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If the exception proves the existence of the rule, then by parity of reasoning Cobra Golf Ltd v Rata affirms the continued application of the common law privilege against self‐incrimination. For the case stands out against the background of English authorities such as R v Director of Serious Fraud Office, ex‐parte Smith, AT&T Istel v Tully and, most recently, R v Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales, ex parte Nawaz. And even the European Court of Human Rights, which forum one might expect to safeguard the individual against assertions tilted towards rectitude of outcome, has provided only lukewarm support for the privilege against self‐incrimination in Saunders v United Kingdom by limiting the case to its facts and refusing to rule that the privilege against self‐incrimination was an absolute right.

It may be a trite observation that the European Court of Human Rights is concerned with the preservation of individual rights, but the extent to which individual rights are to be asserted when faced with competing claims is not so clear. To what extent, for example, are competing rights and interests or the incidental costs of the individual right to be weighed in the balance so as to override that individual right? This issue arose in Goodwin v United Kingdom, where the European Court of Human Rights considered whether a company could obtain disclosure of a journalist's notes of a conversation with an informant who had obtained information from a stolen confidential business plan belonging to the company. The judgment of the European Court is important on a substantive level but of equal importance is the adjudicative process employed by the European Court, since an examination of this may reveal the manner in which the Court deals with competing claims.

Serious fraud trials are the sum of their component parts such that examination of one particular area often repays attention. The Roskill Fraud Trials Committee's criticisms were the backdrop for the Criminal Justice Act 1987 and the enhanced investigatory powers that are to be found in s. 2 thereof. Seven years after the enactment of the 1987 Act it is apposite to examine whether in derogating from the confines of traditional criminal evidential practices a certain level of procedural and substantive fairness has been maintained. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and its application to the rights of a suspect are also of importance. A critical examination of the above issues demands steering a careful course between normative rules and theory: in this area above all others it is impossible and undesirable to divorce one from the other.

Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 abrogates the right to silence since a suspect is required to answer questions in pre‐trial investigations by the SFO, although the answers are inadmissible as evidence unless proceedings are brought under s. 2(14) for giving false information or by s. 2(8), where the individual ‘makes a statement inconsistent with it’. In a previous article, the writer has considered the necessity and effectiveness of s. 2 powers. It is also instructive to analyse the conceptual basis of s. 2 powers since this will aid in the interpretation of statutory ambiguities and will allow the courts to have a uniformity of approach when seeking to resolve the statutory ambiguities. The conceptual basis is also important as concerns the resolution of where the line lies between the effective investigation of offences pursuant to s. 2 and the rights of the individual subject to such questioning. A critical examination of the above issues demands steering a careful course between normative rules and theory: in this area above all others it is impossible and undesirable to divorce one from the other.

Serious fraud trials are the sum of their component parts such that examination of one particular area often repays attention. The Roskill Fraud Trials Committee's criticisms were the backdrop for the Criminal Justice Act 1987 and the enhanced investigatory powers that are to be found in s. 2 thereof. Seven years after the enactment of the 1987 Act it is apposite to examine whether in derogating from the confines of traditional criminal evidential practices a certain level of procedural and substantive fairness has been maintained. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and its application to the rights of a suspect are also of importance. A critical examination of the above issues demands steering a careful course between prescriptive rules and theory: in this area above all others it is impossible and undesirable to divorce one from the other.

In preparing this report, the compliance sub‐group has set out to (a) summarise the current compliance regime as a matter of law and practice, (b) identify particular problem areas within that regime concerning public sector officials (PSOs), and (c) suggest recommendations for change. The result may be seen as providing features of a ‘model’ compliance structure designed to cause difficulties for corrupt PSOs seeking to launder the proceeds of their corruption; UK law and practice has formed the springboard for the model, but it should be stressed that in order to be of any utility any suggested changes would have to be adopted (effectively) universally throughout the financial world. Piecemeal adoption by one or a few states would merely be likely to drive the tainted monies elsewhere, and would not serve the desired purpose of reducing the extent/profitability of corruption.