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Since Jensen and Meckling [1976] first introduced the concept of an agency cost of debt, most research on the agency cost of debt has centered on who bears these costs. Jensen and Meckling's original contention was that if bondholders have rational expectations, then the owner‐manager should bear the agency costs of debt. The alternative to this explanation was first offered by Barnea, Haugen and Senbet [1981] who claimed that because of the effects of agency costs on the supply of debt, these costs would be borne by the bondholders. Roberts and Viscione [1984] extend the analysis of Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet by including costly tax avoidance on personal and corporate levels to show that the agency costs of debt are shared by bondholders and owner‐managers.

The relationship between the amount of executive compensation and the size of the firm has long been a disputed area of economics. Baumol (1959) was among the first to observe that firm size and executive compensation appear to be positively correlated. This view was further supported by the works of McGuire, Chin and Elbing (1962), Ciscel (1974), and Walkling & Long (1984). Other studies (see e.g., Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) have contended that profit maximization is the principal determinant of variations in executive compensation. More recently, a debate has raged in the popular press as to whether executives of the auto industry deserve the largest salaries recently awarded them (see e.g., Fortune 1984).

This study examines the distortive effects of the states’ regulatory climate on the underwriting costs of new equity issues of public utilities. Each state has its own public utility commission (or public service commission) to regulate the natural monopolies of public utilities. The wealth‐maximizing behavior of utilities is constrained by the rate‐making process monitored by the commissions. The policies of a state’s commission collectively establish the ’regulatory climate’ in that state. Using a sample of new equity securities issued, during the period from January 1973 through September 1980, by utilities listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange, we investigate the effect of the regulatory climate on underwriting costs. Our findings are that,in general, the direct costs of flotation, namely, underwriting commissions and out‐of‐pocket expenses,are positively related to regulatory climate where as the indirect cost of flotation, namely, underpricing of the new issue, is negatively related to regulatory climate. These results are counter intuitive since they imply that as the regulatory climate becomes more unfavorable the direct costs of flotation increase and the indirect cost of flotation decreases. This is clearly a distortive effect of the regulation and we offer some explanations for it.

Volume 25 celebrates the 25th year of publication for the American Journal of Business (AJB). Launched by eight MAC schools of business in March 1986, the Journal has featured more than 700 authors who have contributed more than 330 research articles at the intersection of theory and practice. From accounting to marketing, management to finance, the Journal prominently covers the breadth of the business disciplines as a general business outlet intended for both practitioners and academics. As the Journal reaches out beyond the MAC in sponsorship, authorship, and readership, we assess the Journal’s first quarter century of impact.

Each year since 1983, Fortune magazine has published a survey featuring “America's most admired” corporations. Although the most admired corporations are certainly worthy of some praise and the least admired deserving of criticism, whether these admired companies are worthy of investors' money is less clear. We examine the ex ante and ex post returns of a sample of the most and least admired corporations in the Fortune survey.

Private equity and venture capital (VC) firms in the capital markets sector invest capital with the primary goal of delivering economic value. However, some firms in the capital markets sector have started to shift this focus to create (i.e. invest in) social value. More specifically, traditional VC firms are starting socially oriented funds, while other firms have emerged to focus solely on investments in social enterprises. These VC firms are contributing to an interesting paradox – performance metrics are not measured by profit alone but also by social innovation. From an architectural perspective, the authors examine the implications of internal design, i.e. how specific strategic and structural factors influence the financial performance of VC firms with a social orientation to determine if these firms really can “do well and do good.”

Social orientation was determined by content analysis of mission statements of the VC firms. Firm strategies, structures and performance were sourced from secondary data. A moderated mediation model was used to test relationships.

Results suggest that (1) socially responsible VC firms adopt distinct foci of social investing that directs their strategic orientation and (2) these various foci have vastly differing effects on the firm's overall performance, strategic decisions made and the architecture of their structural design.

This study is among the first to explore socially responsible VC architectural dimensions, with implications for firm design based on blended measures of success.

This chapter examines the key characteristics of success of the university-wide entrepreneurial ecosystem at Syracuse University. From 2007 to 2012, Syracuse University developed an academic signature in entrepreneurship, innovation, and community engagement resulting from 165 programs that linked the campus and the community. Nine critical factors of success for individual programs were observed. This chapter provides recommendations for establishing an experientially focused university-wide entrepreneurship education program and suggestions on mistakes to avoid.

Understanding and predicting the emergence of venture initiation entails research to explore the antecedents of entrepreneurial intention (EI) and behavior. This book chapter aims to provide an overview on the role of exogenous factors (entrepreneurship education), contextual and environmental factors (perceived entrepreneurial motivators and barriers) in developing EIs and behavior among the university graduates. It also highlights the different strands of opinion and research on the role that formal entrepreneurship programs may (or may not) play in developing EI and action. This book chapter further provides some developments on the factors mentioned above among the different Asian countries while using Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). Since 1999 GEM reports have been a key source of comparable data across a large variety of countries on attitudes toward entrepreneurship, start-up, established business activities, and aspirations of entrepreneurs for their businesses.