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Stephen Heard graduated from the University of Rhode Island in 1970 with a degree in business administration. He started his career by signing up as a management trainee at Woolworth℉s Department Store in Wellesley, Massachusetts. It didn℉t take him long to realize he missed his calling: being by the Rhode Island shoreline and employed in the fishing industry. Nearly 35 years later, Stephen is a self-made multimillionaire, having followed both his passion for entrepreneurship and for living his life on the Atlantic coast.

The unjustifiable claims made by manufacturers of a certain class with regard to their products are frequently of a startling character, such claims often being so utterly absurd that in the case of educated persons they serve not to recommend the puffed goods, but rather to hold up the manufacturer who makes such statements to ridicule. False claims and false allegations are always made with one object in view, namely, to obtain money by taking advantage of public ignorance. There are two distinct kinds of false claims and allegations: they may either be unfair and unjustifiable with regard to the properties, uses, and value of the article, or, what is far worse, they may be entirely false allegations as to the purity and genuineness of the product. With regard to the latter practice it is difficult to find words of condemnation sufficiently strong. The manufacturer not only sells an adulterated and inferior article, but boldly makes a statement to the public to the effect that the article is pure and genuine. It is unpardonable that men who claim to be honourable men of commerce should make such statements, knowing full well that the manufacture of the article consists in a process of adulteration. The effect of these malpractices is not only to gull the public, but to cause the manufacturer of products which are really genuine and of good quality to suffer severely. To any reasonable mind it is quite evident that really good and genuine products cannot be sold to compete in price with articles which, despite the strong claims that may be made for them, are inferior and often worthless. The unscrupulous manufacturer is putting money into his own pocket to which he has no right, and which in reality belongs to those who have suffered as the result of dishonest competition.

At the commencement of this decade, leaving behind the “striking seventies”, we christened it the “anxious eighties”, for there was a profound disquiet and uncertainty among most of the population, a fear that things were going to get worse, but they could have hardly expected the catastrophic events of the year 1981. The criteria of quality of life are its richness, grace, elegance; by the promise it contains; inspiration and purpose, hope, determination (to survive, to make certain that the evildoer is not permitted to succeed), love of one's country — pro patria, of other days.

THE other day my attention was arrested by a statement from one of our younger critics. “Mr. Auden,” he said, “makes Mr. Yeats's isolation guilty as a trance.” Not a particularly earth‐shaking statement, perhaps; but, when one thinks of it, a startling and significant one. I had not thought to live to see Mr. Yeats receiving the public sneer. Only a year or two ago Mr. Yeats was the doyen, the inerrable loadstar, of the young poets. Of all the older school of living poets, him alone they delighted to honour. They guffawed at Sir William Watson; spoke with amused irony of Laurence Binyon's epics; and the very mention of Alfred Noyes's name was enough to send them off into explosions of fierce anger. But Mr. Yeats was—Mr. Yeats. They found in him profundity, marvellous technical skill, flexibility of outlook, nobleness of aspiration. His reputation appeared to be solid and deep‐founded. And then came his anthology of modern verse, in which Mr. Yeats, with more enthusiasm than discretion, admitted a host of the young poets to the O.U.P.'s pantheon of fame. The book was a bad one—inexplicably bad for a man of Mr. Yeats's eminence. Even his reputation could not stand the strain of such a performance. “If,” argued the young, “Mr. Yeats's judgment is so ludicrously bad, how can it be that he is a good poet?” A strange dualism, they remarked: fine creativeness, weak critical sense. Then there were whispers. Was Mr. Yeats really so—? Could it be possible that—? The doubts grew. The young critics took courage from each other. The loadstar was dimming a little. And now Mr. Dylan Thomas has come into the open. Mr. Yeats's isolation is as guilty as a trance. The meaning is not very clear, but the implication is. “Isolation” is a bogey to the younger school. Once let Mr. Yeats be labelled with that dreadful word and he is as good as damned. Mr. Thomas will be listened to, for the intestinal raptures of his poetry are much admired. I foresee that in a year or so Mr. Yeats's prestige among the young will lose much of its impressiveness.

Service robots are expected to become increasingly common, but the ways in which they can move around in an environment with humans, collect and store data about humans and share such data produce a potential for privacy violations. In human-to-human contexts, such violations are transgression of norms to which humans typically react negatively. This study examines if similar reactions occur when the transgressor is a robot. The main dependent variable was the overall evaluation of the robot.

Service robot privacy violations were manipulated in a between-subjects experiment in which a human user interacted with an embodied humanoid robot in an office environment.

The results show that the robot's violations of human privacy attenuated the overall evaluation of the robot and that this effect was sequentially mediated by perceived robot morality and perceived robot humanness. Given that a similar reaction pattern would be expected when humans violate other humans' privacy, the present study offers evidence in support of the notion that humanlike non-humans can elicit responses similar to those elicited by real humans.

The results imply that designers of service robots and managers in firms using such robots for providing service to employees should be concerned with restricting the potential for robots' privacy violation activities if the goal is to increase the acceptance of service robots in the habitat of humans.

To date, few empirical studies have examined reactions to service robots that violate privacy norms.

The Dictionary of National Biography (or DNB as it is commonly called and as it will be referred to in this paper) is a classic. Depending on whether a library owns an original edition published by Smith, Elder and Company or a reprint edition published by Oxford University Press, sixty‐three brown volumes or twenty‐two blue volumes and supplements loom bulkily from the shelves. It would be an odd, ill‐trained reference librarian, historian, or scholar of English literature who has never heard of the DNB, let alone used and perused it. But mere bulk does not explain the lasting fame and staying power of this reference work, whose first volume appeared in January 1885 over a century ago.

On March 9, 1998, the elected University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign (UIUC) Senate, the governing body of the campus elected from its faculty and students, voted 97 to 29 in favor of the resolution,The University Administration and Board of Trustees immediately retire Chief Illiniwek and discontinue licensing Native American Indian symbols as representations of the University.At that meeting, the voices of students and faculty were heard, a supporting petition signed by more than 700 faculty was presented to then Chancellor Michael Aiken, and data from 10 other institutions were presented and attested that those colleges and universities did not experience any diminution in gift-giving as a consequence of retiring their Indian mascots. It seemed the retirement of Chief Illiniwek and the end to the use of Native American imagery in the UIUC sports program would be imminent. No one, certainly not me, thought it would take another ten years before the mascotry ended. During that prolonged interim, I requested and was granted permission to speak to the University Board of Trustees during the mandated Open Intake session of their meetings. The following represents the texts of my messages, which by Board policy needed to be confined to 5 minutes, and which by practice were never responded to.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.