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The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between executive perquisite consumption and indicators of corporate governance after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) expanded the disclosure requirements related to perquisites.

This study uses ordinary least squares and Tobit regressions to examine the dollar value of perquisites consumed, the number of perquisites consumed and the types of perquisites consumed.

The analysis shows that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to award perquisites to executives. Firms characterized as being more prone to the presence of agency problems are associated with greater levels of perquisite consumption. Finally, there is evidence that not all perquisite consumptions can be attributed to an agency problem. Efficiently operating firms are associated with greater levels of perquisite consumption as are larger firms.

The authors examine firms in the period immediately after the SEC initiated the expanded disclosures. This may limit the generalizability of the results to other exchange-listed firms that changed their perquisite policy as a result of the rule change.

The paper extends the literature on corporate governance and mandatory corporate disclosure by investigating the association between corporate governance characteristics and perquisite consumption. This paper examines this relation immediately after the SEC expanded the disclosures surrounding perquisites to provide the public with more transparent disclosures.

Corporate finance is under attack. Commentators mention that corporate managers have enriched themselves and shareholders, and in the process have failed to consider the interests of all stakeholders (Hennessy, 1989, Alkhafaji, 1989, Newton, 1989, Dunfee, 1989, Steidlmeier, 1989, Jones and Hunt, 1991). They cite the active corporate control market that produced hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and corporate restructuring activity, all presumably causing a reduction in social welfare. This view is now beginning to permeate itself into the financial education debate. For example, Hawley (1991) suggests that financial educators are abdicating their responsibility of helping prepare corporate managers to recognize and deal with business ethics‐social responsibility effectively. Hawley proposes that the shareholder wealth maximization model for corporate management rationalizes the commission of unethical or socially irresponsible actions. Because of this ongoing criticism being levied against the practice of corporate finance, financial educators are now moving to incorporate ethics in the finance curricula. Although this move may be welcomed, we suggest that financial educators proceed with caution.

Extant literature identifies board composition and the market for takeovers as two important measures for controlling the agency problem associated with top management. This study tests the substitution hypothesis that outside directors on the board and the effectiveness of takeover markets are substitutes for each other. This is done by first identifying a group of states that are characterized as weak takeover markets on the basis of their state takeover statutes. It is then shown that for a sample of firms in these states the stock markets react negatively to the election of an insider to the board, while no significant reaction is noted when an outsider is elected to the board. These results suggest that the election of an insider to the board signals a reduction in the monitoring power of the board over top management. We interpret this result as consistent with the substitution hypothesis.