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1 – 4 of 4Salau Olarinoye Abdulmalik, Noor Afza Amran and Ayoib Che-Ahmad
This study aims to examine the unique nature of family firms by investigating the moderating effect of chief executive officer (CEO) identity on CEO career horizon and the…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to examine the unique nature of family firms by investigating the moderating effect of chief executive officer (CEO) identity on CEO career horizon and the auditor’s client risk assessment. Consistent with literature on family businesses, the level of CEO attachment to socio-emotional wealth (SEW) varies among family businesses.
Design/methodology/approach
This study used a longitudinal sample of 2,063 non-financial family firm-year observations from 2005 to 2016 listed on the Bursa Malaysia. The study used the general method of moments (GMM), which controls for endogeneity concerns.
Findings
The results reveal that, without the moderating effect of CEO identity, the relationship between CEO career horizon and auditor’s risk assessment is positive, which suggests that the auditor’s risk perception of retiring CEOs is very high. However, the interaction of CEO identity reverses the relationship as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on the interacted terms. The finding suggests that the auditor’s perceived risk associated with CEO career horizon is lower in family firms with CEOs affiliated to family members or in which the CEO has an equity stake. Overall, the findings provide compelling evidence that the extent of the CEO’s attachment to the firm’s SEW affects the auditor’s client risk assessment.
Practical implications
The findings of the study serve as an enlightenment to policymakers such as Bursa Malaysia and Security Commission that within the family-controlled firms, differences still exist; therefore, there might be a need for future regulatory initiative to cater for the specific need of family-controlled firms.
Originality/value
The study contributes to prior literature by departing from the agency theory adopted in previous studies on auditor choice in family firms under the assumption that family firms are homogenous.
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Salau Olarinoye Abdulmalik and Ayoib Che-Ahmad
This study examines the contemporaneous changes in the reporting regime in Nigeria by investigating the effect of regulatory changes on audit fees as well as the moderating effect…
Abstract
Purpose
This study examines the contemporaneous changes in the reporting regime in Nigeria by investigating the effect of regulatory changes on audit fees as well as the moderating effect of overlapping directorship and financial reporting quality.
Design/methodology/approach
This study utilises a longitudinal sample of 409 firm-year observations, from 2008 to 2013, of nonfinancial companies listed on the Nigerian stock exchange. The study uses the general method of moments (GMM) to control for endogeneity concerns.
Findings
The results reveal that, without the moderating effect of overlapping directorship and financial reporting quality, the relationship between regulatory changes and audit fees is positive but weak, which suggests that regulatory changes drive cost. Similarly, the interaction of overlapping directorship did not reverse the positive relationship, which suggests the perceived risk associated with overlapping directorship. However, the improvement in financial reporting quality reverses the relationship, as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on the interacted terms.
Practical implications
This study provides useful insights about committee membership overlap to regulatory authorities concerning the weakness of the monitoring ability of such committees.
Originality/value
The results of this study contribute to the growing literature on regulatory reform, audit fees and corporate governance. Specifically, the study provides empirical evidence on the effect of committee overlap on audit fees, which, to the best of the researchers' knowledge, has received no empirical attention in the Nigerian context.
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Moses Elaigwu, Salau Olarinoye Abdulmalik and Hassnain Raghib Talab
This paper aims to examine the effect of corporate integrity and external assurance on Sustainability Reporting Quality (SRQ) of Malaysian public listed companies.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine the effect of corporate integrity and external assurance on Sustainability Reporting Quality (SRQ) of Malaysian public listed companies.
Design/methodology/approach
The study uses a longitudinal sample of 2,463 firm-year observations of non-financial firms listed on the main board of Bursa Malaysia from 2015 to 2019. The study employed panel regression that is, Fixed Effect (FE) Robust Standard Error estimation technique to test its hypotheses.
Findings
The panel regression results reveal that corporate integrity and external assurance positively and significantly influence the quality of sustainability reporting. Though the positive association shows an improvement in the SRQ of the sampled firms, it needs an improvement as the disclosure is more general and qualitative than quantitative. The present improvement in SRQ might result from some regulatory changes like the Sustainability Practice Note 9 Updates of Bursa Malaysia 2017 and the Revised MCCG Principle A to C within the same period.
Research limitations/implications
The study adopts a purely quantitative approach and call for a qualitative investigation in the area in the future.
Practical implications
The study has policy implication for the government and regulators to strengthen compliance with the sustainability reporting guide and the Practice Note 9 Updates. It also has implication for corporate integrity and external assurance for companies, to enhance SRQ and achieve sustainable development.
Originality/value
The study bridged literature gaps by offering new insights and empirical evidence on the role of corporate integrity in SRQ, which has received no empirical attention in the Malaysian context.
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Ayoib B. Che-Ahmad, Salau Olarinoye Abdulmalik and Nor Zalina Mohamad Yusof
The present study examines the effect of the chief executive officer (CEO) career horizon (CH) problem on earnings quality (ERN) for selected family-controlled firms known to have…
Abstract
Purpose
The present study examines the effect of the chief executive officer (CEO) career horizon (CH) problem on earnings quality (ERN) for selected family-controlled firms known to have a unique operational goal.
Design/methodology/approach
The generalised method of moment linear regression model was used on a sample of family-controlled firms in Malaysia from 2005 to 2016.
Findings
The study found a negative relationship between CH and ERN, measured by earnings persistence and earnings predictability. However, in the earnings predictability model, the reverse was found to be the case after interacting CH with CEO family affiliation, CEO experience and CEO equity. However, the use of a reputable auditor could not mitigate the CH problem. Also, the study obtained a closely related result in the earnings persistence model. The result aligns with the socio-emotional wealth (SEW) theory, which states that the goals of family-controlled firms go beyond financial objectives to include other non-financial objectives, and hence, their commitment to perpetuating their dynasty encourages them to preserve the quality of their earnings.
Originality/value
Existing studies on family firms and ERN have treated family firms as homogeneous entities by comparing family and non-family firms, using the underlying theoretical justification of the agency theory. However, this study departs from the agency theory, by considering those factors (i.e. the extent of CEO alignment with family owners and the choice of auditor), using the SEW theory, which establishes the differences among family firms. This work builds on that of Chen et al., (2018) and Ali and Zhang (2015), which suggested that corporate governance can mitigate the CH problem. Therefore, the strength of a CEO's attachment to the family firm (measured by CEO equity ownership and CEO affiliation to family members in family firms) and the choice of the auditor can explain the variation in the effect of the CH problem in family firms.
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