Bridget Tyma, Rina Dhillon, Prabhu Sivabalan and Bernhard Wieder
The purpose of this study is to examine how accountability is constructed for blockchain systems. With the aim of increasing knowledge on accountability across three different…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine how accountability is constructed for blockchain systems. With the aim of increasing knowledge on accountability across three different types of blockchains (public, private and consortium), the researchers ask: how do blockchain systems construct accountability?
Design/methodology/approach
This study draws on theorising in the accountability literature to study how blockchains relate to our construction and understanding of accountability. A qualitative field study of the Australian blockchain technology landscape is conducted, with insights garnered from 18 blockchain experts.
Findings
Findings reveal that different types of blockchains employ different forms and mechanisms of accountability and in novel ways previously less acknowledged in the literature. Importantly, this study finds that accountability does not require a principal–agent relation and can still manifest in less pure applications of blockchain technology across a wide range of stakeholders, contrary to that espoused in earlier exhortations of blockchain use in interdisciplinary literature. This study also finds that similar subtypes of accountability operate very differently across public, private and consortium blockchains and there exists an inverse relation between trust and consensus building through transparency as blockchains progress from public to private types. Overall, this study offers novel explanations for the relevance of greater accountability in blockchains, especially when the assumptions of public blockchains are softened and applied as private and consortium blockchains.
Originality/value
This study contributes to the accountability literature by addressing how different blockchain systems reshape the understanding of traditional accounting and accountability practices. This study questions the very need for a principal–agent relation to facilitate accountability and offers an additional perspective to how trust and transparency operate as key mechanisms of accountability.
Details
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Emma McDaid, Christina Boedker and Clinton Free
Online ratings and reviews have recently emerged as mechanisms to facilitate accountability and transparency in the provision of goods and services. The purpose of this paper is…
Abstract
Purpose
Online ratings and reviews have recently emerged as mechanisms to facilitate accountability and transparency in the provision of goods and services. The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and outcome of the accountability that online ratings and reviews create in the sharing economy.
Design/methodology/approach
The study draws on 30 face-to-face and Skype interviews with Airbnb guests and hosts as well as on secondary materials, including content from Airbnb data analytic reports.
Findings
The authors demonstrate that face-saving practices widely condition user ratings and comments. Face saving occurs when individuals attempt to preserve their own identity and the identity of others during a social interaction. At Airbnb, the authors find that reviewers adopt three distinct face-saving strategies: the use of private reviewing channels, the creation of tactful reviews and refraining from reviewing entirely. The authors also find that users are sceptical of rating metrics and public comments and draw upon a wide range of alternative sources, such as private messaging and other publicly available resources, in their decision making.
Originality/value
This paper highlights the overwhelmingly positive character of Airbnb ratings and reviews. It proposes the concept of crowdbased accountability as a limited, partial form of assurance for sharing economy users. Guests and hosts alike prioritise face-saving practices over reviewer responsibilities to provide authentic, reliable accounts to the public. Consequently, reviewers effectively remove the risk of sanctions for those in the network who underperform.