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This paper aims to examine the association between the types of mutual funds, i.e. active versus passive, and the level of earnings manipulation in companies that comprise their stock portfolios.

The authors use Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) classification of mutual funds by active share and tracking error volatility to differentiate between active and passive mutual funds. To assess the extent of earnings quality at portfolio companies, the authors measure accruals earnings management and real earnings management.

The authors find that the portfolio firms held by active fund managers exhibit lower levels of earnings manipulation. The inverse relationship between earnings management and fund holdings is more pronounced at higher levels of active share selection among concentrated active fund managers.

The degree to which earnings management influences mutual funds’ investment behavior has significant implications for the stability of the US stock market. Based on the findings that earnings management at portfolio companies serves as a potential instrument to guide funds’ investment decisions, future research would examine how these investment preferences exert price pressure (if any) on the stock of the portfolio companies. It would also help to ascertain whether the investment preferences of fund managers with respect to earnings management help to render the stock market more or less efficient.

This paper contributes to the understanding of how actively managed funds perform stock selection. Earnings manipulation leads to negative earnings quality that would inhibit stock performance over time. Active fund managers, who dynamically manage their exposures to systematic and stock-specific risks (in their attempt to outperform their benchmark index), target firms that manage earnings less to form part of their investment portfolios.

This paper proposes a framework to identify a pattern in the relationship between firms’ cost structure (i.e. fixed versus variable) and their volatility in stock returns.

Our empirical analysis is based on a panel data regression where we use an extended sample period and a time-series regression-based elasticity measure of operating leverage.

We document significantly higher systematic risk among firms with large fixed costs, a conclusion which confirms theoretical predictions of earlier studies. In new findings, we document high firm-specific risk and high stock return volatility among firms with a fixed cost structure.

The paper fills a gap in the literature by examining the effect of cost structure using various operating leverage measures and other control measures for firm characteristics on idiosyncratic risk. Studies that seek to explain firms’ systematic risks are numerous; conversely, there are relatively fewer studies on the determinants of firms’ specific risks.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the link between institutional ownership stability and dividend payout ratio.

First, the authors estimate the propensity of a firm to pay dividend. Next, the authors perform panel fixed-effect regressions of dividend payouts on institutional ownership stability variables. The authors also compare institutional ownership between dividend paying and non-dividend paying investee firms. The authors analyze the dividend preferences of different types of institutional owners. Finally, the authors examine the cross-sectional variation in the volatility of dividend payouts.

The authors find that stable and large institutional owners favor dividend paying companies. There also exists a positive association between ownership persistence and dividend payout. Conversely, firms that change their dividend payout frequently are associated with larger deviations in institutional ownership. Additionally, the presence of pressure-sensitive institutional investors (i.e. investors that also hold business ties with the investee firm) is significantly linked to dividend payout policy. Conversely, pressure-insensitive investors use alternative forms of monitoring instead of requiring investee firms to pay dividends, which serve to reduce agency conflicts.

This paper considers the preferences of long-term stable institutional investors in their selection of dividend paying firms.

This study aims to examine the ability of investors to process signs of real activities manipulations at bidder firms in the quarters leading to the announcement of a merger. It further provides a supplementary explanation for the post-merger underperformance puzzle.

Examining a sample of cash-only, stock swap and mixed mergers completed between 1980 and 2011, it was found that bidder firms increase the use of real activities manipulation in the quarters leading up to the merger announcements. Using average abnormal stock return method, it is shown that the short-term positive effect of real activities manipulation on share prices is stronger than accrual-based earnings management.

While bidders are able to escape investors’ scrutiny in the short run, it is not the case in the long run. It was found that bidders’ long-run stock performance, measured by matched buy-and-hold stock returns, is inversely related to their pre-announcement level of earnings management. This paper contributes to the literature on earnings management by considering how real activities manipulations affect stock prices in mergers and acquisitions.

This study tests whether real activities manipulation, in addition to accrual-based earnings management, explains the underperformance puzzle of the acquiring firms in M&As. Zang (2012) argues that there is a greater likelihood for firms to engage in real activities manipulation, especially when firms are constrained in their use of accrual-based earnings management owing to heightened scrutiny or overuse in prior years.

Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 404) requires auditors to attest to, and report on, management's assessment and effectiveness of the company's internal control systems. This paper aims to examine investor reaction to companies' announcements of new information technology (IT) or improved existing IT to satisfy requirements of Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002.

Using a sample of 124 SOX‐related IT announcements from 2003 to 2007, an event study measuring market reactions using average cumulative abnormal return is undertaken. Additionally, the cross‐sectional variation in the marketplace is analyzed to test the effect of firm‐specific factors on market responses.

The empirical results suggest that the stock market reacts favorably to corporations that invest in SOX 404‐related IT. The reaction is more favorable toward companies without prior reported internal control deficiencies/weaknesses. Additionally, the results marginally support the notion that firms with higher risk and poorer financial reporting quality can demonstrate their commitment to improve internal control over financial reporting by investing in IT for SOX 404 compliance.

The findings will influence companies' IT investment decisions, particularly IT decisions that are SOX Section 404‐related. Potential benefits of SOX 404 IT investments include favorable market returns. Additionally, the study contributes to a deeper understanding of SOX for standard‐setting and regulation bodies examining past rulings and preparing for future regulation.