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Article
Publication date: 10 April 2017

Tarun Kabiraj and Uday Bhanu Sinha

The purpose of this paper is to show that outsourcing can occur as outcome of a separating or pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium although it is not profitable under complete…

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Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to show that outsourcing can occur as outcome of a separating or pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium although it is not profitable under complete information. Therefore, asymmetric information can itself be a reason for outsourcing.

Design/methodology/approach

The present paper constructs a model of two firms interacting in the product market under asymmetric information where one firm has private information about its technological capability, and it has the option to produce inputs in-house or buy inputs from an input market. However, using outsourced inputs involves a fixed cost at the plant level. The model solves for perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Findings

There are situations when under complete information, outsourcing of the input will not occur, but, under incomplete information, either only the low-cost type or both high and low-cost types will go for outsourcing, and there always exist reasonable beliefs supporting these equilibria. In particular, when the fixed cost is neither too small not too large, a separating equilibrium occurs in which the low-cost type outsources inputs from the input market but the high-cost type produces in-house; hence, outsourcing signals the firm’s type. Outsourcing by only the high-cost type firm will never occur in equilibrium.

Originality/value

That incomplete or asymmetric information can itself be a reason for strategic outsourcing is never identified in the literature. The present paper is an attempt to fill this gap and raise the issue of outsourcing in an incomplete information environment.

Details

Indian Growth and Development Review, vol. 10 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1753-8254

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Article
Publication date: 25 September 2009

Manas Chaudhuri and Tarun Kabiraj

The purpose of this paper is to study the question of pre‐emptive merger decisions in a composite good framework where these goods have both competitive and complementary features.

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Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to study the question of pre‐emptive merger decisions in a composite good framework where these goods have both competitive and complementary features.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper constructs a model of partial mergers when there are three firms and three goods in the production network, but consumers need only two goods to complete their consumption. This means, two of the firms produce two competing brands while the other firm produces any complementary product. Then under vertical merger cooperation takes place between two firms producing mutually compatible or complementary goods, whereas horizontal integration occurs when cooperating firms produce goods substitutes to each other.

Findings

In such a framework, partial mergers inflict strong negative externalities on the outside firms. The paper shows that loss of profits to the non‐integrated firm is higher under horizontal integration than that under vertical integration; hence pre‐emptive incentives for vertical merger are always larger. The paper clearly distinguishes between private incentives and pre‐emptive incentives for merger. If so desired, the vertically merged firm could foreclose the market of the outside firm and emerge as monopoly. Interestingly, foreclosing in our model is never optimal. The paper also provides a welfare analysis. While all‐firm merger maximizes social welfare, under vertical merger consumers are always better off. Industry profit also goes up if the goods are not so close substitutes.

Originality/value

This appears to be the first paper that discusses the question of pre‐emptive mergers in a framework of composite goods. Since, in the structure presented a horizontal merger always reduces welfare, one implication of the result is that the antitrust authority should not remain indifferent to the forms of merger actually taking place in a country.

Details

Indian Growth and Development Review, vol. 2 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1753-8254

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