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The purpose of this paper is to present a case study of a programme aimed at raising standards of care and levels of professionalism in private, drug-free therapeutic communities (TCs) in Santa Catarina, Brazil.

The paper describes the Reviver intervention in detail and draws on subjective insights collected during its implementation.

Over 100 TCs applied to the Reviver project, of which 83 qualified to participate. The large majority of TCs were found to combine community-as-method, religious worship and abstinence in their treatment model.

The paper highlights the significant role religious organisations have in the treating substance dependency in Brazil and raises ethical and practical questions regarding the incorporation of religious TCs into mainstream public mental health provision.

The paper outlines the qualification process, control systems and monitoring procedures employed by the Reviver project.

The paper attends to the gap in English language publications regarding TCs in Brazil and raises important questions regarding the role of religion, faith and spirituality in the treatment of substance dependency.

As public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become more widespread, doubts and criticisms about this type of infrastructural projects have emerged. The authors describe the PPP framework, discuss the financial structure and risk-sharing processes, and dissect the structure and organisation. The authors address the following questions: what are the main organisational characteristics of PPPs? How does the private sector structure and finance PPPs? And why and how are PPP contracts renegotiated? The paper aims to discuss these issues.

This paper draws on extensive theoretical and empirical research, which is presented in a literature overview on PPPs and their renegotiations. A comprehensive review is carried out and two case studies are developed to investigate the reasons behind success and failure of PPPs and the renegotiation of contracts.

Incomplete contracts and the long duration of concessions can bring uncertainty and change to PPPs. Joint decision making can be difficult due to different parties involved. Renegotiation outcomes tend to rely on the position of the government. In Fertagus, the private sector asked for financial help led to a very balanced agreement. Conversely, Lusoponte renegotiations were initiated by the government, which significantly changed the project. Instead of relying solely on commercial revenues, Lusoponte was substantial financed by public funds.

Incomplete contracts and the long duration of concessions bring about much uncertainty to PPPs. Ex post decision making in PPPs in the wake of changing risks is difficult as it necessarily involves negotiations between the public sector and the private firm. The paper shows that marked differences in renegotiation outcomes emerge. In one case study, the private sector asked for financial help and the negotiation outcome was a very balanced agreement. Conversely, renegotiations in a second case were initiated by the government mainly for political reasons, resulted in a significant change in the PPP’s structure, risk, financing, and returns, and yielded a large public losses.

Contrasting successful and unsuccessful PPPs enables the reader to examine the opportunities and pitfalls in case of PPP renegotiations, which frequently occur. He can gain insight in the determinants of negotiation outcomes and the importance of a governmental PPP entity as well as of an independent monitor such as a court of audits.

This paper should be useful for both academics and practitioners and should help increase the understanding of the several stages, structures, and renegotiation processes associated with PPPs.

The purpose of this study is to compare revenue guarantee programs in a build-operation-transfer project (BOT). Two types of revenue guarantee programs are formulated: a payment-based annual revenue guarantee program and a period-extension-based cumulative revenue guarantee program.

Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the real option approach. This method is applied to a toll road project in the Philippines wherein the expected payoffs of the government and the concessionaire are simulated over an evaluation period that includes the concession period. The condition under which the expected government return in one program is equal to that in the other program is shown. These programs are then evaluated by incorporating a project risk factor into the project return.

The results show that the cumulative revenue guarantee program is preferred to the annual revenue guarantee program. However, the optimal solution depends on the government's return-risk preference.

The simulation was implemented with limited cases of discrete input with respect to the cost-sharing parameter, the annual guarantee rate, and the guaranteed cumulative revenue. A simulation with more input values should be performed to achieve results that are more general and sophisticated.

It is indicated that the simple reduction of risk does not necessarily mean that government expected payoff will increase.

It is expected that this method contributes to the proper decisions made by the governments with respect to the choice of a revenue guarantee mechanism in BOT projects.