Stephen Mark Rosenbaum, Stephan Billinger, Daniel Kwabena Twerefou and Wakeel Atanda Isola
The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of income inequality on cooperative propensities, and thus the ability of individuals to resolve collective action dilemmas.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of income inequality on cooperative propensities, and thus the ability of individuals to resolve collective action dilemmas.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper presents a meta-study of 32 developing country lab experiments correlating cooperative behaviour with prevailing Gini coefficients. Furthermore, the paper conducts standard dictator- and public goods game (PGG) experiments with culturally and demographically similar subject pools in two West African countries characterized by high and persistent variation in national income inequality.
Findings
The meta-study findings of a significant negative relationship between income inequality and contribution levels in the PGG are corroborated by the own laboratory experimental findings that participants in more unequal Nigeria are significantly less altruistic and exhibit significantly lower propensities to cooperate than their more egalitarian Ghanaian counterparts. Moreover, the latter findings are robust when controlling for personal income levels.
Practical implications
The findings have nontrivial implications for collective action theorists and practitioners seeking to elicit tacit cooperation in developing countries.
Originality/value
The major contributions of this paper are the novel meta-analysis and the first attempt to examine the influence of personal income levels on cooperative behaviour in societies characterized by differential levels of income inequality.
Details
Keywords
Stephen Mark Rosenbaum, Stephan Billinger and Nils Stieglitz
Corruption has traditionally been associated with an absence of pro-social norms such as trust and altruism. This paper challenges this view by examining market corruption �…
Abstract
Purpose
Corruption has traditionally been associated with an absence of pro-social norms such as trust and altruism. This paper challenges this view by examining market corruption – one-shot exchange transactions between strangers in the shadow of the law. The paper aims to propose that in the absence of repeat interactions and legal remedies to prevent contractual violations, acts of market corruption will require strong norms of generalized trust and altruism. As such, pro-social norms facilitate, rather than mitigate, market corruption.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper utilizes meta-analysis to examine the relationship between pro-social behavior in economic experiments and prevailing corruption levels.
Findings
The results from meta-analyses of both trust- and dictator game experiments show positive, significant relationships between pro-social norms and prevailing corruption levels.
Research limitations/implications
The findings of the paper suggest the need for further research into the relationship between societal norms and different types of corruption.
Practical implications
Policymakers should be wary about attempting to combat corruption through bottom-up policies designed to strengthen pro-social norms. Such policies may be counter-productive in that they are likely to provide the breeding ground for more acts of market corruption.
Originality/value
Conventional wisdom suggests a negative association between pro-social norms and corruption levels. The paper proposes that the relationship is not that simple. Indeed, the meta-study findings suggest the reverse relationship in the case of petty (market) corruption.