature in the field.

The research develops a hybrid model that incorporates the inputs of government representatives and civil society organisations. This study suggests a complete revision of the Act to eliminate ambiguity and focus on the goals of global anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist funding restrictions.

This paper seeks to examine certain important aspects of the domestic laws of Nigeria, the UK, the USA and Canada with a view to pointing out the remarkable differences capable of affecting adversely the war on terror.

Analyses the domestic laws of all four countries with a view to pointing out the remarkable differences capable of affecting adversely the war on terror.

Despite the obvious zeal and commitment with which nations and states of the world have set out to wage a legal war on terrorism, particularly the aspect of financing it, and despite the existence of a convention of which they are members, serious disparity exists in the legal frameworks adopted for the war. Even amongst such countries as the UK, the USA and Canada, uniformity of laws and approach is still a far‐fetched idea, a situation that is capable of hurting the international collaboration against terror. There is an urgent need for closer affinity between the laws of such countries while even countries like Nigeria that may not presently consider themselves as serious targets of terrorism need to urgently shirk themselves of such impressions and reform their laws.

The paper makes suggestions as to how the differences in the laws of the four countries may be corrected or down played, and how the international objectives of uniformity of laws may be achieved.