Sang Ik Seok, Tae Hyun Kim, Hoon Cho and Tae Joong Kim
This paper examines the effect of fund manager replacement on investment performances of mutual funds. In managerial labor market of mutual fund industries with information…
Abstract
This paper examines the effect of fund manager replacement on investment performances of mutual funds. In managerial labor market of mutual fund industries with information asymmetry about the type and action of a fund manager, separating compensation may not be achievable due to imperfect evaluation of performances of fund managers. This paper extends contract theory to model the situations where a mutual fund offers pooling compensation contract to a fund manager based on his reputation. Under these environments, the fund manager has an economic incentive to acquire private benefit by manipulating performances and then to turn over to other mutual fund. Fund manager’s replacement is an aspect of adverse selection in the managerial labor market of fund industries. That is, a fund manager with low ability can select and manipulate unsuccessful investment portfolio generating loss to fund while he turns over to hide himself in the reputation under pooling contract mechanism. The empirical analysis of this paper provides the significant evidence that, differently from those of mutual funds of which managers stay in the same mutual funds, the fund performances drop after the fund managers turn over to other mutual funds. These empirical evidences support the theoretical prediction that the fund managers have incentive to manipulate short-term performances to maintain reputation for acquiring favorable compensation contracts.
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Keywords
The purpose of this paper is to analyse international political economy (IPE) thought in Korea during its pre-modern and colonial eras.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to analyse international political economy (IPE) thought in Korea during its pre-modern and colonial eras.
Design/methodology/approach
It divides these eras into three periods. The first period is the eighteenth century, in which Silhak arose. The second is the mid- and late nineteenth century, a time characterised by conflicts between Wijeong-cheoksa and Gaehwa thoughts. The final period is that of colonial Korea under imperial Japan, and during this time economic nationalist movements were pursued while Marxist theories were also introduced to the country.
Findings
This research shows that IPE thoughts analogous to Western economic liberalism and economic nationalism did emerge endogenously in Korea when its environment was similar to those in which these Western thoughts arose, although in ways that reflected Korea’s peculiar situations of the times. This study also demonstrates that the “economic” thoughts of the Koreans in these periods were shaped largely by their political thoughts.
Originality/value
This research contributes to the building of a more “globalised” intellectual history of classical IPE thought.