Search results

The purpose of this paper is to propose Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory, developed by the Durkheimian institutional theory, as developed by anthropologist Mary Douglas, as a suitable theory base for undertaking cross-cultural accounting research. The social theory provides a structure for examining within-country and cross-country actions and behaviours of different groups and communities. It avoids associating nations and cultures, instead contending any nation will comprise four different solidarities engaging in constant dialogues. Further, it is a dynamic theory able to take account of cultural change.

The paper establishes a case for using neo-Durkheimian institutional theory in cross-cultural accounting research by specifying the key components of the theory and addressing common criticisms. To illustrate how the theory might be utilised in the domain of accounting and finance research, a comparative interpretation of the different experiences of financialization in Germany and the UK is provided drawing on Douglas’s grid-group schema.

Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory is deemed sufficiently capable of interpreting the behaviours of different social groups and is not open to the same criticisms as Hofstede’s work. Differences in Douglasian cultural dialogues in the post-1945 history of Germany and the UK provide an explanation of the variations in the comparative experiences of financialization.

Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory has been used in a wide range of contexts; however, it has been little used in the context of accounting research. The adoption of the theory in future accounting research can redress a Hofstedian-bias in accounting research.

This paper examines risk information disclosed by UK public companies within their annual reports. The types of risk information disclosed are analyzed and the authors examine whether a relationship exists between company size or level of risk and risk disclosure totals.

No prior empirical studies of the risk information content of annual reports have been undertaken. To analyze the risk disclosures, a sentence‐based approach was used.

Overall the results indicate that the companies sampled are not providing a complete picture of the risks they face. There is minimal disclosure of quantified risk information and a significant proportion of risk disclosures consist of generalized statements of risk policy. More usefully directors are releasing forward‐looking risk information. The principal driver affecting levels of risk disclosure is company size and not company risk level.

Further risk disclosure research is possible in many different areas. Cross‐country studies could be undertaken as could risk disclosure studies within specific industry sectors. A limitation of the sentence‐based methodology is that it does not measure the quality of the risk disclosures and therefore different methods may be adopted in future studies.

Professional bodies attempting to improve risk reporting have not convinced directors of the benefits associated with greater voluntary risk disclosure. In the UK this has led to a mandatory requirement to provide better risk information being forced upon companies through legislation enacted by the UK government.

The area this paper researches is of particular importance given recent accounting scandals that have occurred. No previous risk disclosure studies have been published, therefore this exploration is also valuable in linking risk management and transparency.

The purpose of this paper is to examine risk disclosures by UK companies within their annual reports. Tests are performed to measure the level of the readability of the risk disclosures and to assess whether directors are deliberately obscuring bad risk news.

The paper draws upon methodologies developed in prior empirical studies of annual report readability. Thus it uses the Flesch Reading Ease formula to measure the readability of the risk disclosures and coefficients of variation are used to measure obfuscation. A content analysis approach is adopted to identify risk disclosures.

The paper finds that the mean Flesch reading ease ratings for the sample companies are all below 50 indicating that the level of readability of the risk disclosures is difficult or very difficult and this supports prior research examining the readability of sample passages in annual reports. No evidence is found to suggest that directors are deliberately obfuscating or concealing bad risk news through their writing style.

The paper also finds that the Flesch reading ease ratings measure the readability, not the understandability, of disclosures and whilst actions can be taken to minimise problems associated with reliability when performing content analysis they cannot be wholly eliminated.

The paper shows that there have been calls for improved risk disclosures to enable stakeholders to better understand a company's risk position. Requiring directors to issue extra risk information will not, however, lead to enhanced risk communication unless the readability of the risk disclosures is also improved.

In this paper it is shown that there have been no prior studies that focus upon testing for readability and obfuscation in risk disclosures. It is important that transparent risk information is provided to the marketplace and therefore this study is valuable in its examination of the clarity of communication of published risk information.

This paper aims to utilise cultural theory of risk to provide a broad analytic framework for examining how risk is constructed within the dominant discourses around patient safety within the domain of psychiatry. It also seeks to examine notions of blame and to consider the possibility of the creation of a no‐blame culture.

The empirical element of the paper draws on qualitative interviews with a sample of psychiatrists to explore how culture may give rise to different perceptions and responses in respect of “risky behaviour” and “safe practice”.

The paper discusses how psychiatry may be differentiated from other branches of medicine and concludes that the cultural grouping that appears to be most apposite in respect of psychiatrists is the egalitarian culture. However, changes in the NHS are resulting in the imposition of an individualistic culture on the community of psychiatrists with the effect that behaviours are being adopted as measures to avoid potential blame.

The paper finds that if the NHS is to improve patient safety then it must recognise that it is not possible to create a no‐blame culture and, therefore, it is more important to consider which type of culture will impact most positively on patient safety. It appears that psychiatrists are being compelled to adopt an individualistic culture when an egalitarian culture would be more advantageous for patient safety.

In contrast with the methodological individualism of the current safety orthodoxy which interprets risk as an objective and measurable phenomenon, the paper draws on cultural theory of risk to develop a critical perspective on current safety policy and to explore how “risky” and “safe” practices are socially constructed in the context of psychiatry.

This paper provides a wide-ranging and up-to-date (1997–2016) review of the archival empirical risk-reporting literature. The reviewed papers are classified into two principal themes: the incentives for and/or informativeness of risk reporting. Our review demonstrates areas of significant divergence in the literature specifically: mandatory versus voluntary risk reporting, manual versus automated content analysis, within-country versus cross-country variations in risk reporting, and risk reporting in financial versus non-financial firms. Our paper identifies a number of issues which require further research. In particular we draw attention to two: first, a lack of clarity and consistency around the conceptualization of risk; and second, the potential costs and benefits of standard-setters’ involvement.

Discussions regarding United States competitiveness in the world today often include and even accept the idea of government business “partnerships.” Gaining strategic advantage is seen as a matter of changing the role and also the priorities of government, and developing new relationships with the business community. This creates new expectations for our public officials. Experts are saying in many different ways that economic progress reflects an increase in a nation's goods sold on world markets; greater global “market share” for that nation's products; or an increased ability to attract foreign investment. In each case, the key actor is the multinational corporation.