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In July, a London solicitor was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for laundering £30m, being the proceeds of drugs and other uncustomed substances which one of his clients had smuggled into the country. The judge who sentenced him observed this was the largest money laundering operation he had come across. In fact, in 1998, the operator of a bureau de change in Notting Hill Gate in west London was sentenced to 14 years in prison for laundering an even larger sum. It was the fact that the defendant was a solicitor, that the amounts were so huge and that he used the respectable front of a London solicitor's practice for what used to be called ‘receiving’, or ‘fencing’ the proceeds of crime, that makes this case so notable.

In the words of the song, ‘Money Makes the World go Round’. In the business of investigating and prosecuting serious and complex financial fraud, especially the international variety, the money goes around the world pretty effectively as well. And the more it can do so without the movement of the funds being detected, the more effective is the flow of mis‐appropriated money and the less likely the fraud will be detected and the fraudster brought to book.

Describes the 1985 Roskill Committee Report on Fraud Trials as a success: of its 112 recommendations only two were not implemented. Explains why Roskill is nevertheless often criticised: there is a lack of resources for fraud investigation, while the amount of computer‐generated data in modern fraud cases is huge, and the demands on the jury much greater. Outlines the work of the Serious Fraud Office, of which the author is Director. Asks what can be done to remedy the lack of resources, given that the number of police squads dedicated to fraud investigation has shrunk over recent years. Assesses how the nature of fraud itself has changed since Roskill: there is much more of it, it is more closely linked with general criminality, and it uses the ever more sophisticated methods of information technology. Suggests that there should be a general offence of fraud, that juries might be replaced in fraud cases, and that there should be more public education about fraud. Concludes that more emphasis on public‐private partnerships will help fight economic crime.

Focuses on the work of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) over the last 15 years in investigating and prosecuting major fraud; the author is its Director, and the SFO supports the Financial Services Authority in enforcing the Money Laundering Regulations 1993. Shows how prevention of money laundering depends firstly on banks and financial institutions, and increasingly also on lawyers and accountants, plus those dealing with high value goods like bonds, art and antiques; banking secrecy is outdated. Outlines legislation, notably the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and its new provisions relating to money laundering and suspicious activity reporting, plus the SFO’s perspective on these. Moves on to the Financial Action Task Force, the new Asset Recovery Agency, legal developments, problems of enforcement in the age of the Internet, and the need for more international cooperation.

This paper aims to examine what is meant by economically motivated crime (ECM) and to look at the typologies of offences considered to fall into this category, to analyse the effects of ECM on financial services business and assess the efficacy of steps taken by law enforcement and business to prevent, investigate and mitigate the damage caused by ECM on business.

The paper is based on the session: “Risks to financial institutions presented by economically motivated crime” at the Cambridge 24th International Symposium on Economic Crime.

Much ECM is perpetrated by organised crime on business and the tools available to law enforcement, through legislative instruments and available resources to investigate it, are inadequate. Business does not accord sufficient recognition to the risks posed by ECM and accordingly fails to manage those risks. Models for a Fraud Policy and a Fraud Policy Statement are set out and a higher priority for fraud on the Government agenda for policing is advocated.

The paper addresses the impact fraud has on business and the economies of the world and highlights the threat of financial crime which is affecting everyone.

The paper aims to demonstrate the causes of failure of some fraud prosecutions.

The paper provides a review of common contexts within which prosecutions of allegations of fraud are brought and discussion of the factors which influence the prosecutor, the investigator, the defence, the trial judge and the fact‐finders.

Several factors are common to many fraud prosecutions which, taken together, make these cases difficult to try and to obtain convictions. Many fraud prosecutions fail because the egregious length of the investigation and trial process jeopardises the mental health of some defendants, preventing them from being tried at all. The mass of documentary evidence adduced can cloud the key issue of dishonesty. Excessive splitting up and “pruning” of the case with a view to making the trial shorter may obscure the essential elements of the case. Effective management of the trial process is sometimes lacking. Presentation of complex facts and egregious amounts of documentation to a lay jury can contribute to the inordinate length of the case and the proposition is made that an alternative tribunal, without a lay jury, may eliminate many of the factors which contribute to the failure of major fraud trials.

The conclusion is drawn that tribunals sitting without juries would have the effect of shortening the trial without lessening public confidence in the criminal justice system in this very limited class of case.

The paper draws together several key factors found in the author's experience as Director the Serious Fraud Office and as Chairman of the Fraud Advisory Panel which distinguish fraud prosecutions from any other types of criminal case and provides leads for improving future prosecution and trial technique.

The struggle against corruption is not an area where any state has had a sufficiently high success rate to become complacent, particularly when bearing in mind the evidence of the scale on which such crimes are being committed. This lack of success applies in terms of both the number of prosecutions brought and, at least in those states where the burden of proof rests on the state, the success rate in attaining successful prosecutions. Particular problems arise for developing countries. This paper considers reasons for the increase in the scale of the problem, and the steps a developing country will need to consider in terms of staff and institutional development, in addition to changes in its criminal and civil law. By comparison, it also looks at successful developments in developed countries that highlight approaches to the problem which may have an impact if used elsewhere.

Corruption is a historical social phenomenon just like other hinds of crime. It was born and will die with the social class system. It is one of the oldest crimes which remains the same under different names on the journey of social change. The rulers of society have insisted on severe sanctions against it including capital and other punishments upon offenders, but it has always survived in spite of continual prohibitions at different times in history. Since economic contacts are more frequent and closer, new types of corruption have emerged. Offences are now more organised and better planned. New characteristics are: (1) illegal organisation; (2) there may be political motives as well as economic purposes; (3) the offenders tend to use fraudulence and blackmail; (4) enormous sums of money are involved to obtain vast unlawful profits. According to the characteristics of organised corruption, the strategy of prevention should be comprehensive, consisting of precaution, relief and warning. Precaution is the most important and relief is the second best, followed by warning. These three measures should be used together. The strategy should combine sanctions and education together, with emphasis on precaution as well as relief and warning, reminding public servants of their duties and reputation and the penalties for breaches of the law.

In England and Wales the Crown Prosecutor is a lawyer who is independent from the investigation and is charged with assessing evidence and evaluating whether a prosecution should proceed or not. The CPS is intentionally authorised to override the decisions of the police to curb any potentially over‐zealous investigations and evidence gathering that might subsequently tarnish the standards of procedure in the courts when applying the criminal law. The increasingly burdensome rules of disclosure have made demands on the CPS which are akin to the overall requirement on the investigating magistrate of civil law jurisdictions to find the truth by examination of the prosecution and defence evidence. The recent moves to return a limited number of lawyers to police stations is a further indication that the future role of the CPS may include an active rather than solely passive role in evidence gathering. The Serious Fraud Office are directly involved in the investigation and prosecution of complex frauds. This office has statutory and judicial authority to conduct investigations which follow an inquisitorial rather than accusatorial model. The juge d'instruction in France has authority to direct and control police investigations and subsequently to compile a dossier of evidence for presentation before a trial court. This paper points out that there are close parallels emerging in pre‐trial procedures in England and Wales and in France and the criticisms of the role of the investigating magistrate, the ‘sick man’, may hold lessons to be learnt for investigators and prosecutors within this jurisdiction.

Criminals have always exploited technological advances and therefore the advent of the gun, the telephone and the car created new opportunities for crime. Similarly, the increasingly widespread use of computers in society has led to computer‐related crime.