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This paper aims to examine the link between the corporate social responsibility (CSR) communication efforts of companies and their ability to obtain public procurement contracts.

The authors are exploiting a database with the number of public procurement contracts won by SBF 120 companies in France and a constructed CSR index over the period of 2007–2015. The authors provide estimates of the amount of public contracts won by those companies.

The results suggest a striking influence of CSR communication on the ability of firms to win contracts.

This study focused on the case of the SBF 120 companies under the French regulatory system and European directives, which are different from the obligations in North American countries. Second, our constructed CSR index may be too simplistic in nature, and its application is limited only to the French context. Third, we do not have any evidence about the efficiency of well-ranked firms in our study. CSR reporting is still considered to be a form of communication, even if formal, that can contain information that does not especially reflect reality, as the scandals of several companies have shown in recent years (e.g. Volkswagen, Eiffage, Enron).

Companies should consider Business-to-Government (B-to-G) market when investing in CSR actions.

This is one of the first empirical studies measuring the impact of CSR on the ability of companies to win public contracts.

This case study can help the reader to understand how to build an effective board for family business, and why evolving board structure can help family firm to sustain for a longer period in Market. Reader can also learn about role of independent director, CEO's Succession process and ways to deal with duality issue that family owned enterprise may face during a transition from generation X to Y.

This teaching case study describes various decision-making situations using example of a Pakistani family firm and entrepreneurs who started the business few decades back in France. This partially disguised case is based on actual events. The data are collected based on discussions with family business owners and minutes of meetings. The objective of study is to make sense of the family business theories e.g. socio emotional wealth stakeholder and agency. Case readers can also learn about the family’s business governance practices using diverse scenarios presented in this case.

This study is suitable for graduate and undergraduate studies.

Teaching Notes are available for educators only. Please contact your library to gain login details or email support@emeraldinsight.com to request teaching notes.

CSS 7: Management science.

There exists a tremendous number of studies in strategy and management journals concerning contracting issues between private firms. Those studies are usually grounded in competing theoretical frameworks such as transaction cost economics, the resource-based view of the firm, incentive and agency theories and few others. However, very few studies, especially in those reviews (this is also true to a lesser extent in economic journals), are concerned with the issue of contracting between private firm and government. This is particularly surprising since existing theoretical frameworks qualified to tackle contracting strategies between private firms can also provide insights into issues related to contracting with government.

To assess the impact of TCE on the field of strategy, we first quantified the distribution of TCE-related research articles across all disciplines and fields. Specifically, we identified every article that appeared in a journal included in the Institute for Scientific Information's (ISI's) Web of Knowledge between 1975 and 2008 and that included among its keywords some variation of “transaction costs.” We then removed those articles for which this term clearly did not refer to transaction costs of the Coasean kind (primarily articles in finance and computing, for which “transaction cost” has a different meaning). Finally, we categorized each journal according to its discipline or field. Granted, this requires some judgment, but we attempted to be objective in our categorizations.¹ As Table 1 shows, articles that are self-described as part of the TCE research stream have appeared more frequently in strategy journals than in the journals of any other discipline or field. We interpret this as evidence of TCE's impact on strategy, and of the importance of the strategy field to TCE.

In many countries that allow unsolicited proposals (USPs) for public–private partnership (PPP) projects, incentives are awarded to the initial proponent of the USP projects during the tendering process as rewards for initially making a proposal. Because of such a reward system, including the bonus system, USPs are commonly known to involve fewer tender participants. This paper aims to investigate the empirical relationship between the number of tender participants and the institutional factors of PPPs. Specifically, two institutional factors are examined: the use of USPs and the bonus system for initial USP proponents.

The ordinary least squares (OLS) and Poisson regression analysis is used in this study to analyze PPP data in South Korea.

This paper demonstrated that USP projects have fewer bidders participating in tenders than solicited projects. Meanwhile, the analysis showed that the bonus system as another component of the institutional framework did not account for the number of bidders in tendering. In the analysis by three different facility types (“Roads,” “Environmental facilities” and “Other” types) of whether the bonus system discouraged participation in the bidding, the authors found heterogeneous responses among the types. For “Roads” and “Other” types of projects, the existence of the bonus system reduced the number of bidders for USP projects, while for “Environmental facilities,” there was no negative relationship between bonus points and the number of bidders. In the analysis of whether there were fewer bidders when no bonus points were awarded, there was no statistically significant difference in the number of bidders for “Roads” and “Environmental facilities.”

This study shows the possibility that other institutional factors apart from bonus points affect competition. The characteristic factors of USPs can affect the decision to participate in the tender from the perspective of potential bidders.

Recent studies on USPs have mainly focused on the strategies that ensure the effective management of USPs for PPP implementation. However, quantitative effects of USPs on the tendering process have not yet been addressed. The quantitative effect refers to something that may be estimated by quantity or that relates to the describing or measuring of quantity, such as the present attempt to account for the number of bidders.