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The existence of controlling shareholders creates a remarkable difference between the corporate governance structures of Chinese firms and those of western firms. Despite the increasing importance of controlling shareholders, it remains disputable whether they are playing the “tunneling” roles or the “governance” roles. Therefore, more research is needed on what roles controlling shareholders are playing and how they play their roles. Previous empirical studies document a common phenomenon that directors play dual roles both on the board and in the top management team. Because of information asymmetry, the board of directors may not be able to perform its supervisory and strategic decision-making functions. Therefore, this paper aims to investigate whether controlling shareholders participate in firm management by appointing the executive directors and examine the economic consequences of controlling shareholder involvement.

In the empirical tests, the authors use the split share structure reform in China as a natural experiment. Using the data from Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2015 and difference-in-differences analysis, the authors examine the impact of the split share structure reform on the executive directors of controlling shareholders and the governance effect of controlling shareholders’ appointing executive directors to the management.

The authors find that controlling shareholders get involved in firm management by appointing executive directors to strengthen the supervision and incentives of managers. The authors also find that firms exhibit a lower level of earnings management and enhance and higher pay-performance sensitivity after controlling shareholders appoint executive directors to the top management team.

As the natural experiment of the split share structure reform enables us to mitigate endogeneity, the authors investigate the channels through, which controlling shareholders get involved in firm management from the unique perspective of executive director appointment. The study expands the literature on corporate governance and board functions. The findings provide new insights to the effect of controlling shareholder governance and casts light on a new way for controlling shareholders of Chinese firms to participate in firm management – by appointing executive directors.

Luxury consumption in China is featured by clear conspicuous purposes. The purpose of this paper is to investigate this phenomenon from the indigenous perspective of face consciousness.

Drawing on Ho’s (1976) framework of gaining vs losing face process, the authors decomposed the construct of face consciousness into two dimensions, namely, desire to gain face and fear of losing face, and developed a multi-dimensional scale for face consciousness. Then, a survey that consisted of 338 participants was conducted to test the relationship between face consciousness and luxury consumption.

The face consciousness scale was shown to be reliable and valid. Furthermore, the authors found both desire to gain face and fear of losing face had a unique contribution in explaining why Chinese consumers purchase luxury products.

This paper fills the gap in the extant literature by developing a multi-dimensional face consciousness scale, providing convenience for empirical research in future. Moreover, this research shows that Chinese consumers’ luxury consumption behavior contains both promotion and prevention motivation.

This paper aims to examine the internal logical relationship between two intergenerational inheritance ways of passing property rights and residual control rights (RCR) and to construct a conceptual model comprising transfer elements, paths and timing of succession in this process.

Driven by the cases of Haixin, Tianyijiao and Changhe Group, this paper applies research methods of copying and expanding analysis logic, progressive deduction, content analysis and comparative research based on the perspective of HeXie theory to explore the deep interrelation of transfer elements, paths and timing during family business succession.

The findings present that the content of intergenerational inheritance of a family firm is the inheritance of property rights and RCR. First, the inheritance of property rights is a static inheritance of time-point delivery, whereas the inheritance of RCR is a dynamic inheritance process for a period of time. Second, the inheritance of property rights and RCR are not independent; only a “HeXie” succession of both rights can realize a successful inheritance of family firms.

This paper constructs the paths and timing model of intergenerational inheritance of property rights and RCR in family firms. This paper integrates the current literature studies on the family inheritance of property rights and RCR and explains their internal mechanisms. This paper also provides a theoretical foundation and empirical evidence for family business transitions in the business world.