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The purpose of this paper is to examine if the structure and design of CEO compensation has any effect on firm innovation. It further investigates the effectiveness of each component of portfolio of compensation incentives in encouraging innovation.

This study uses systems of simultaneous equations to model the interdependence between compensation incentives and measures of firm innovation.

Results indicate that the pay‐performance sensitivity of the CEO portfolio of compensation incentives is positively related to investment in R&D expenditures, number of patents and citations. Options in general are more effective than stocks. However, within the options portfolio, recently awarded and unvested options are more effective than previously awarded and vested options. Restricted stock is more effective than unrestricted stock.

Measuring innovation output is difficult as innovation could take different forms, including business model innovation, which does not appear in the patent data.

Stock options encourage investment in value‐increasing innovations and should remain a significant part of managerial compensation. If the firm awards stock, it should only award restricted stock.

This study uses comprehensive measures of compensation incentives and firm innovation. It views incentives as a portfolio of stock and options and uses incentives in their entirety. It examines the effectiveness of each component of the portfolio in encouraging innovation. It measures innovation as investment into the innovation process (R&D expenditures) and the resulting success of that investment (patents and citations).

The purpose of this paper is to analyze if the composition and activity of the appointment and remuneration committee have a significant effect in the remunerations of the members of the board of directors.

To achieve the paper's objective the authors proposed four hypotheses in order to analyze the repercussions of independent, institutional and executive directors in the Appointment and Retribution Committee (ARC) and its activity in the directors’ remunerations.

The results put into evidence that the composition (independent, institutional and executive members) of the ARC is not associated with the variation of the directors remuneration mean, while the activity of the ARC influences positively this remuneration mean, contrary to what was expected.

The ARC in Spain is not effective in fixating the directors’ remunerations.

El objetivo de este artículo es analizar si la configuración y actividad de las comisiones de nombramientos y remuneraciones (CNR) tienen un efecto significativo en las remuneraciones de los miembros del consejo de administración.

Para alcanzar el objetivo del artículo hemos planteado cuatro hipótesis con la finalidad de analizar la repercusión de los consejeros independientes, dominicales y ejecutivos de las CNR y la actividad de las mismas en las remuneraciones de los consejeros.

Los resultados ponen de manifiesto que la composición (miembros independientes, dominicales y ejecutivos) de las CNR no se asocian con la variación de las remuneraciones medias de los consejeros, mientras que la actividad de las CNR influye de manera positiva, contrario a lo pronosticado, en las variaciones de las retribuciones medias de los consejeros.

Las CNR en España no son efectivas en la fijación de las retribuciones de los consejeros.

This paper surveys theoretical and practical issues associated with a particular type of information retrieval problem, namely that where the information need is pictorial. The paper is contextualised by the notion of a visually stimulated society, in which the ease of record creation and transmission in the visual medium is contrasted with the difficulty of gaining effective subject access to the world's stores of such records. The technological developments which, in casting the visual image in electronic form, have contributed so significantly to its availability are reviewed briefly, as a prelude to the main thrust of the paper. Concentrating on still and moving pictorial forms of the visual image, the paper dwells on issues related to the subject indexing of pictorial material and discusses four models of pictorial information retrieval corresponding with permutations of the verbal and visual modes for the representation of picture content and of information need.

Dramatic changes have taken place in the UK gas industry, particularly within the last decade. It is therefore helpful to briefly consider these changes and the role of research and development within the industry so as to provide a backcloth to the subsequent descriptions of R & D information services.

Ask what is meant by ‘Distributed Information Processing’ (DIP) and you are likely to receive as many varied answers as there are respondents. Depending on their background and experience, they may refer to such matters as distributed computing, communications networks, clustered mini‐computers, office automation, local area networks, personal computers; the list is virtually endless.

We study the events that motivate CEOs to underinvest in R&D long-term projects (CEO myopia). Based on the existing literature in earnings management and agency theory, myopia is likely to become more problematic under five circumstances: when the CEO nears retirement (the CEO horizon problem), R&D projects have very long time horizons (the project horizon problem), the firm’s financial health is deteriorating (the cover-up problem), ownership structure is heavily weighted toward insider owners (minority owner oppression problem), and when the threat of hostile takeover increases (the entrenchment problem). We setup a dynamic simulation model in which rational CEOs maximize the total value of their bonus compensation over their tenure. Our findings related to the five circumstances are consistent with the extant literature. However, we found an unexpected stable, nonlinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between CEO tenure and R&D investment. We discuss the theoretical implications of our model and offer suggestions for future research.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically test the predictions in Titman (1984) and Berk et al. (2010) which indicate that firms with higher leverage will pay chief executive officer (CEO) and employee more. In addition, this paper examines whether financial distressed firms utilize leverage as a bargaining tool to reduce labor costs.

This paper conducts ordinary least squares regression analysis to investigate: CEO compensation which represents critical employees and lower-level employee compensation which represents less critical employees. Empirical data consist of US publicly held companies during the period between 2006 and 2013.

This paper finds that firms with higher levels of leverage tend to compensate employees for their human capital risk and that financially distressed firms consider leverage a bargaining tool by which to depress labor costs, which leads to lower employee compensation as compared to that of financially healthy firms.

This paper highlights the importance of keeping balance between human capital and labor costs. In the case that human capital risk might not be fully compensated by firms facing financial distress, vicious cycle could occur because a failure of considering human capital might invite unrecoverable consequence. This could be done in future research.

This paper has three contributions. First, this paper supports the Titman (1984) and Berk et al. (2010) by empirically documenting that high-leveraged firms compensate their employees for potential human capital risk. Second, this paper adds to the literature by empirically providing that human capital risk might not be fully compensated if the firms are facing financial distress. Finally, this paper contributes to the authorities by showing that employees’ interests may be sacrificed if the firm is under financial distress.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between stock options compensation and firm strategic risk-taking, employing a quantile regression (QR) model. This study aims to analyze whether the impact of stock options on firm strategic risk-taking changes across various quantiles and investigates the moderating role of firm performance.

This study is based on a sample of 90 French firms for the period extending from 2008 to 2019. To deal with the non-uniform association, the authors use a panel quantile method.

The results reveal that the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) stock options on firm strategic risk-taking varies across risk-taking quantiles. More specifically, the study’s results show a positive association at low quantile levels of strategic risk-taking, measured by research and development (R&D) and a negative linkage at high levels. The authors also find that firm performance moderates the impact of CEO stock options on strategic risk-taking.

The non-uniform relationship between CEO stock options and firm strategic risk-taking shows that the weight of CEO stock options in the total compensation can be a major determinant of the firm's strategic risk-taking attitude.

This study extends existing research on executive compensation and strategic risk-taking. Thus, this study has the potential to help stakeholders, board of directors and regulators, who are attempting to understand how the compensation contract – in particular, stock option pay – is related to the risk behavior of the agents and guide them to structure the executive compensation in an optimal way.

This study examines whether CEO power influences the book-based and market-based performance of Russian companies when it is restricted by the presence of essential shareholders, namely, state and influential businessmen.

Managerial power is divided into structural, ownership, expert and prestige. The proposed power metrics include not only CEOs but also the board of directors' characteristics that may restrict or enhance CEO power. The empirical analysis is based on the sample of 90 large traded Russian firms, which shares are included in the Moscow Stock Exchange Broad Market Index (MICEX BMI), observed from 2012 to 2019.

Panel data analysis suggests that higher board ownership and tenure may restrict CEO power, which in turn would be beneficial for corporate performance. the authors also see that in companies owned by influential businessmen, CEO power influence on M/B value is more negative, while state ownership does not moderate it. CEO power metrics, based on political experience and tenure, affect corporate performance differently in companies affiliated with extractive industries.

First, the authors consider two channels through which a company in emerging markets may get additional resources: CEOs and influential owners. Second, the authors develop power metrics based on Finkelstein's managerial power classification (1992) and the idea of relative power proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2011). It allows identifying whether the board of directors' may constrain or enhance CEO power to raise corporate performance. Third, the authors analyze developing Russian markets that represent a good ground for testing the question, whereas empirical research on Russia is relatively scarce (Grosman and Leiponen, 2018). Fourth, the authors pay particular attention to the CEO power in the extractive industry, strategically important for the Russian economy.

本研究擬探討行政總裁的權力，若因有不可或缺的股東 - 即國家和具影響力的實業家 - 的存在而受到約束時，其權力會否影響俄羅斯公司以賬簿為基礎和以市場為基礎的表現

管理權分為結構性的、所有權的、專家的和聲望的。提出的權力指標不但包括行政總裁，也涵蓋或會限制或增加行政總裁權力的董事會特徵。本研究的實證分析法是基於90間股份被納入莫斯科股票交易廣泛市場指數的大型俄羅斯上市公司樣本，觀察期由2012年至2019年

面板數據分析顯示、較高的董事會所有權和較長的任期或會限制行政總裁的權力，這因此有利於提升企業績效。我們亦看到，在具影響力的企業家擁有的公司裡，行政總裁權力對市價淨值的影響是較負面的，而國有制沒有把它減低。就隸屬採掘業的公司而言，基於政治經驗和任期的行政總裁權力指標，會對企業績效帶來不同的影響

(一) 我們考慮在新興市場公司可取得額外資源的兩個途徑：行政總裁和具影響力的所有者。(二) 我們基於芬克爾斯坦 (Finkelstein, 1992) 的管理權分類，以及 Bebchuk et al. (2011) 所提出相對功率的學說，建立了權力指標。憑著這權力指標，我們可鑑定董事會會限制、抑或增強行政總裁提升企業績效的權力。(三) 我們分析發展中的俄羅斯市場，其為測試我們問題的良好地方，而探討俄羅斯的實證研究較為稀有 (Grosman and Leiponen, 2018) 。(四) 我們特別關注在採掘業的行政總裁權力，而採掘業對俄羅斯經濟來說、是具有重要戰略意義的

The purpose of this study is to examine the nonlinear relationship between executive stock options and strategic risk taking and to investigate the moderating effect of CEO characteristics (CEO age and tenure). This study aims to analyze whether the impact of executive stock options on strategic risk-taking is moderated by CEO compensation and characteristics.

This study is based on a sample of 90 French firms for the period extending from 2008 to 2021. To deal with the nonlinear relationship, the author adopts a dynamic threshold model.

The results reveal that the impact of CEO stock options on firm strategic risk-taking is nonlinear and moderated by CEO age and tenure. Using research and development (R&D) as a measure of risk taking, the author show a positive relationship between executive stock option and R&D below the threshold value of stock option, CEO age and tenure and it becomes negative above.

Stock options, CEO age and tenure shows that CEO characteristics and compensation structure are major determinants in defining the direction of the nonlinear relationship between CEO stock options and firm strategic risk-taking.

The author extends through this paper the existing research on executive stock option, strategic risk-taking and CEO characteristics using a nonlinear dynamic estimator that caters to the problems of endogeneity. Insights from the findings provide boards and regulators with a better understanding of structuring CEO compensation.