Peter Chalos, Margaret Poon, Dean Tjosvold and W.J. Dunn
Organizations rely on budget teams for capital investment decisions. This study examined conditions that affected budget team performance. Variables included the formulation of…
Abstract
Organizations rely on budget teams for capital investment decisions. This study examined conditions that affected budget team performance. Variables included the formulation of cooperative, competitive and independent team budget goals and the mediating effect of budget information analysis between goals and budget performance. Two antecedents to budget goal formulation were examined, the budget knowledge of individual team members and organizational feedback control. Posited hypotheses were supported. Asymmetric budget knowledge between team members significantly increased independent and competitive budget goals and decreased cooperative budget goals. Organizational controls discouraged independent and competitive goals and encouraged cooperative budget goals. Cooperative (competitive and independent) budget goals improved (hindered) budget information analysis that in turn positively (negatively) affected budget performance.
Connie Rae Bateman, Neil C. Herndon and John P. Fraedrich
This paper represents a discussion of transfer pricing (TP). Key factors are identified and propositions developed from tax accounting and other perspectives. Stages of the TP…
Abstract
This paper represents a discussion of transfer pricing (TP). Key factors are identified and propositions developed from tax accounting and other perspectives. Stages of the TP decision process are identified along with the critical factors directly affecting sales and a TP audit. Propositions are derived which show relationships among these variables and tax rates, competition, and TP methodologies. Finally, academic research implications are suggested.
Peter Chalos and Neale G. O’Connor
Studies the characteristics, control and performance of joint ventures producing a model based on four cases. Explains the theory of complementary strategic objectives, and the…
Abstract
Studies the characteristics, control and performance of joint ventures producing a model based on four cases. Explains the theory of complementary strategic objectives, and the need for delineating specific transaction costs and management controls under differing cultures. Interviews managers of four Sino‐American Joint Ventures in manufacturing for several years. Finds that the US partner controlled the technology, the Chinese partner wanted to reduce imports and import management and product skills. Focuses on raw material sourcing as a cause of conflict, as well as slow learning and high transaction costs from a poorly controlled system. Points out the keenness for incentive payments among Chinese workers and the reluctance by Chinese managers to have their performance evaluated.