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The timeliness and quality of information provided to board members are crucial for them to effectively monitor and advise a firm. This study examines the influence of board composition and structure on (1) the board’s actions to mitigate the information asymmetry problem by implementing enterprise information systems (EIS) and (2) the board of directors’ awareness of information asymmetry, their perception of its causes and their efforts to address it.

Our research employs a mixed-methods approach. First, using data from 115 publicly listed Chinese companies, we empirically assess the likelihood of top-level EIS modules adoption at the firm level. Subsequently, through 23 semi-structured interviews, we aim to gain deeper insights into the behavioral motivations behind directors’ attempts to reduce information asymmetry.

The study reveals that boards with a higher number of independent directors or with a strategy committee – indicative of a greater concern regarding information asymmetry problems – are more inclined to adopt top-level EIS modules. Additionally, we identify three primary sources of information asymmetry that directors consider significant in prompting the adoption of top-level EIS modules to alleviate perceived information asymmetry.

This study contributes to both the corporate governance and information systems literature. The implementation and utilization of EIS at the board level have not been extensively explored previously. Moreover, while the issue of information asymmetry at the board level is recognized as a critical governance challenge, the ways in which directors perceive and address this issue remain largely unknown. Our research seeks to illuminate this relatively less-explored area.

In this study, the authors examine acquirers’ selection of legal advisors for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions. The authors first confirm the importance of their own prior experience and imitation within this context. Then, the authors propose and find that firms with less experience in performing M&A deals place more emphasis on imitating others while firms with more experience with a particular legal advisor focus less on others’ experience with this advisor. The authors further find that when they imitate, firms selectively, rather than broadly, imitate others by focusing on their industry or state peers. The authors present corroborating evidence for these hypotheses through analyzing a matched sample of acquirer – legal advisor pairs developed from an initial dataset of 29,398 domestic and cross-border acquisitions performed by US firms between 2000 and 2010.

A key component of evolutionary models in economics and organizational research, the notion of organizational selection is rarely the object of inquiry. It generally suggests instead a neutral and unquestioned process, a mechanism explaining organizational success and survival. In this chapter, we explore the variation of selection; we problematize the notion of selection and do an exercise in conceptual genealogy. We differentiate between three patterns of firm selection: Darwinian, strategic, and institutional and define the associated “embedded rationalities” that buttress those different selection patterns. We illustrate how selection differed and evolved through time by exploring two empirical cases – France and the United States. Building upon our empirical exploration, we stress some important contributions for three theories familiar to strategy scholars – resource-based view, population ecology, and institutional theory. We also point to some consequences for empirical research and suggest new directions for future work on the dynamics of organizational action.