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This paper aims to investigate the combined effect of two interventions, perspective taking and incentives, on auditors’ professional skepticism (hereafter skepticism) when auditing complex estimates. Specifically, this paper examines the different ways that perspective taking (management versus inspector) and incentives (absent versus reward versus penalty) combine to impact skepticism.

This paper uses an experiment with 177 experienced Big 4 auditors. The experiment used a 2 (management vs inspector perspective) × 3 (absent vs reward vs penalty incentives) between-subjects design.

In the absence of incentives, adopting a management perspective raises situational skepticism when measuring skepticism as appropriateness of management’s fair value estimate while adopting an inspector perspective raises situational skepticism when measuring skepticism as need for more evidence. The authors find some evidence that incentives complement perspective-taking by enhancing those aspects of skepticism for which perspective-taking performs poorly. When assessing management assumptions, auditors adopting an inspector perspective enhance their skepticism more substantially than those adopting a management perspective, and this enhancement is greater with rewards than with penalties. However, this study does not detect an interaction between incentive type and perspective-taking on auditor skepticism in relation to gathering additional evidence.

This paper extends the literature by shifting the focus from a single perspective to a comparison of two perspective-taking approaches and discusses how each of these approaches enhances different aspects of skepticism. This paper also illustrates the importance of the interplay between perspective-taking and incentives in enhancing auditor skepticism.

This paper uses a probit model to analyse 100 observations in terms of three hypotheses about the formation of owners’ corporations in high‐density private housing estates in Hong Kong within the context of Mancur Olson’s group theory. The findings do not reject the theory, revealing that it is more likely for an older urban estate with fewer owners to form owners’ corporations. The discussion includes a brief introduction to Olson’s group theory and the development of the probit analysis. Some speculative thoughts about public participation in local level urban management and planning are offered in the conclusion.

The purposes of this paper are 1) to develop model of long term financial health for logistics companies in Thailand 2) to identify factors that determine long term financial stability. Many researchers currently provide factors affecting financial health. Most factors refer to financial ratios, not many non-financial ratios such as age and size have been mentioned. This paper considers both financial and non-financial ratios that affect financial performance of Logistics companies in Thailand. The study has covered some interesting non-financial ratios such as Nationality of Shareholders, type of network in Logistics Company, growth rate (consisted of sales growth rate/profit growth rate/asset growth rate / Liability growth rate) and variable of growth rates. The target group is 110 logistics companies in Thailand enlisted from Department of International Trade Promotion Ministry of Commerce, Royal Thai Government. The group is divided into three categories according to financial health of company; Healthy financial, Unhealthy (Distress) and normal situation. The Multidiscriminant Analysis (MDA) is applied to analyze the differentiations among the three categories. Significant variables from MDA will be used as the independent variables for Multimonial Logistic Regression Analysis (MLRA) to identify factors that determine long terms financial stability. This paper find CF/D, RE/TA, BE/TL, Size, Age, Type of network, Nationality of Shareholders and Number of Shareholders are significant factors determine long term financial stability of Logistics company in Thailand.