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The study, by focusing on a context dominated by firms with a concentrated ownership, in which type-II agency problems (principal-principal conflicts) may occur, aims to depict which board configurations may be effective in protecting minority shareholders by mitigating the risk of controlling shareholders' expropriation via cash holdings.

The research adopts a configurational approach and empirically conducts a fuzzy set/qualitative comparative analysis on a sample of 268 Italian listed companies.

The analysis depicts three combinations of board configurations and ownership structures that can be considered effective, namely Active Independent Control, Female Active Control and Double Internal Control.

The study revisits the topic of the risk of expropriation via cash holdings in a type-II agency problem framework and delineates the meaning of board effectiveness in a mature context ruled by family firms, like Italy. Furthermore, by drawing on a configurational approach, it overcomes the causality relationship between each board characteristic and cash holdings policies and reasons from a “bundle” perspective.

Drawing on upper echelons theory (UET) and arguments from behavioral theory of the firm, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on family involvement-performance relationship, by considering the mediating role of the propensity towards merger and acquisition (M&A) and the moderating role of performance feedback.

The hypotheses are tested by applying a moderated mediation analysis on a sample of 111 German family firms. First, a mediation model is run to verify the mediation role of the propensity towards M&A; then, to evaluate the magnitude of the mediation at different values of the moderator (performance feedback), conditional indirect effects are tested using normal-theory standard errors and bootstrapping procedure.

The main findings suggest that a higher percentage of family members sitting in TMT is related to better performance and that this effect is mediated by the propensity towards M&A. Furthermore, findings also show that a higher percentage of family managers is positively related to the propensity towards M&A and, in turn, exerts a positive effect of firm performance, especially when performance feedback is negative.

The paper suggests to family firms' managers that when performance feedback is negative, a riskier behavior, such as M&A, could represent a way to improve firm performance.

The paper provides a full application of UET to the context of family firms, offers the point of view of TMT, instead of that of ownership, to study the propensity towards M&A in family firms and goes beyond the rational view to explain family managers' risk-taking behaviors.