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We set out, in this paper, to extend the Das and Sundaram (2000) model as a means of simultaneously considering correlated default risk structure and counter-party risk. The multinomial model established by Kamrad and Ritchken (1991) is subsequently modified in order to facilitate the development of a computational algorithm for valuing two types of active credit derivatives, credit-spread options and default baskets. From our numerical examples, we find that along with the correlated default risk, the existence of counter-party risk results in a substantially lower valuation of credit derivatives. In addition, we find that different settings of the term structure of interest rate volatility also have a significant impact on the value of credit derivatives.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the structure of both CEO and non-CEO executive compensation affects the overall risk of a firm. The author focuses on the interplay between CEO and non-CEO executive compensation structure.

The author uses a hand-collected pension-database that employs both OLS and two-stage least squares regressions to determine the effects of inside debt on default risk using the distance-to-default framework. The database consists of 8,965 executive-year data points from 272 firms.

This paper accomplishes three major objectives: first, the author presents a significant extension of Sundaram and Yermack (2007) by including non-CEO executives; the author demonstrates how the differences in inside debt between CEO and non-CEO executives are directly related to firm risk; and that funding these pensions via a Rabbi Trust eliminates most of the risk-shifting effects. Firms with the lowest compensation leverage gap between CEO and non-CEO executives were most likely to observe the agency costs associated with high executive leverage. When compensation leverage structures were substantially different, or the pension was pre-funded, these effects are neutralized.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, the first paper addresses the effects of Rabbi Trusts on risk-shifting behavior between both CEOs and non-CEO executives. Further, the author extends Sundaram and Yermack (2007) using a hand-collected database six times larger than the original paper. By focusing on the “leverage gap” between CEOs and non-CEO executives, the author presents unique evidence that underlines the risk dynamics between CEOs and their boards.

This paper aims to examine jointly the CEO inside debt and firm debt to further investigate the compensation incentives on risky decision-making and the resulting financial policy decisions concerning the debt structure of the firm.

Using S&P 1500 data from CRSP, Compustat, Execucomp and Capital IQ between 2006 and 2011, statistical analysis and regression models are used to determine potential correlations between the variable of interest, inside debt and debt control variables, including specialization.

Firms with high inside debt specialize in commercial loans and drawn credit lines. Larger firms diversify their debt holdings among commercial instruments and senior bonds. As firm size increases with inside debt, the effects are counteracted. Larger firms with high CEO inside debt have lower interest rates on these debt instruments and shorter maturities, suggesting a more conservative financing policy with regards to debt.

Debt diversification is partially affected by compensation in the form of inside debt. Future studies of debt diversification should include CEO compensation controls.

For struggling companies or for those that want to return to a conservative financial policy, they can influence the CEO to make this decision by deferring his compensation to retirement.

This paper considers debt policy through the lens of a key decision maker, the CEO, and uses compensation as an incentive to determine what choices are made concerning debt.

This study aims to reduce the interfacial tension by increasing the better adhesion between different immiscible polymers phases and also to evaluate the mechanical, thermal and thermo-mechanical behavior of the immiscible polymer blends.

The polymer blend composite (PBC) was prepared using a twin-screw extruder followed by injection molding. Two different kinds of PBC with compatibilizer (Ethylene-n-Butylacrylate-Glycidyl methacrylate) of varying compositions like polybutylene terephthalate + poly trimethylene terephthalate and polybutylene terephthalate (30% glass filled) + poly trimethylene terephthalate were prepared and material behavior at various test conditions were studied. The effect of glass fiber reinforcement on polymer blend and the interlocking effect by the compatibilizer between the polymer phases were also assessed.

Mechanical behavior of PBC was estimated by tensile, flexural and angular impact tests. Likewise, the thermal deflection was studied with the help of heat deflection temperature test. Thermo-mechanical behavior likes storage modulus, loss modulus and loss tangent were studied using the dynamic mechanical analysis test. Morphological analysis was characterized using field emission scanning electron microscopy.

This in turn makes the process easy to obtain the PBC having inherent mechanical, thermal and thermo-mechanically stable. And, it also enhances the mechanical properties like tensile, flexural and impact strength. Simultaneously, posse’s excellent heat deflection and thermo-mechanical behavior over a temperature range of 35–140ºC at a constant frequency of 5 Hz.

Digital transformation is essential for commercial banks to maintain long-term competitiveness in the digital economy era. This study aims to investigate the relationship between inside debt and the bank's digital transformation.

This study set up a quasi-natural experiment based on implementing the executive compensation deferral system in the Chinese banking industry. Using the annual panel data of 180 commercial banks in China from 2007 to 2021, this study employed the difference-in-differences (DID) method to conduct an empirical analysis.

This study confirms a significant statistical relationship between inside debt and the bank's digital transformation, and managerial myopia is the transmission channel of inside debt affecting the bank's digital transformation. Furthermore, the development of Internet finance and the enhancement of bankers' confidence will improve the contributions of inside debt to the bank's digital transformation.

This study contributes to the literature on inside debt and the bank's digital transformation. It has specific policy value for the scientific design of the banking compensation mechanism and accelerating banks' digital transformation.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between CEOs' inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage of the firms they manage, with the aim to examine whether CEO incentives play a role in corporate risk-taking.

The authors investigate the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (CIDH) (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and the operating leverage (DOL) of the firms they manage. Using a sample of 11,145 US firm-year observations over the period 2006–2017, the authors find a strong negative association between CIDH and DOL. Additional analyses reveal that the relationship between CIDH and DOL is more pronounced in firms with heightened agency issues, powerful CEOs and for CEOs with stronger professional networks. The results are robust to various sensitivity and endogeneity tests.

The authors find strong evidence confirming the expected negative association between CEO inside debt and DOL suggesting that firms with higher inside debt tend to maintain lower levels of operating leverage. These findings continue to hold with the alternative measure for the inside debt and operating leverage, and across a range of tests designed to rule out the possibility that the primary findings are in any way driven by potential endogeneity. In addition, the findings demonstrate that the presence of manager-shareholder agency conflicts can strengthen the inside debt–DOL relationship suggesting the strong role of inside debt in reducing firm risk.

Findings in this paper have implications for design of compensation structures so that corporate boards can establish incentives as a tool for risk management. A limitation of this study is that it is focused on one market, i.e. US listed companies, so the findings may not be applicable on a global scale.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that links firm-level management of operating leverage through design of CEO inside debt incentives (two obvious choices for risk-reduction at the CEOs’ disposal include reducing financial risk through reduction of firm leverage and reducing operating risk through reduction of operating leverage). While use of firm leverage as an instrument of choice has been explored in the past, use of operating leverage to achieve risk reduction when CEO possess high inside holding, has received very little attention.

The authors extend the recent research using the risk component of human resource’s (HR’s) compensation plans to examine the effects of risk components on two strategic outcomes: within-firm temporal change, or strategic variation, and firm strategic divergence from the industry, or strategic deviation. In addition, the authors examine the role of previous financial performance as a boundary moderator condition of the effects of risk components in the compensation plan and firm strategic outcomes.

To examine the effects of low- and high-risk components of executive compensation on strategic variation and deviation over time, the authors collected data from 2,510 companies listed in the Standard and Poor’s 500 index in a panel data format of a 12-year period. The authors gathered financial and other firm-level data from COMPUSTAT, and executive compensation and executive-level data from ExecuComp.

The findings support the main effects of risk components on strategic change, while both high- and low-risk components act on strategic deviation contingent on the moderating role of total shareholder return (TSR). In the theoretical framework, the authors test the moderating role of total shareholder return (TSR) as a boundary condition of the effects of risk components in the compensation plan. In doing so, the authors provide a fine-grained understanding of the influence of compensation plan risk components on outcomes proximal to executives, such as the maintenance of the status quo and the search for financial gains.

New studies can explore a three-way moderating effect on performance indicators, such as TSR, Tobin’s Q and return on asset. The authors addressed this limitation and did a comparative analysis, but the authors did not include additional moderating mechanisms in these interactive effects.

By disaggregating the executive’s compensation based on the risk components, boards of directors can mitigate any possible unwanted biases in the relationship between principal and agent.

By considering the influence of both low- and high-risk components of compensation plans on strategic outcomes –instead of firm performance – this study expands strategy literature supporting the influence of compensation schema on a firm’s outcomes. This path is new because it offers a moderating perspective to understand the strategic deviations and changes that chief executive officers imprint in their firms.

Los autores amplían la investigación reciente usando el componente de riesgo de los planes de compensación de RH para examinar los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en dos resultados estratégicos: cambio temporal dentro de la empresa, o variación estratégica, y divergencia estratégica de la empresa de la industria, o desviación estratégica. Además, examinamos el papel del desempeño financiero anterior como una condición moderadora límite de los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en el plan de compensación y los resultados estratégicos de la empresa.

Para examinar los efectos de los componentes de alto y bajo riesgo de la compensación ejecutiva en la variación y desviación estratégica a lo largo del tiempo, recopilamos datos de 2510 empresas que figuran en el índice Standard & Poor's 500 en un formato de datos de panel de un período de 12 años. Los autores recopilaron datos financieros y de otro tipo a nivel de empresa de COMPUSTAT, y compensación de ejecutivos, y datos a nivel ejecutivo de EXECUCOMP.

Nuestros hallazgos respaldan los efectos principales de los componentes de riesgo en el cambio estratégico, mientras que los componentes de alto y bajo riesgo actúan sobre la desviación estratégica dependiendo del papel moderador del rendimiento total del accionista. En el marco teórico, los autores prueban el papel moderador del Retorno Total del Accionista como condición límite de los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en el plan de compensación. Al hacerlo, brindamos una comprensión detallada de la influencia de los componentes de riesgo del plan de compensación en los resultados próximos a los ejecutivos, como el mantenimiento del statu quo y la búsqueda de ganancias financieras.

al considerar la influencia de los componentes de bajo y alto riesgo de los planes de compensación en los resultados estratégicos, en lugar del desempeño de la empresa, este estudio amplía la literatura de estrategia que respalda la influencia del esquema de compensación en los resultados de una empresa. Este camino es nuevo porque ofrece una perspectiva moderadora para entender las desviaciones y cambios estratégicos que los CEOs imprimen en sus firmas.

los nuevos estudios pueden explorar un efecto moderador de tres vías en los indicadores de rendimiento, como TSR, Tobin's Q y ROA. Abordamos esta limitación e hicimos un análisis comparativo, pero no incluimos mecanismos moderadores adicionales en estos efectos interactivos.

al desagregar la compensación del ejecutivo en función de los componentes de riesgo, las juntas directivas pueden mitigar cualquier posible sesgo no deseado en la relación entre el principal y el agente.

Os autores estendem a pesquisa recente usando o componente de risco dos planos de remuneração de RH para examinar os efeitos dos componentes de risco em dois resultados estratégicos: mudança temporal dentro da empresa, ou variação estratégica, e divergência estratégica da empresa do setor, ou desvio estratégico. Além disso, examinamos o papel do desempenho financeiro anterior como uma condição moderadora dos efeitos dos componentes de risco no plano de remuneração e nos resultados estratégicos da empresa.

Para examinar os efeitos dos componentes de baixo e alto risco da remuneração executiva na variação e desvio estratégico ao longo do tempo, coletamos dados de 2.510 empresas listadas no índice Standard & Poor's 500 em um formato de dados de painel de um período de 12 anos. Os autores coletaram dados financeiros e de outros níveis da empresa da COMPUSTAT, remuneração executiva e dados de nível executivo da EXECUCOMP.

Nossos resultados suportam os principais efeitos dos componentes de risco na mudança estratégica, enquanto os componentes de alto e baixo risco atuam no desvio estratégico contingente ao papel moderador do Retorno Total ao Acionista. No referencial teórico, os autores testam o papel moderador do Total Shareholder Return como condição limite dos efeitos dos componentes de risco no plano de remuneração. Ao fazer isso, fornecemos uma compreensão refinada da influência dos componentes de risco do plano de remuneração nos resultados próximos aos executivos, como a manutenção do status quo e a busca por ganhos financeiros.

ao considerar a influência dos componentes de baixo e alto risco dos planos de remuneração nos resultados estratégicos -em vez do desempenho da empresa- este estudo expande a literatura de estratégia que apoia a influência do esquema de remuneração nos resultados de uma empresa. Esse caminho é novo porque oferece uma perspectiva moderadora para entender os desvios e mudanças estratégicas que os CEOs imprimem em suas empresas.

Novos estudos podem explorar um efeito moderador de três vias em indicadores de desempenho, como TSR, Q de Tobin e ROA. Abordamos essa limitação e fizemos uma análise comparativa, mas não incluímos mecanismos moderadores adicionais nesses efeitos interativos.

Ao desagregar a remuneração do executivo com base nos componentes de risco, os conselhos de administração podem mitigar possíveis vieses indesejados na relação entre principal e agente.

This study examines the association between chief executive officer (CEO) gender and the readability of annual reports by considering some demographic attributes of female CEOs.

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used to test the research hypotheses on a sample of S&P 500 firms between 2004 and 2016.

The results show that female CEOs are significantly positively associated with the readability of 10-K reports – in line with ethical-sensitivity theory. Further results show that this association is variable depending on the demographic attributes of female CEOs – in line with upper echelon theory. Specifically, older female CEOs and those with financial expertise are significantly associated with more readable 10-K reports. In contrast, female CEOs hired from within the firm are negatively associated with the readability of 10-K.

This study provides evidence on the effect of female CEOs and their demographic attributes on annual report readability, which was not addressed in prior research.

The findings show that the appointment of female CEOs seems like a helpful avenue to reduce concerns among the regulators about the textual complexity of annual reports. However, the most important policy implication of the study is that the decision to appoint female CEOs should be based more on their demographic attributes than on gender equality recommendations and full trust in women's behavioral consequences.

This study contributes to the academic literature on readability and gender. Prior research has not clarified which attributes and skills of female CEOs drive their abilities to improve shareholder value and make more ethical decisions. This study suggests that female CEOs are not better “per se” to improve corporate governance practices, and the impacts of female CEOs are not the same and differ according to their demographic attributes.

Recently, Stein et al. (2016) studied theoretical properties and parameter estimation of continuous time processes derived as solutions of a generalized Langevin equation (GLE). In this paper, the authors extend the model to a wider class of memory kernels and then propose a bond and bond option valuation model based on the extension of the generalized Langevin process of Stein et al. (2016).

Bond and bond option pricing based on the proposed interest rate models presents new difficulties as the standard partial differential equation method of stochastic calculus for bond pricing cannot be used directly. The authors obtain bond and bond option prices by finding the closed form expression of the conditional characteristic function of the integrated short rate process driven by a general Lévy noise.

The authors obtain zero-coupon default-free bond and bond option prices for short rate models driven by a variety of Lévy processes, which include Vasicek model and the short rate model obtained by solving a second-order Langevin stochastic differential equation (SDE) as special cases.

Bond and bond option pricing plays an important role in capital markets and risk management. In this paper, the authors derive closed form expressions for bond and bond option prices for a wider class of interest rate models including second-order SDE models. Closed form expressions may be especially instrumental in facilitating parameter estimation in these models.