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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the long-run performance of a unique set of US domiciled firms that have bypassed the US capital markets in pursuit of their initial public offering (IPO) overseas. Additionally, this paper then tests the popular underwriter prestige impact and the window of opportunity hypothesis on this unique subset of IPOs.

Using a sample of foreign and purely domestic IPOs made by US firms from 2000 to 2011, this study investigates the long-term performance, one-, two- and three-year by using two measures (buy-and-hold return and cumulative abnormal returns) to test the long-run returns of newly listed companies. Finally, the research incorporates both the traditional matching methodology (issue year and size) along with propensity score matching methodology.

FIPOs of US companies underperform DIPOs and their matched DIPOs; furthermore, FIPOs underperform the index of the two listing countries they use the most (UK and Canada). Although the choice of a reputable underwriter mitigates underperformance, the choice of listing in a foreign country only may be a result of possible high valuations accorded by foreign investors who buy US-listed companies on the domestic exchange possibly for reducing exchange rate risk and gaining US diversification without incurring additional costs. It is, thus, possible that US companies that undertake Foreign IPOs not only escape potentially higher Security and Exchange Commission regulations and disclosure but also benefit from higher valuations in the foreign markets.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the long-term performance of US firms bypassing the US capital markets in pursuit of their initial equity offering elsewhere. Caglio et al. (2016) investigated why firms decide to pursue such equity raising activity but fail to investigate the firms’ actual performance after issuing equity. This research fills such a gap in the literature and is important for both academics and practitioners. Practitioners can use this information in assessing the quality of such investments in the long-run, and firms can use such information when determining the different options of issuing equity. Further, regulators should be aware of the implications that increased regulations have on capital raising activities in their domestic market.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of financial regulation policy uncertainty (FRPU) on bank profit and risk.

This study applies dynamic panel techniques and uses the Baker et al. (2016) FRPU index and macroeconomic variables to assess FRPU’s impact on bank profit and risk using Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation call reports from Q1 2000 to Q4 2016 for over 4,760 commercial banks.

The effect of FRPU on profitability (Return on Assets [ROA] and Return on Equity [ROE]) and risk (standard deviation of ROA and ROE) produces complex results. FRPU negatively (positively) impacts profits for small and large banks (money center banks). There is a positive impact on FRPU for small and medium-sized banks, with no impact reported for the large and money center banks.

Findings lead to several implications for financial services regulators, investors and executives as summarized in the conclusion. It is essential to ensure that clear communication channels are open especially to small and medium-sized banks for proper strategic planning, given their greater sensitivity to regulatory uncertainty.

This paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, it explores the impact of FRPU on bank profits and risk using a novel index introduced by Baker et al. (2016). This news-based continuous measure presents a bank profit modeling approach that differs from traditional event study methodology. Second, a large sample of US commercial banks is used which represents an important departure from banking regulation studies.

The aim of this paper is to evaluate empirically the impact of oil price fluctuations on the relationship between banking sector development and economic growth in oil-importing MENA countries.

The study used the newly developed panel autoregressive distributed lagged (ARDL) approach in order to address any potential endogeneity between research variables.

The empirical results show a unidirectional causality in the long run from oil price to both economic growth and banking sector development for oil-importing countries. Also, banking sector development not only leads directly to economic growth but also can play a moderator role in the oil price—economic growth nexus.

The study has two principal limitations. On the one hand, this study was conducted in a relatively limited sample of countries. On the other hand, the study did not consider others indicators for banking sector development and others macroeconomic variables.

The results found have imperative implications for banks' managers, regulators and researchers. Bank managers should be more concerned with the negative repercussions of oil price fluctuations on the development of their banks. The regulatory authorities must emphasize policies and strategies to further strengthen their banking sector in order to alleviate the negative influence of oil price shocks on economic growth. Researchers focused on finance-growth nexus must take into account the potential influence of oil price shocks.

The developed conceptual model allows examining to what extent the oil price fluctuations might affect the relationship between economic growth and banking sector development. This effect is neither evaluated nor clarified in the relevant literature.

The initial shock of devaluing the currency, after so many promises that it would not take place, has passed; only the uncertainty and apprehension remain. It seems an idle exercise to compare the present state of the country's economy with other periods in recent history, such as when in the first Labour Government, we went off the gold standard; at that time, shock was indeed profound and again, the French were cock‐a‐hoop, but the position was complicated by the huge inter‐indebtedness of the Allies in the First War. Or the first devaluation after the Second World War, but both periods were also characterized by public waste and profligate spending. Now, we have to obtain foreign loans and financial backing to keep going, and it is this aspect of the present devaluation which will probably far outweigh any positive advantages. The country's massive external debts were increased by approximately one‐seventh overnight, probably wiping out completely all the repayments made at such great effort since the War. Devaluation of the currency cannot be seen as anything but a grievous blow to the country, presaging hard times ahead for everyone. When promises were being made that devaluation would not take place, there can be little doubt that these were honestly made and, at the time, believed in, for no Government of a country with imports always exceeding exports, would impose such a burden on its people willingly. It must then have been forced upon them.

Investigates the possible social causes of unemployment; focuses on how competition among employers can increase and perpetuate already high levels of unemployment. Starts from the premise that, despite divergent attitudes, most industrialized nations make some collective provision for the unemployed, with firms ultimately bearing the costs. Describes how, although a firm may reduce its labour force to save money, it is ultimately, albeit collectively, paying the costs of unemployment via taxes to the State ‐ the main effect is to redistribute the costs to other organizations; depicts a resulting downward spiral in the economy. Looks at the relationships between increased productivity and the costs to society. Concludes that competitive unemployment is a reality and suggests possible solutions.

Outlines the Libertarian framework of rights and obligations in abortion. Argues that abortion is homicide based upon the scientific and philosophic evidence available and disputes further points believed by abortion proponents.

The Astroworld concert tragedy is used as an example of crisis (mis)management and the potential utility of the 4R model. Although the 4R model has been implemented in high-risk emergency management situations, it is useful in the PR field because of its actionable approach, creating a way for practitioners to prepare for and manage crisis situations.

This is an analysis of the crisis that occurred at Astroworld, spanning preparation, day-of events, casualties and enduring reputational impact. The paper applies the 4R method to the Astroworld tragedy to show how it could have lessened or even prevented the tragedy. Finally, the SCCT model is used to explain why the official post-crisis statements were ineffective.

Social media has heightened the importance of a quick and effective organizational response to risk and crisis situations because poor responses can go viral quickly. However, social media also provides intelligence and crowd sourced information that can inform PR practitioners of emerging crisis scenarios. It is also an underutilized tool for two-way communication during crises.

The 4R approach is beneficial to general practitioners as it simplifies crisis best-practices, something essential for quick action. As our world changes and becomes less predictable, practitioners must have a clear plan to protect their organizations and the public surrounding them. This approach includes reduction, readiness, response and recovery, which are all essential in crisis communication.

The 4R method has not been explored or applied in the PR field. This paper highlights how the model has been utilized in the emergency management field and illustrates the way 4R can serve the PR field.