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The purpose of this paper is to explore the long-run economic structure and economic policy consequences of wide-spread blockchain adoption.

The approach uses institutional, organisational and evolutionary economic theory to predict consequences of blockchain innovation for economic structure (dehierarchicalisation) and then to further predict the effect of that structural change on the demand for economic policy.

The paper makes two key predictions. First, that blockchain adoption will cause both market disintermediation and organisational dehierarchicalisation. And second, that these structural changes will unwind some of the rationale for economic policy developed through the twentieth century that sought to control the effects of market power and organisational hierarchy.

The core implication that the theoretical prediction made in this paper is that wide-spread blockchain technology adoption could reduce the need for counter-veiling economic policy, and therefore limiting the role of government.

The paper takes a standard prediction made about blockchain adoption, namely disintermediation (or growth of markets), and extends it to point out that the same effect will occur to organisations. It then notes that much of the rationale for economic policy, and especially industry and regulatory policy through the twentieth century was justified in order to control economic power created by hierarchical organisations. The surprising implication, then, is that blockchain adoption weakens the rationale for such economic policy. This reveals the long-run relationship between digital technological innovation and the regulatory state.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how Chinese firms’ ownership structure is related to their effective tax rate. The People’s Republic of China provides an interesting environment to examine the corporate income tax. Government has significant ownership stakes in the for-profit economy and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are liable to the corporate income tax. This is very different to most other economies where SOE tends to dominate the not-for-profit economy and pays no corporate income tax. Government ownership also varies between the central government and local government in addition to state asset management bureaus. This provides a rich institutional background to examining the corporate income tax.

A panel data analysis approach is used to examine relationship between ownership structure and effective tax rates of all public firms in China from 1999 to 2009.

The authors report that effective tax rates do appear to vary across the ownership types, but that SOEs pay a statistically higher effective tax rate than to non-state-owned. In addition, local government owned SOE pay higher effective tax rates than central government and SAMB owned SOE. The authors also investigate Zimmerman’s (1983) political cost hypothesis. Unfortunately, these results are econometrically fragile with the statistical significance of those results varying by empirical technique.

This paper provides insight into government ownership and taxation in China.

The purpose of this paper is to: first, test if information-adjusted noise model (IANM) can be applied in China; second, quantify noise trader risk, overreaction, underreaction and information pricing errors in that market; and third, explain the relationship between noise trader risk and return.

The authors use a behavioural asset pricing model (BAPM), CAPM, the information-adjusted noise model and model proposed by Ramiah and Davidson (2010).

The findings show that noise traders are active 99.7 per cent of the time on the Shenzhen A-share market. Furthermore, our results suggest that the Shenzhen market overreacts 41 per cent of the time, underreacts 18 per cent of the time and information pricing errors occur 40 per cent of the time.

Various methods have been applied to the Chinese stock market in an effort to measure noise trading activities and all of them failed to account for information arrival. Our study uses a superior and alternative model to detect noise trader risk, overreaction and underreaction in China.

We investigate the effect standard time series β‐adjustments have on the OLS‐β. We report that most changes are not statistically significant and the β‐adjustments appear to have no relationship to the extent of thin trading. Researchers using β face the difficult choice of using an estimate known to be biased by thin trading, or making an adjustment that may not be statistically significant.

It is commonly believed that banks are in special need of regulation to prevent financial crises, and the recent sub-prime crisis would tend to support such views. Yet it is clear that a series of perverse incentives exist in the banking industry. Incentives for bankers to take on too much risk lead to financial crises, and then a lack of a bankruptcy process for large financial institutions lead to massive taxpayer bail-outs. This chapter canvasses the issues surrounding the sub-prime crisis and explores arguments relating to regulation and the political economy of the recent crisis. As long as the political cost-benefit of having inefficient banking regulation dominates an economic cost-benefit of having efficient regulation, we can expect that perverse incentives will remain and financial crises will be a regular feature of the economic landscape.

International banking refers to the activities of providing financial services (banking) to clients (both institutional and individual) located in many different countries. This encompasses a wide range of activities, including transactions with foreigners and domestic residents relating to deposits and lending in domestic and foreign currencies, facilitating foreign currency transactions and foreign exchange risk hedging, participating in international loan syndications, and facilitating international trade finance for clients.