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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate whether or not lenders are environmentally liable by the simple act of lending money. The concept of “lender liability” is one of the more critical issues which seems to be ready to upset the “apple cart” of environmental calm, which the English law enjoyed until recently. Why should banks be held liable for pollution and clean-up costs? The banks’ responsibility should end when it has granted the loan to the borrower to carry out its commercial activities. It is argued that a lender who becomes involved in the borrower’s financial management is unlikely to incur a clean-up liability, but it will become liable to clean it up if it forecloses or takes possession of the land. Can the bank be regarded as the “owner” of the land? In some English statutes, there is no definition of the word “owner”. Does a mortgagee in possession entitle him to ownership of the property to hold him responsible for liabilities for environmental harm?

The development of domestic environmental liability and the Trans-Atlantic position with the USA will be examined. The “owner” concept will also be critically reviewed to see whether banks and mortgagees can be regarded as owners on possession of the property. The dilemma of the English courts with regards to lender issues and lender self-protection will also be examined. This will all be analysed and criticised in this paper.

This paper aims to demonstrate whether or not lenders are environmentally liable by the simple act of lending money. It will also discuss “owner” concept to see whether banks and mortgagees can be regarded as owners on possession of the property.

In this paper, the “owner” concept will be critically reviewed to see whether banks and mortgagees can be regarded as owners on possession of the property. The dilemma of the English courts with regards to lender issues and lender self-protection will also be critically analysed and compared with different legal systems.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss incongruities in the corporate entity over the matter of agency. In lieu of the traditional notion of moral agency theory, the stakeholder model offers congruent grounding to corporate governance. Socially irresponsible or unethical corporate activities are perceived to increase expenses, diminish shareholder value and tarnish business reputations. In contrast, socially responsible corporate practices contribute to positive attitudes to the company and contribute to the creation of competitive advantage.

This paper follows the ongoing evolution of the regulatory changes instituted after the scandalous corporate fiascos of the present century, such as those of Enron and WorldCom in the USA, Polly Peck in the UK, HIH Insurance and One.Tel in Australia, and Siemens in Germany, inter alia. The exposition also touches on the regulatory metamorphosis of corporate governance in its convergence towards “meta-regulation” with corporate social responsibility at the core.

While meta-regulation has so far worked in many countries, caution is expressed over the perils of over-reliance on a meta-regulatory approach. Industries or market sectors should also attempt to operate from the start within the confines of self-regulation and government regulation. Market sectors and industries need to find the framework of regulation that is best suited to their operations.

The paper concludes by discussing the observed challenges and implications of such convergence, as well as future directions for law practitioners, academics and researchers in the realm of corporate conduct.