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The low success rate of megaprojects stems from the opportunism triggered by uncertainty. Developing trust between participants is an effective means to reduce uncertainty, but this process is inevitably affected by contracts. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of uncertainty on participants’ opportunism in megaprojects and the effect of trust on reducing uncertainty. At the same time, the moderating effects of contractual control are tested.

This research classifies trust into competence-based trust and goodwill-based trust and categorizes uncertainty into environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty. Partial least squares structural equation modeling is used to test the hypotheses based on data collected from 172 respondents.

The results show a positive correlation between the two types of uncertainty and opportunism. For the governance of uncertainty, competence-based trust can reduce environmental uncertainty, but it is ineffective for behavioral uncertainty, and goodwill-based trust has a significant effect on both types of uncertainty. The test of moderating effects shows that contractual control strengthens the effect of competence-based trust but weakens the effect of goodwill-based trust, which means that contractual control complements competence-based trust and substitutes for goodwill-based trust.

This research enriches the theory of megaproject management. First, it validates the role of competence-based trust and goodwill-based trust in reducing the different types of uncertainty in megaprojects. Second, this study clarifies the substitution or complementarity between contractual control and different dimensions of trust in the context of high uncertainty, which provides a comprehensive answer to prior research inconsistencies on contractual control and trust.

For practice, this research provides some implications for megaproject management. First, project managers should recognize that the match between trust and project uncertainty is key to the success of megaproject governance. For example, some megaprojects involve many organizations, and there are many difficulties in behavioral supervision and performance appraisal. Therefore, developing goodwill-based trust between participants through positive interactions is an effective means to reduce the behavioral uncertainty of all participants and to curb opportunistic behaviors.

This research validated the role of competence-based trust and goodwill-based trust in reducing the different types of uncertainty in megaprojects. Furthermore, it clarifies the substitution or complementarity between contractual control and different dimensions of trust in the context of high uncertainty, which provides a comprehensive answer to prior research inconsistencies on contractual control and trust.

This study identifies three main CSR motivations (i.e. strategic benefits, altruism and greenwashing) and explores the relationship between CSR motivations and environmental collaboration by considering the mediating role of environmental commitment and the moderating role of team autonomy.

The data collected from 336 respondents in the construction industry, structural equation modeling and bootstrapping were used to test hypotheses.

The findings show that altruistic CSR enhances environmental collaboration through enhancing environmental commitment, whereas greenwashing CSR damages environmental collaboration through reducing environmental commitment. Although there is no direct association between strategic CSR and environmental collaboration, environmental commitment mediates the effects of strategic CSR on environmental collaboration. Moreover, the positive effect of strategic CSR and altruistic CSR on environment commitment is stronger when team autonomy is stronger, whereas the negative effect of greenwashing CSR on environment commitment is weaker when team autonomy is stronger.

The findings contribute to the understanding of how CSR motivations can act as catalysts for collaborative efforts in addressing environmental issues within construction projects and offer theoretical understanding of team autonomy by illustrating its role in shaping organizational responses to CSR motivations. The findings can provide insights into why and how participating teams can collaborate better on environmental management, enriching the knowledge of environmental management practices in construction projects.

The purpose of this paper is to study the mechanisms governing dynamic changes in relational and contractual governance at different stages of government-funded mega construction projects (MCPs) by studying their different effects on project performance and participants’ opportunism.

Partial least squares structural equation modeling was used to test eight hypotheses based on data collected from 147 respondents in different participating organizations in Chinese MCPs.

First, contractual governance has a stronger positive impact on project performance than relational governance in the early stage of MCPs, while relational governance exerts more positive effects on project performance than contractual governance in the middle and late stages. Second, opportunism is a mediator variable between governance mechanisms and project performance, and relational governance is more effective than contractual governance in restricting opportunism.

In contrast to a static analysis of project governance mechanisms, this study examines dynamic changes in the governance mechanisms of MCPs in the Chinese context by considering the mediating role of opportunism as well as guanxi as an element of relational governance, thus filling in gaps in the literature on MCP governance and contributing to the development of MCP management theory.