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The purpose of this paper is to examine – using crime script analysis – the practical effectiveness of internationally endorsed and universally recognised counter-terrorism financing (CTF) standards in preventing the movement of money for the purposes of terrorism. The paper does not seek to examine the originating circumstances of terrorist finances or how laundered value is assigned.

Preliminary evaluation focuses on the discrepancies between the practices of money laundering and terrorist financing. Following an introduction to crime scripts, internationally endorsed anti money laundering (AML)/CTF practices are discussed to identify the process used to trace, prevent and limit money laundering and terrorist financing. Several terrorist financing case studies are then aligned to the process of crime script analysis to determine whether existing AML/CTF practices are effective in preventing terrorist financing.

The AML model “Placement, layering, integration” is only relevant to CTF in the comparatively rare cases when the origin of the money is crime. This creates a false sense of security through over reliance on AML/CTF for CTF purposes. A crime script approach can be applied to terrorist finance, but it is currently hindered by insufficient reporting of low level financing of terrorists, their addresses and associates. Law enforcement make insufficient use of financial intelligence – as a routine practice – in their crime and terrorist investigations; they have not adopted parallel investigation as a routine approach and consequently remain largely unconnected with the AML/CTF regime.

Utilising terrorist financing case studies, this paper identifies that existing AML/CTF international standards and practices are not adequate for controlling the movement of funds for financing terrorism because of the lack of focus on a specific script that aligns to known terrorist finance methodologies. While the paper identifies that existing AML/CTF international standards are thorough, the process underpinning the financing of terrorism is too dissimilar to the process of money laundering, namely, placement, layering, and integration, to support practices associated with terrorism prevention and detection.

This paper provides an examination of the practicalities behind the countering of terrorist financing from a compliance and investigative perspective. The paper is of interest to those involved in policy, compliance and investigations associated with terrorist financing.

Few articles have been published on counter‐terrorist finance (CTF) policies in the UK and fewer still have attempted to evaluate their effectiveness. This paper seeks to examine both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the UK's CTF policies from open‐source materials and in doing so considers the credibility of many of the claims by those who have attempted to evaluate their effectiveness in light of the data gathered.

The paper presents an analysis of the UK's CTF regime.

There have been just over 100 convictions under terrorism legislation offence in Great Britain alone since 11 September 2001 resulting in at least ten individuals being convicted of a CTF offence. In terms of assets frozen or seized, Robinson appears to have a point when he argued that: “when you look closely at those frozen assets, you discover that most of them have been unfrozen”, given the tens of millions of pounds returned to the Afghan Government.

This paper will be of interest to academics, politicians, practitioners interested in the use of CTF policies.

Countries with high levels of corruption can experience collusion between powerful elites and accountants to conceal, disguise and clean the proceeds of criminality. This study investigates the willingness of accountants to report evidence of money laundering in an emerging economy, Iran, notwithstanding potential personal and professional risks implicit in such due diligence. It evaluates the relevance of personal characteristics of accountants to the propensity to report, and the implications for policy makers in terms of audit team composition.

The methodology is quantitative. Data was gathered by means of a suspicious activity scenario-based questionnaire administered to 1,128 of Certified Public Accountants in Iran, of which 281 responses were received. Four hypotheses were tested relating to the implications, if any, of gender, age, education and working experience for the propensity to report red flags indicative of money laundering.

Data revealed that accountants were generally more willing to report activity indicative of money laundering than was anticipated in an environment perceived to be characterised by professional and personal risks. Older accountants are more risk averse and more likely to report suspicious activity than younger counterparts who tend to disregard borderline indicators of money laundering. A significant red flag indicator of money laundering is a client's reluctance to provide information regarding controlling shareholders, debtors and creditors or to explain contrived and opaque corporate structures. Audit teams may be more effective when gender-balanced: female accountants tend to be more willing to report suspicious activity than male counterparts, reducing the risk of interference by powerful elites.

The time frame over which the research was conducted was a single year; if it had been conducted over several years it may have revealed more nuanced and evolving reporting behaviour. The study was limited to Iran: a cross-comparison with another emerging economy or economies may have revealed useful contrasts.

The study contributes to behavioural accounting research in emerging economies. Limited empirical data is available regarding the influence of personal characteristics of accountants on their willingness to report suspicious activity in corrupt environments where personal safety and professional security may be at risk from powerful elites. It evaluates the implications of these for suspicious activity reporting policy, and for improving the effectiveness of the scrutineering role of audit teams. An innovative questionnaire was designed which may be suitable for future comparable research in emerging economies.

This paper aims to explore the evolution of the law for combating economic crimes including money laundering in Tanzania and explore the current developments in the anti-money laundering (AML) law and the ongoing fight against these crimes in Tanzania.

A desk-based review of documents on money laundering and its control in Tanzania was conducted. The paper presents qualitative data from the documentary sources. It applies the doctrinal legal research approach to examine, analyze and describe the AML law applicable in Tanzania. The paper uses the “law-in-context” research approach to explore some non-law aspects of money laundering in Tanzania and interrogate how the law addresses non-law dimensions of money laundering. Policy documents and media reports were analyzed. The thematic data analysis technique was applied, which involved identifying, describing and reporting issues according to the themes emerging from the data.

The AML law in Tanzania emerged from the law that was originally enacted to curb economic crimes. The law has evolved for some decades. Its evolution has been driven by domestic factors and foreign drivers which are political, economic and social in nature. The role of the AML law has been changing. Initially, the law was a tool for curbing economic crimes. Recently, the law has acquired a new role, namely, to facilitate the recovery of illicit funds and non-financial assets from offenders and enable the authorities in Tanzania to use those economic resources for developmental purposes.

The paper underscores the need for the Government of Tanzania to re-consider the broader implications involved in its current efforts to tackle economic crimes and money laundering. The balance between the implementation of the measures to combat money laundering and economic crimes in Tanzania and the importance of protecting rights of persons indicted with those offences should be struck. The AML law should be applied in such a way not to infringe the rights of the accused persons and not to throttle economic activities including the flow of legitimate foreign investments into Tanzania.

This paper generates insightful information to policymakers, law enforcers, regulators and other stakeholders who undertake activities to tackle money laundering and its control in Tanzania and researchers who study these issues for purposes of providing understanding of the problem and facilitating policy and legal reforms. The paper raises issues that can be explored further in future and contribute to the discourse on money laundering and its control in Tanzania.