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The purpose of this paper is to examine the short horizon stock behavior following large price shocks in the Indian stock market.

The author followed the methodology developed by Pritamani and Singhal (2001) to the short horizon stock behavior following large price shocks. Multivariate regression has also been used to test the robustness of the evidenced results.

The abnormal return following large one-day price changes were not found to be important. However, large price one-day changes, conditioned with volume, evidenced significant reversals and momentum over the following 20-day period. Large price changes accompanied by low volume exhibited significant reversals and suggests significant economic profits. The large price changes accompanied by high volume exhibited continuations.

Large price changes accompanied by low volume exhibited significant reversals and suggested significant economic profits. The large price changes with high volume exhibited continuations. The contrarian strategy of buying low-volume one-day losers and selling one-day winners produced significant short horizon economic profits in the Indian stock market directly contradicting the efficient market hypothesis and has behavioral implications.

In this paper, the author has unearthed significant simple profitable trading strategies based on reversals and continuation following large one-day price changes with potential for significant economic profits.

This paper provides a practical framework for profitable trading strategies based on reversals and continuation following large one-day price changes with a potential for significant economic profits. The analysis of short horizon stock behavior following large price shocks conditional on volume based on the chosen methodology has not been attempted so far in the Indian stock market.

There is growing empirical evidence in context of the developed countries that greater tax aggressiveness of companies is associated with higher incentives to their executives. However, the same cannot be extended to emerging economies like India due to their distinct compensation practices. The present study, therefore, aims to bridge this gap by exploring the relationship between executive compensation and corporate tax aggressiveness in context of the Indian economy.

The sample comprises a subset of the S&P BSE 500 Index companies for FY 2014–15 through 2018–19. A fixed effects panel model has been used to discern the impact of executive compensation on corporate tax aggressiveness with and without the moderating effect of a proxy for corporate governance strength.

The econometric analysis evinces a significant negative impact of the fixed executive compensation on tax aggressiveness, specifically with the moderation of corporate governance strength which was found to have a positive effect on the said relation. In addition, no significant relationship was observed between variable compensation and tax aggressiveness. These results were robust to an alternate specification of the corporate governance strength proxy as well as the system generalised method of moments estimation employed to deal with endogeneity.

The study provides insights on a poor interest alignment between shareholders and managers in India owing to an insignificant amount of variable pay in the total executive compensation.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between gray directors (non-executive non-independent directors) and executive compensation among companies listed in India’s National Stock Exchange (NSE). The paper also examines the possible interplay of relationships between controlling shareholder duality (controlling shareholder being the CEO), ownership category and executive compensation.

A sample of 438 firms listed in the NSE of India was studied using data spanning five financial years, 2012–2013 to 2016–2017.

Empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive association between the proportion of gray directors on the board and executive compensation. The sensitivity of executive compensation to gray directors is found to be higher among family controlled firms. This research has also found that CEOs who belong to controlling shareholder groups received higher pay than professional CEOs. The authors conjecture that these results suggest cronyism and may contribute to lower levels of corporate governance practices in the country.

The hybrid board structure, which India has adopted with the desire to bring the best of Anglo Saxon and Japanese board philosophies, has paradoxically led to self-serving boards. Exploration of alternative thinking to bring about changes in the regulatory framework is, therefore, necessary.

Serious problems are identified with the philosophy behind board composition mandated by Listing Requirements for Indian firms with empirical evidence showing how the existing rules generate cronyism and unfairness to minority shareholders.