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The purpose of this paper is to analyze how monetary fundamentals affect exchange rate movements.

To develop this paper, a Bayesian Network modeling is applied to explore the causal interactions between monetary fundamentals and exchange rate fluctuations. Subsequently, a sensitivity analysis is performed to asses and estimate exchange rate behavior with uncertain monetary fundamentals. Furthermore, a Granger Causality test is used as suggested in the Econometric literature to determine the causality direction among factors.

The empirical findings show that money supply and interest rate have a significant positive effect on exchange rate, whereas inflation rate has a considerable negative effect on exchange rate. In addition, the authors deduce that real income has an indirect impact on exchange rate and a direct impact on inflation rate, interest rate and money supply. Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis shows that monetary uncertainty has a considerable effect on exchange rate fluctuations. Moreover, the Granger Causality test reveals that there is a unique unidirectional causality running from money supply to exchange rate.

The model can be considered as a vital management tool for international investors and financial analysts to explore the effect of monetary fundamentals on exchange rate behavior. It allows estimating exchange rate fluctuations with uncertain monetary factors.

This study is the first one which applied a Bayesian Network modeling to examine the exchange rate determination problem. Results of this research are presented under a clear graphical representation that can be easily useful by monetary policymakers and international traders to determine the influential monetary factors on exchange rate behavior. Also, the model will help them in estimating the effect of monetary uncertainty on exchange rate fluctuations.

Remuneration policies may differ from country to country, and their effect on bank stability could be due to the legal framework. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how the legal system impacts the relationship between CEO compensation and bank stability across countries.

To test the study hypotheses, the authors use panel data of 74 banks operating in ten OECD countries during the period 2009–2016 and apply the generalized moments method regression model to better remediate the endogeneity problem.

The findings confirm that a country’s banking regulations significantly affect its bank stability. Common law countries have less bank stability than civil law countries. This result can be interpreted by the fact that, in common-law countries, banks’ CEO are strongly protected by the law, so they allocate a large part of bank assets to risky loans to improve their variable remuneration.

The research can help policymakers understand bank stability in one country. Any legal reform would require prior knowledge of how risk-taking may arise in executive compensation.

The contribution is to explain the controversial effect of executive compensation on bank stability in the framework of legal theory. The authors argue that regulators should monitor compensation structures and that the country’s legal origin of law shapes the CEO compensation structure and is a determinant of bank stability. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies exploring this field. So, this study tries to shed more light on the dark side of CEOs’ behavior when undertaking risky projects to maximize their remuneration.