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Taking an inter-Asian perspective on the perception of China’s rise and power shifts in Asia, this reflection draws on the examples of Hong Kong’s years-long pro-democracy movement, Taiwan’s democratization and India’s anti-China sentiments to discuss the growth of domestic and international discontents against China’s projection of sharp power, even military power, along its peripheries. The severity of these crises suggests that an assertive China has trapped itself in a perpetual cycle of intensifying authoritarian rule at home and seeking expansionary outreach abroad. China’s diplomatic and military adventurism is likely to antagonize potential allies, jeopardizing the hope for inter-Asian solidarity and cooperation.

The authors consult relevant secondary literature to contextualize the perception of China’s rise to domination from an inter-Asian perspective.

Following the end of the Cold War in 1990 and the demise of the Soviet Union as a Eurasian empire, some cultural theorists proposed a postcolonial, inter-Asian perspective to de-globalize the Euro-American-dominated humanities and social sciences, recognizing that many areas once deemed by the West as marginal and peripheral had contributed to the transformation of the modern world. The nineteenth-century Western imperialists and early twentieth-century Japanese militarists once deployed the geopolitical concept of “Asia” to advance their respective discourses of modernity and progress. Thus, the very notion of Asian solidarity or Pan-Asianism is deeply problematic because it reminds us of the entwined histories of colonial oppression and resistance against imperialistic intrusions.

The conventional “inter-Asian” perspective that emphasizes relational connectedness across and within nations does not seem applicable to explaining the troublesome relationship between American universalism and China-centric authoritarianism.

In today’s multipolar world, the USA and China are embroiled in a competitive relationship regarding the shape the global order should take. The recent US-China trade war is only the opening shot in the wider bilateral conflict. Behind this contest for global leadership in economic influence and technology is a serious battle of ideas.

China is still coming to terms with many unexpected consequences of globalization. Steady recovery gave China a temporary reprieve but the overall economy has weakened due to many years of trade disputes with the USA and the COVID-19 pandemic. China has yet to find a way to coexist with a fast-developing India, address the genuine grievances and demands for democratic change in Hong Kong and accommodate a stronger pro-independence force in Taiwan. To revive the vision of inter-Asian solidarity, China should build trust at home and abroad and reimagine institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution. Otherwise, it would trap itself in endless cycles of tensions and conflicts that benefit no one.

The rapid rise of China to power in the Eurasian continent and Asian waters has not only distorted the inter-Asian vision of seeking unity among postcolonial states but also accelerated competitions for territorial resources and regional dominance. By reflecting on the latest interventions of China in geopolitical affairs, this paper shows that despite the rhetorical appeal of horizontality, the engagement of many emerging Asian powers has diverged from the ideal of inter-Asian cooperation. The task for scholars is to gain a more accurate understanding of the fluid situations on the ground.

This introductory essay historicizes the evolution of China’s geopolitical strategy from the Maoist era (1949–1976) to the present. It examines the Chinese strategic thinking in four spatial settings: Eurasia, maritime Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the wider Indo-Pacific region. The Chinese strategic concerns are comparable across these regions, but the ability to pursue security interests is contingent on many circumstantial factors. This study refers to some snapshots of the ongoing regional disputes to discuss the continuities and breakpoints in China’s strategic outreach in a multipolar world.

This study draws on the scholarly literature and policy papers to examine the interrelated forces that shape China’s rise to regional dominance: how Beijing has co-opted a series of global and regional crises for its rise to domination; how China, the USA and neighbouring countries have adjusted and adapted to a new changing international order; and how major powers in littoral and maritime Asia respond to an increasingly assertive Chinese state.

This study documents the combination of smart, soft and sharp power that China has deployed, since the global financial crisis of 2008, to enforce its dominance against the USA across the Pacific Rim and Eurasia. It argues that General Secretary of the Chinese Communist PartyXi Jinping initially launched the Belt and Road Initiative to respond to former US President Barak Obama’s policy of rebalancing Asia, and he has expanded these expansionary projects to counter US President Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine, thereby asserting Chinese influence abroad and tightening control against discontented populations at home.

Many Western policy analysts are wondering whether a rising China will be a “status quo” state or a revisionist state that attempts to challenge the existing world order. The lack of clarification from Beijing has prompted Washington to shift from a longstanding strategy of diplomatic engagement to that of geostrategic containment to balance against China.

The strategic goals of China in the early 21st century pertain to security reassurance, access to energy resources and national image building. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, China has become immensely confident of its own socio-economic accomplishments and scornful of what it perceives as an American conspiracy to undermine its rise to power. Following in the footsteps of the USA in the post-Second World War era, Japan in the 1980s and Taiwan in the 1990s, Beijing has used international commercial activities and business contracts to achieve specific political, strategic and diplomatic objectives.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the significance of skewness in maximizing the investor utility using the daily data for eight sectors listed on the National Stock Exchange of India.

The analysis is carried out in three different steps. In the first part, the author analyzes the monthly stock returns and the important financial ratios – price-to-book (PB) ratio, price-earnings (PE) ratio and dividend yield (DY). Second, the author tests the sector-wise return predictability using Westerlund and Narayan (2012) flexible generalized least squares estimator. Third, the author compares the mean–variance–skewness (MVS) utility function with the mean–variance (MV) utility function.

The author forecasts the sectoral stock returns using three financial ratios – PB ratio, PE ratio and DY – as predictors. The results indicate that sectoral stock returns are significantly predicted by these financial ratios. The author then formulates trading strategies by including skewness in the utility function and finds that the investor utility is high when the utility function includes skewness as opposed to when the skewness is excluded.

The author extends the MV utility function to the MVS utility function and shows that the Indian stock market is more profitable when the investor uses a MVS utility function which highlights the main contribution to the literature.