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An assimilation and a synthesis of the major General Accounting Office (GAO) reports released on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for calendar year 2002 reveal a variety of tax administration problems. An analysis of the GAO reports also suggests that the IRS might be a contributor to the non-compliance problem. Additionally, Congresses and Administrations have not facilitated meaningful improvements.

While the GAO reports generally attempt to portray the ongoing modernization efforts within the IRS favorably, the weaknesses identified suggest that significant tax administration problems exist. This article presents a detailed analysis of the GAO overall report on the 2002-filing season and assesses GAO reports and testimonies that contain IRS in their titles.

U.S. and E.U. public and defense procurement rules require large prime contractors to promote subcontracts to small businesses, a.k.a. small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Under the U.S. Small Business Act, large firms encourage subcontracting through publicity, subcontracting plans, and “good faith” efforts to achieve subcontracting goals. However, processoriented measures failed to guarantee definitive results. In contrast, E.U. and member governments can hold large firms accountable to stricter subcontracting standards (often sweetened by incentives). With the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, the U.S. is trying accountability measures now. Therefore, large contractors must plan for definitive subcontracting commitments in both markets.

Research on performance management, as it applies to public sector organizations, has been addressed most often from a static perspective. A process-oriented view on performance is undertaken through use of perceived obstacles, garnered through two large surveys of U.S. government managers, to infer the adaptive paths federal agencies have followed. By applying a learning-based model founded on March’s framework of exploration and exploitation, the ideal-typical ways that public organizations adapt to a performance initiative can be distinguished, opening a window into the processes such learning entails. Structural equation modeling provides the statistical capacity to interpret exploration and exploitation as cohesive paths. Exploratory adaptation appears to have been largely counterproductive, as the obstacles associated with this dynamic indicated a roadblock rather than a path forward. But exploitation had the opposite effect, as its associated obstacles corresponded with greater use of performance measures for management activities and enhanced results orientation.

This paper considers a class of parametric models with nonparametric autoregressive errors. A new test is established and studied to deal with the parametric specification of the nonparametric autoregressive errors with either stationarity or nonstationarity. Such a test procedure can initially avoid misspecification through the need to parametrically specify the form of the errors. In other words, we estimate the form of the errors and test for stationarity or nonstationarity simultaneously. We establish asymptotic distributions of the proposed test. Both the setting and the results differ from earlier work on testing for unit roots in parametric time series regression. We provide both simulated and real-data examples to show that the proposed nonparametric unit root test works in practice.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) has been Congress’ long‐serving auditor, issuing reports designed to improve the operations of government agencies and to enhance their cost effectiveness. In order to do this effectively, it must have unrestricted access to records. The GAO, in response to a request from two congressmen, sought access to records and names of attendees at an energy planning group meeting held in 2001. Access was denied by Vice President Cheney. The GAO then brought a suit to secure access. The suit was dismissed by District Circuit Judge Bates and the Comptroller General decided not to appeal. At this time the GAO's continuation as a super audit agency appeared highly uncertain, resulting in an emasculation of Congress’s powers.

Insufficient achievement of performance management in the federal government is widely acknowledged, despite the absence of an accepted way for determining when and how progress has been made. The process of maturation is traced through a model based on Stinchcombe’s innovation framework, enabling progress toward utilization of performance management to be gauged. The premise of this model is that change has to permeate the organization, reaching the level of routines, to be implemented operationally. Assessment of performance management maturity employs a match between the obstacles expected in the distinct stages of adoption and implementation and the hindrances federal agencies have encountered. Quantitative analysis of data provided by pooled Government Accountability Office surveys of federal managers points to activity at the adoption stage, but not at the implementation stage, calling into question the maturity of the performance initiative.

John Kwoka’s Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies is a meta-analysis of “retrospective” academic studies of consummated mergers and other horizontal arrangements. Based on this meta-analysis, Kwoka strongly criticizes federal enforcement policies, claiming that the agencies permit far too many anticompetitive mergers to go unchallenged, and are far too willing to accept remedies that fail to prevent a significant loss of competition. Kwoka claims further that this excessive leniency is the culmination of a trend reflecting deliberate policy choices made over the last several decades.

In a forthcoming critique, Vita and Osinski challenge Kwoka’s analysis and his conclusions, identifying serious flaws in the size, construction, and composition of his sample, and in the statistical analysis of the data drawn from that sample. In a published response to Vita and Osinski, Professor Kwoka offers a number of objections and counter-arguments. In this rejoinder, I respond to Professor Kwoka.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the corporate behavior of Volkswagen in its emissions scandal. It describes and analyzes a complex ethics dilemma within the purview of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate sustainability (CS) and examines how this dilemma impacts critical stakeholders, thus offering several “opportunities to learn” for professionals.

The case takes a stakeholder perspective, applying Cavanagh et al. (1981) and Gao’s (2008) ethical judgement framework. It is situated within a qualitative approach to textual analysis. Social actors, topics and evaluative statements were identified and grouped into broader categories.

Six major stakeholders were directly affected by Volkswagen’s behavior: customers, investors and shareholders, the US Environmental Protection Agency, German authorities, European institutions and society-at-large. Stakeholder concerns were condensed into three dominant themes: economic, legal and environmental. According to the ethical judgment framework, Volkswagen corporate behavior showed ethical problems, theoretically demonstrating that under no ethical principle was Volkswagen’s actions justifiable, even under instrumental justifications.

The analysis was primarily based on corporate material and news media reporting. Consequently, diverse managers’ prospectives and opinions are not entirely captured.

This paper offers several “opportunities to learn” for corporate communication professionals.

The focus on stakeholder perspectives allows professionals to take an outside-in approach when evaluating the impact of corporate actions on stakeholders’ interests. The case analysis through Cavanagh et al. (1981) and Gao’s (2008) ethical judgment framework provides a practical theoretical instrument to assess corporate behaviors that can be used both as pre- and post-evaluations of corporate actions on CSR and CS issues.

Neither capture theory, nor neo‐conservative theory and technical failure arguments adequately account for the behaviour of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OHSA) during the 1970s. A framework drawn from organisation theory suggests that regulatory failure is due to a crisis of compliance resources caused by a flawed legislative mandate. Lacking effective compliance mechanisms, regulatory agencies are forced into a bargaining posture rather than an enforcement stance towards industry. This leads to creation of de facto policy which diverges substantially from the original legislative mandate, and this is read as evidence for regulation failure.