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The purpose of this paper is to present evidence about cultural differences between Mexico and China, and analyze their significance when implementing an innovative financial model. Specifically, the authors analyzed the case of the Yunus model (or Grameen model), originally developed in Bangladesh and further implemented in China and Mexico.

This paper uses a comparative quantity study to test the cultural difference which affects the innovative financial model implementation. A materialism and credit overuse value scale (Ponchio and Aranha, 2008; Richins, 2011; Roberts and Jones, 2001) is applied to analyze cultural differences with a sample of 250 people in each country.

The results show that the survey responses are statistically significantly different in these two countries. The Mexican sample shows a greater affinity with luxury and bragging. The Chinese sample shows more responsibility toward credit. Recommendations for the implementation of the innovative financial model considering cultural differences are suggested.

Based on the survey results, gender equality, greater caution with young borrowers, financial education programs, and strict liability agreements to ensure credit repayment, especially for Mexico, are suggested, with the aim of enabling microfinance institutions to increase the successful implementation of the Yunus model in China and Mexico.

There are few existing cultural comparisons between China and Mexico. Therefore, one of the relevant contributions of this work is to shed light on the cultural differences of these two important emerging economies for future research. Additionally, the authors applied a materialism and credit overuse value scale developed to assess consumer behavior as a proxy for culture. The results are relevant for further usage of this scale as a tool to help adapt innovative financial models for application in other cultures.

This chapter presents first a theoretical model of conflict between two agents characterised by a two-sector economy. In a contested sector, two agents struggle to appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. In an uncontested sector, they hold secure property rights over the production of some goods. Agents split their resource endowment between ‘butter’, ‘guns’ and ‘ice-cream’. Eventually, tradable goods made of both butter and ice-cream produced by conflicting parties are sold to the rest of the world. Therefore, the opportunity cost of conflict depends also on the relative profitability of contested and uncontested production. In particular, productivity of uncontested production and profitability of contested sectors are countervailing forces. The empirical section focused on a panel of Sub-Saharan African countries for the period 1995–2006. Results are not fully conclusive. However, there is robust evidence that prices of manufactures (interpreted as the uncontested ice-cream) are negatively associated with the likelihood of a civil war. Eventually, international price of manufactures is also associated with a higher GDP per capita growth rate. The concluding remark seems to be that an increase in world prices of manufactures would make civil wars less likely.

We empirically analyze the link between state capacity and civil conflict via the manufacturing sector, which is the source of wealth for an emerging new elite interested in obtaining political representation, and is the outcome of a new political equilibrium more in tune with capital accumulation. This raises the cost of civil conflict, reducing its probability of occurrence. We find evidence in favor of our hypothesis in panels of African and Latin American countries.

This chapter focuses on the Maoist insurgency in the 75 districts of Nepal and tries to analyze the insurgency in a comparative perspective. We compare the 75 districts with the aim to address the following questions: Why does an insurgency emerge in certain areas? How is it linked to economic, social, or political factors? Why does an insurgency show a robust presence in some districts but fail to do likewise in others? We attempt to answer these questions by conducting multivariate regressions using longitudinal data to test our primary hypothesis that the onset of an insurgency and the continuation are functions of the same factors. We examine insurgency within one country, Nepal, and test our model in Nepal's 75 districts, in a single country context, using available data on the 10-year-long insurgency. We break down the Nepalese insurgency into two parts: the onset and the continuation. Our findings indicate that regions predominantly polarized by caste are more prone to the onset of insurgency than any other factor. Higher literacy rate, a proxy for government efficacy, renders insurgency less feasible, and difficult terrain has no impact whatsoever. However, after the onset, many of the explanatory variables are no longer significant for the continuation of the insurgency and grievances alone tend to be meaningless.