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The paper focuses on the question of the extent to which individual preference-based values are suitable in guiding environmental policy and damage assessment decisions. Three criteria for “suitableness” are reviewed: conceptual, moral and legal. Their discussion suggests that: (i) the concept of economic value as applied to environmental resources is a meaningful concept based on the notion of trade-off; (ii) the limitations of the moral foundations of cost-benefit analysis do not invalidate its use as a procedure for guiding environmental decision making; (iii) the input of individual preferences into damage assessment is compatible with the basic foundations of tort law; (iv) using individual preference-based methods provides incentives for efficient levels of due care; (v) determining standing is still very contentious for various categories of users as well as for aggregating non-use values. Overall, the discussion suggests that the use of preference-based approaches in both the policy and legal arenas is warranted provided that they are accurately applied, their limitations are openly acknowledged and they assume an information-providing rather than a determinative role.

Strong versions of the Precautionary Principle (PP) require regulators to prohibit or impose technology controls on activities that pose uncertain risks of possibly significant environmental harm. This decision rule is conceptually unsound and would diminish social welfare. Uncertainty as such does not justify regulatory precaution. While they should reject PP, regulators should take appropriate account of societal aversion to risks of large harm and the value of obtaining additional information before allowing environmentally risky activities to proceed.

Snakes and Ladders: Adult education and mental health video‐based action pack. Jeremy Braund, Richard Hooper, Stewart Moore and Robin Hoyle (Eds.). Looseleaf folder with 2 videos. Produced by the Lancashire Stepping Stones Project.

Thomas Reid (1710–1796) was the originator of the Scottish philosophy of common sense, an approach that claims reality is objective and knowable, made up of material objects, and understandable by ordinary men. Common sense philosophy developed in opposition to the pervasive skepticism of the period, best exemplified by David Hume. A professor of philosophy at King’s College, Aberdeen, Reid was chosen to be the successor to Adam Smith as the chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. From that position, Reid played an important role in the Scottish Enlightenment as professor, scholar, and correspondent. While Reid was not an economist, he did write on important theoretical and philosophical issues in moral philosophy, the natural sciences and mathematics. Reid may prove additionally interesting to economists for his insightful critique of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.

Proposes a general rationale for acting cautiously when marketing to children, and indicates some possibly inappropriate managerial attitudes: for instance that minors are basically small adults, that parents rather than companies should protect children in the marketplace, that all marketing is directed at adults, that certain practice are acceptable because they were done in the past, that managers were once children, and that the company’s practices must be acceptable if they are legal. Suggests ways that companies can remedy this: appoint an ethics officer and take ethics training seriously, avoid dubious products and marketing that support premature maturation and the end of childhood, accept an “in loco parentis” role with regard to children, and remain alert to new threats.