Search results

The main purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of state capital participation (SCP) on the corporate environmental engagement (CEE) of privately controlled listed firms in China.

We use a sample of 20,133 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2021. We use three different measures to proxy corporate environmental engagement and two different measures to proxy for state capital participation. We employ a difference-in-difference regression model to estimate the effect of state capital participation on corporate environmental engagement.

Using a sample of 20,133 firm-year observations from 2009 to 2021, we find that SCP significantly increases corporate expenditure on environmental protection, corporate environmental performance and ESG ratings. Specifically, SCP increases environmental investment capacity and attracts more media coverage, online attention and analysts’ following, which leads to better environmental engagement. Further analyses show that after state shareholders exit privately controlled firms, CEE deteriorates, while private capital injection in state-owned firms has no significant impact on CEE. The positive effect of SCP is stronger in privately controlled firms with local government ownership, a larger number of state shareholders, longer state shareholder holding periods, those without politically connected managers and firms operating in heavy pollution industries. Lastly, we show that minority government ownership reduces firm-level toxic emissions and enhances financial performance.

We enrich the literature on the role of minority state ownership in corporate financial and environmental performance.

We enrich the literature on the role of minority state ownership in corporate financial and environmental performance. In light of the escalating environmental concerns and the growing emphasis on corporate environmental responsibility, this study highlights the beneficial role of minority government ownership in driving environmental performance. By providing resources and attracting external scrutiny, the government, as a minority shareholder, can significantly enhance the environmental engagement of privately controlled firms.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how venture capital (VC) backing influences the board size and independence and how VC backing and board structure impact firm performance in China.

Using hand-collected data from 924 initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses covering the period from January 2004 to December 2012, the authors investigate the impact of VC backing on board size, board independence and firm market performance through regression analysis. A two-stage approach is also used to address the endogeneity issue.

The authors find robust evidence that VC-backed IPOs have more independent boards, after controlling for CEO and firm characteristics, and the potential endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, firms backed by VCs with management political ties (PTs) have more independent directors with industry relevant expertise than other firms. While no significant relationship is found between board independence and firm performance, the authors present some evidence that IPOs which have a larger percentage of independent directors with industry relevant expertise exhibit higher long-term stock returns, and VCs with management PTs also improve IPO long-run stock performance.

Although VC is new in China and the Chinese capital market has relative poor corporate governance and weak minority shareholder protection, the authors find support in this paper that VC backing is valuable to IPO firms in China not only through providing funding but also by providing political ties and industry experience. However, Chinese regulatory and institutional settings have strong impact on test results and they change rapidly, so the results may not apply to other period in Chinese markets.

This paper sheds lights on the influences of VC backing on corporate governance and firm performance in a transitional and emerging economy. It discovers the value of VC investors in a transitional economy as of providing political ties and industry experience. The new definition of independent directors suggested by Suchard (2009) is first used by our paper in the Chinese context.

This paper aims to explore various tensions related to the diffusion and reception of the New Qing History (NQH) in China, and more specifically, it aims at underlying a recurrent tension within the core of this debate, between a Global and a Nationalist historical narrative.

The author’s focus is to analyze various texts published in China between 2006 and 2018.

The author argues that the intensity of the current debate is partly related on the one hand, to the fact that NQH undermines various aspects of China’s Nationalist teleology and territorial claims and, on the other hand, to the basic difficulty of accepting the coexistence of various historical representations that are risking to weaken contemporary’s justifications of its rising schemes.

The text presents an original reading of some important issues raised by the NQH debate.