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This paper examines the effect of fund manager replacement on investment performances of mutual funds. In managerial labor market of mutual fund industries with information asymmetry about the type and action of a fund manager, separating compensation may not be achievable due to imperfect evaluation of performances of fund managers. This paper extends contract theory to model the situations where a mutual fund offers pooling compensation contract to a fund manager based on his reputation. Under these environments, the fund manager has an economic incentive to acquire private benefit by manipulating performances and then to turn over to other mutual fund. Fund manager’s replacement is an aspect of adverse selection in the managerial labor market of fund industries. That is, a fund manager with low ability can select and manipulate unsuccessful investment portfolio generating loss to fund while he turns over to hide himself in the reputation under pooling contract mechanism. The empirical analysis of this paper provides the significant evidence that, differently from those of mutual funds of which managers stay in the same mutual funds, the fund performances drop after the fund managers turn over to other mutual funds. These empirical evidences support the theoretical prediction that the fund managers have incentive to manipulate short-term performances to maintain reputation for acquiring favorable compensation contracts.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the moderating effect of international trade on outside director system in Korean firms. The authors expected that Korean firms highly depending on international trade would mitigate the resource provision function of outside director system in order to reduce information asymmetry among global business partners. In addition, the authors tried to find out the functions of outside director system: the control function based on agency theory and resource provision function based on resource dependence theory.

The authors tested the hypotheses by Poisson regression with 2011 and 2002 Korean-listed manufacturing firms. The dependent variable is the number of excessively appointed outside directors and independent variable is CEO type: family CEO or professional CEO. The moderating variable is the dependency on international trade measured by export proportion out of total sales.

The authors found that not control but resource provision function was a main role of outside director system in Korean firms. The authors also found negative moderating effect of dependency on international trade, which means that firms highly depending on global market tended to consider outside director system as control function, namely “global standard.”

This paper is the leading study that tries to analyze empirically the relationship between international trade and the function of governance mechanism; outside director system in Korean firms. It also confirms that Korean firms adopted outside director system on the basis of the resource dependence theory.