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In this chapter, we will be describing the situation of minority groups in the labour market and in organizations in Québec and Canada. We will be focussing mainly on the situation of women and ethnocultural minorities. First, we will present a statistical picture of their situation. Second, we will explore in more depth the situation of two ethnocultural groups – the Maghrebians and the French – in Québec,¹ to demonstrate the complexity of the situation of minority groups that cannot be portrayed by statistics alone. Then, third, we will examine some tensions specific to Western societies that have an impact on the dynamics of culturally diverse enterprises. This assessment will show that even though much progress has been made, especially for women, there is still much to do to ensure full equality and greater fairness between minority and majority groups in Québec and Canada. Furthermore, by means of a more qualitative analysis of the situation of these two ethnocultural groups, we will see that statistics do not tell the whole story.

Decreasing revenues among local governments across the country have placed an increased focus on governmental financial practices. For states with local government financial oversight organizations, the ratios and other benchmarks used to assess fiscal stability face increased scrutiny. This study examines financial reports sent to North Carolina’s financial oversight body, the Local Government Commission (LGC), to determine the types of operational and policy practices that can lead to fiscal stress based on guidelines established by the LGC. Findings indicate that lowering levels of fund balance, increased salaries, increased debt service levels, and the presence of a countywide water system all increased the probability of a county government receiving notice of potential financing problems requiring immediate action.

A trend toward higher quality has demanded more strategic investments in the transaction of coffee supply in Brazil. Instead of internalizing this transaction, one firm, illycaffè, has challenged the vertical integration assumption by adopting contracts to coordinate its supply. Aiming to investigate whether this firm is losing economic efficiency in terms of coordination, or whether it is being efficient due to a proper definition and allocation of property and decision rights, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the transaction attributes of illycaffè’s suppliers according to the vertical integration dilemma.

The research design is based on a survey of 105 coffee growers analyzed through probit regression. Using a transaction costs approach, the study empirically tests whether well-designed contracts can act as a hierarchy by following the efficient alignment hypothesis.

The results emphasize asset specificity, uncertainty and incentives as determinants for being an illycaffè supplier. In other words, these findings demonstrate that a well-designed contract can substitute a hierarchy based on transaction costs economics. It contributes by illustrating other coordination alternatives overlapping vertical integration, even in environments of high uncertainty and asset specificity, which encourages other private strategies based on allocation of property and decision rights of hybrid arrangements.

The study adopts a unique survey about transaction costs in the transactions of high-quality coffee supply in Brazil. The main contribution is to shed light on the cases where, how and why contracts can substitute the need for in-house production, and to guide private and public strategies using this background.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the relationship between the existence of asset specificity and the architecture of the hybrid governance structures adopted by horticultural smallholders from the Brazilian region of Serra Fluminense.

This paper uses a negative binomial regression model to analyze 567 transactions carried out by horticultural smallholders from the Brazilian region of Serra Fluminense. Starting from the insights of Oliver Williamson’s transaction cost economics, an indicator is constructed with the goal to capture the degree of intensity of coordination from the adoption of diverse bundles of coordination mechanisms in a governance structure.

The results show that higher levels of human and physical asset specificity affect the intensity of coordination of the transactions in the sample, leading to the adoption of hybrid forms with more complex bundles of coordination mechanisms.

This paper adds to a growing literature that studies the architecture of complex governance structures. However, its empirical conclusions are exploratory.

The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, quantitative empirical studies that analyze the diversity of hybrid forms in the same industry are relatively rare. This contribution also presents a theoretical discussion that might inform scholars dealing with similar research challenges.

This study investigates why different governance structures have been adopted to organize similar operations in sugarcane transport transactions, resulting in the plural forms of governance.

Based on a panel of 10 Brazilian mills, covering the 2009–2019 period and employing an econometric strategy grounded mainly on the count data and traditional panel-regression models, this study used the Transaction Cost Economics perspective to investigate how the frequency of transactions, uncertainty and asset specificity influence the decision to adopt the Plural Forms of governance. Moreover, we employed two distinct measures of these Plural Forms and included governance alterations over time.

The results suggest that Transaction Cost Economics is a valid theoretical background for studying the plural forms of governance and that the interviewed Brazilian mills seemed to use these plural forms in their strategic transport planning, thus generating lower transaction costs and reducing issues, such as market uncertainties and opportunistic risks. We also found that the plural forms are gradually maintained but are not being adopted as a transitory management solution because they are aligned with the characteristics of price, the quality of service, contractual clauses and fidelity in negotiations.

The plural forms of governance are strategies for efficiently managing transport, promoting the security of supply and financial benefits related to transaction costs and improving environmental sustainability. Analyzing the plural forms of governance with two different measures (absolute and entropy-related), this study contributes to the ever-growing debate on governance, which is particularly important for the sugar-energy sector.

Agrifood platforms are now part of consumption habits. They have emerged in various forms, and we need to describe this diversity to understand better how platforms manage their relationships with farmers. We aim to understand the governance forms of agrifood platforms and consider whether they comply with the principles of transaction cost economics (TCE).

Based on a survey of 103 French platform managers, a two-step cluster analysis and ordered logit regressions were applied to test hypotheses derived from the theory.

The results enable us to propose a refined typology of eight governance forms for the farmer-platform relationship. These different forms can be classified according to a continuum ranging from “market to hierarchy”, conforming to TCE principles. We define a gradient describing how the platforms manage their relations with the farmers through contractual and relational control. We show that specific assets, behavioural uncertainty, and membership in a platform network are associated with more integrated governance forms.

The article describes the different forms of platform governance and their relevance to market conditions. This clarification is necessary for farmers to elect the more suitable platform and for platform managers to create a new business or improve its efficiency.

This article is the first to offer a detailed typology of agrifood platform governance. It highlights these governance characteristics and their relationship with transaction attributes.