Prem W.S. Yapa, Sarath L. Ukwatte Jalathge and Pavithra Siriwardhane
This paper aims to examine the tensions amongst the audit firms operating in Sri Lanka with the introduction of open economic policies in early 1980s and its impact to the…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine the tensions amongst the audit firms operating in Sri Lanka with the introduction of open economic policies in early 1980s and its impact to the auditing profession.
Design/methodology/approach
Using a qualitative approach, this study consists of in-depth interviews, documentary review and critical interpretation supported by the perspectives of globalisation, digitalisation and neo-liberalism.
Findings
The findings indicate that the main reasons for the tension between audit firms (local and international) have been the conflict of interests on the market share. While global pressures on International Standards of Auditing created more opportunities for international audit firms to capture a wider market with the support of the state, the local audit firms apparently lost their market and experienced tension created by staff. Evidence shows the negative impact of globalisation on the open economic policies and the local audit market.
Research limitations/implications
The findings of this research will be useful for policymakers in revising auditing practices to ensure healthy corporate governance. Only 25 interviews were conducted; hence, the results may not be a holistic representation of the audit environment in Sri Lanka.
Originality/value
This study is significant, as the business capital has surged into Sri Lankan market as a result of the ongoing international agencies-led economic reforms. Such reforms have emphasised the transparency and accountability.
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Keywords
Sarath Lal Ukwatte Jalathge, Hang Tran, Lalitha Ukwatte, Tesfaye Lemma and Grant Samkin
This study aims to investigate disclosure of asbestos-related liabilities in corporate accounts and counter-accounts to examine whether and how accounting contributes to corporate…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to investigate disclosure of asbestos-related liabilities in corporate accounts and counter-accounts to examine whether and how accounting contributes to corporate accountability for asbestos-contaminated products.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses the Goffmanesque perspective on impression management to examine instances of concealed asbestos-related liabilities in corporate accounts vis-à-vis the revealing of such liabilities in counter-accounts.
Findings
The findings show counter-accounts provide significant information on liabilities originating from the exposure of employees and consumers to asbestos. By contrast, the malleability of accounting tools enables companies to eschew accounting disclosures. While the frontstage positive performance of companies served an impression management role, their backstage concealing actions enabled companies to cover up asbestos-related liabilities. These companies used three categories of mechanisms to avoid disclosure of asbestos-related liabilities: concealing via a “cloak of competence”, impression management via epistemic work and a silent strategy of concealment frontstage with strategic reorganisation backstage.
Practical implications
This study has policy relevance as regulators need to consider the limits of corporate disclosures as an accountability tool. The findings may also initiate academic and practitioner conversations about accounting standards for long-term liabilities.
Originality/value
This study highlights the strategies companies use both frontstage and backstage to avoid disclosing asbestos-related liabilities. Through analysis of accounts and counter-accounts, this study identifies the limits of accounting as an accountability tool regarding asbestos-induced diseases and deaths.
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Lalitha Ukwatte, Tehmina Khan, Pavithra Siriwardhane and Sarath Lal Ukwatte Jalathge
The purpose of this paper is to explore issues relating to imposing a ban on the importation of asbestos-contaminated building materials (ACBMs) in the Australian context to…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explore issues relating to imposing a ban on the importation of asbestos-contaminated building materials (ACBMs) in the Australian context to better understand the multiple accountabilities and consequences.
Design/methodology/approach
This study undertakes a qualitative content analysis of the multiple accountabilities and stakeholder expectations using the lens of actor–network theory. This study further explores the weaknesses and complexities associated with implementing a complete ban on asbestos, ensuring that only asbestos-free building materials are imported to Australia. This study uses data collected from 15 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, responses from the Australian Border Force to a questionnaire and 215 counter accounts from the media, the Australian Government, industry organizations, non-governmental organizations and social group websites during the period from 2003 to 2021.
Findings
This study reveals that stakeholders' expectations of zero tolerance for asbestos have not been met. This assertion has been backed by evidence of asbestos contamination in imported building materials throughout recent years. Stakeholders say that the complete prevention of the importation of ACBMs has been delayed because of issues in policy implementations, opaque supply chain activities, lack of transparency and non-adherence to mandatory and self-regulated guidelines.
Practical implications
Stakeholders expect public and private sector organizations to meet their accountabilities through mandatory adoption of the given policy framework.
Originality/value
This research provides a road map to identify the multiple accountabilities, their related weaknesses and the lack of implementation of the necessary protocol, which prevents a critical aspect of legislation from being effectively implemented.
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Daniel W. Richards, Sarath Lal Ukwatte Jalathge and Prem W. Senarath Yapa
This paper researches the professionalization of financial planning in Australia. The authors investigate how the institutional logic of major institutions inhibits this…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper researches the professionalization of financial planning in Australia. The authors investigate how the institutional logic of major institutions inhibits this occupation from moving toward a professional status.
Design/methodology/approach
The study uses documentary analysis of government inquiries into Australian financial services from 1997 to 2017 to ascertain the various institutional logics relating to the professionalization of financial planning. The method involves generating ideas from the data and applying an institutional logic framework to make sense of impediments to the professionalization of financial planning in Australia.
Findings
The regulator adopted a self-regulation logic that empowered financial institutions to govern financial advice. These financial institutions have a logic of profit maximization that creates conflicts of interest in financial planning. The financial planning professional bodies adopted a logic of attracting and retaining members due to a competitive professional environment. Thus, financial planners have not been defined as fiduciaries, professional standards have not increased and an ineffective disciplinary resolution system exists.
Research limitations/implications
This research illustrates the various institutional logics that need to be addressed to professionalize financial planning in Australia. However, the data used is limited to that drawn from the parliamentary inquiries.
Originality/value
Prior research on the emergence of professions such as accounting has shown that financial institutions are sites of professionalization. This research shows that financial institutions impede professionalization in financial planning. Also, where the state granted legitimacy to other professions, this research indicates that the state regulator's logic of self-regulation has not legitimized financial planning.