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This study examines the types, quality, and financial effects of explanations for non-compliance (NCEs) with corporate governance codes.

This study used content analysis to examine various types of NCEs and developed an NCE index (NCEI) to assess their quality and degree of informativeness. Static and dynamic multivariate panel data regression models were used to analyze the relationship between NCEI and firm performance (FP) of 38 non-financial listed Mauritian firms from 2009 to 2019.

Listed Mauritian firms do not provide explanations for all non-compliance, and the most common type of NCE is momentary deviation. The NCEI is 0.243, which implies that the overall quality of the NCEs is poor or uninformative. The NCEI varies according to the listing status and industry type. NCEI has a negative and insignificant relationship with both ROA and Tobin’s Q. The results are inconsistent with the agency, stakeholder, stewardship, and resource dependency theories. Sensitivity analysis indicated that the findings were robust.

Multiple theoretical frameworks offer a deeper understanding of corporate governance practices than a single theory does. A decline in the NCEI in 2019 indicates that the move from the “comply or explain” to the “apply or explain” principle does not necessarily result in enhancements in the degree of informativeness. Regulators should develop guidelines on how to disclose NCEs better. Investors appear to be more concerned about “comply/apply or perform” than the “comply/apply or explain” approach.

This study adds to the extant literature by providing new evidence on the types and quality of NCEs as well as their relationship with FP in emerging economies, where such studies are rare.

The purpose of this study is to examine the linear and non-linear relationship between capital structure (CS) and firm performance (FP) and the moderating and mediating roles of agency costs in the CS-FP nexus.

This study used static and quadratic panel data regression models to examine the linear and non-linear relationships and structured equation models to analyze the mediating effect of agency costs in the CS-FP nexus of 38 listed non-financial Mauritian firms from 2009 to 2019.

Leverage has a significant negative effect on FP supporting the pecking order theory. Agency costs are significantly and positively associated with FP. There is a strong non-linear relationship between leverage and FP supporting the trade-off and agency cost theories. Agency costs are an important moderator and mediator in the CS-FP nexus. Overall, the sensitivity analyses showed that the results were robust.

Firms need to carefully consider the levels and types of debt and equity in their CS involving the use of dynamic strategies to adjust CS in response to changing economic conditions and FP. The moderating effect of agency costs may guide firms in optimizing CS and may contribute to corporate governance discussions, emphasizing the importance of aligning interests to foster sustainable business practices.

This study adds to the extant literature by providing new evidence on the non-linear relationship between leverage and FP and the moderating and mediating roles of agency costs in the CS-FP nexus in emerging capital markets, where such studies are rare.

This study aims to focus on the direct, mediating and moderating effects of corporate governance (CG) and capital structure (CS) in their relationships with firm performance (FP).

Multivariate panel data regression techniques are employed to analyse the direct, mediating and moderating impacts of the CG and CS on FP of 38 listed Mauritian non-financial companies from 2009 to 2019.

This study shows that CG has a positive but insignificant influence on return on equity (ROE) and Tobin's Q. CS has a significant negative impact on both ROE and Tobin's Q and supports the pecking order theory (POT). The interaction of CG and CS influences FP, but the strength of the moderating effects depends on the performance measure being used. Both CS and CG have no mediation effects in their relationship with FP measured by ROE and Tobin's Q.

The results indicate that the combination of the high leverage ratio and good governance practices of companies can improve FP and increases investor confidence resulting in a positive reaction on their market share prices.

This paper contributes to the CG and CS literature by introducing a more precise and comprehensive research approach and is the first to attempt to extend CG and CS in their associations with FP by incorporating both CG and CS as profound moderator and mediator variables simultaneously in the same study.

This study aims to examine the influence of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms and ownership structures on corporate governance disclosure (CGD) in listed Mauritian companies.

Multivariate regression techniques, both static and dynamic panel data models, were employed to analyse the effect of the determinants on the CGD level of 42 Mauritian listed companies (38 non-financial and four financial firms) from 2009 to 2019.

In the static model comprising 42 firms, CG attributes such as board size, board meeting frequency, CG committee meeting frequency and audit committee meeting frequency are major determinants of CGD, whereas ownership structure variables such as managerial ownership and institutional ownership do not influence CGD. In the dynamic model, only the CG meeting frequency is a major determinant. The determinants of CGD vary between non-financial and financial firms.

This study is limited to CGD in listed firms, excluding mandatory disclosures and unlisted firms. Future research can use qualitative approaches to better understand CGD behaviour with an extension to mandatory disclosures and non-listed firms.

Policymakers can rely on determinants to draw policy measures to raise CG standards further. Domestic and foreign investors may also depend on the determinants of their expectations of CGD while making investment and credit decisions.

This study contributes to the extant literature by examining a new determinant of CGD: CG committee meeting frequency. It also investigates any differences in the determinants between financial and non-financial firms with different listing status.