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The purpose of this paper is to examine whether healthcare leaders use evidence-based management (EBMgt) when facing major decisions and what types of evidence healthcare administrators consult during their decision-making. This study also intends to identify any relationship that might exist among adoption of EBMgt in healthcare management, attitudes towards EBMgt, demographic characteristics and organizational characteristics.

A cross-sectional study was conducted among US healthcare leaders. Spearman’s correlation and logistic regression were performed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) 23.0.

One hundred and fifty-four healthcare leaders completed the survey. The study results indicated that 90 per cent of the participants self-reported having used an EBMgt approach for decision-making. Professional experiences (87 per cent), organizational data (84 per cent) and stakeholders’ values (63 per cent) were the top three types of evidence consulted daily and weekly for decision-making. Case study (75 per cent) and scientific research findings (75 per cent) were the top two types of evidence consulted monthly or less than once a month. An exploratory, stepwise logistic regression model correctly classified 75.3 per cent of all observations for a dichotomous “use of EBMgt” response variable using three independent variables: attitude towards EBMgt, number of employees in the organization and the job position. Spearman’s correlation indicated statistically significant relationships between healthcare leaders’ use of EBMgt and healthcare organization bed size (r_s = 0.217, n = 152, p < 0.01), attitude towards EBMgt (r_s = 0.517, n = 152, p < 0.01), and the number of organization employees (r_s = 0.195, n = 152, p = 0.016).

This study generated new research findings on the practice of EBMgt in US healthcare administration decision-making.

Casino gambling in the United States has increased significantly in the last 30 years, going from just 2 states (Nevada and New Jersey) in 1988 to 41 states with over 980 casinos. This rapid growth of casino gambling has resulted in additional social costs, including workplace embezzlements committed by problem gamblers. Embezzlements contribute to greater fraud risk for organizations in casino regions and are expected to rise as casinos multiply and increasingly cater to convenience gamblers. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the proximity of casinos as a fraud risk factor for embezzlement. The authors recommend that internal and external auditors for companies located in casino areas assess this fraud risk and where appropriate, perform audit procedures to address this risk. There is also an opportunity for external auditors to assist those companies located in casino regions (that may lack internal auditors) in establishing fraud prevention programs.

This paper aims to focus on the relationship between audit committees, external auditors and internal control systems (ICS) and strives to point out mutual influences between the instances to provide an integrated perspective for firms’ multilateral monitoring mechanisms. Furthermore, this study emphasizes the incorporation of sustainability and fraud considerations into the traditional roles of audit committees and auditors.

This structured literature review is based on 71 empirical-quantitative studies published in high-quality journals between 2005 and 2022. Considering the classification of ICS into ICS quality and internal audit function, the studies are analyzed with regard to audit committees’ and external auditors’ characteristics, divided into incentives and competencies, as well as their mutual relationships.

This study highlights a dynamic trilateral network of relationships between monitoring authorities and primarily shows that audit committees equipped with adequate competencies generate a substitutive effect for external auditors by reducing their efforts, whereas ICS quality serves as a possible mediator in this network of relationships. The establishment of an integrative three-party coalition of competent and adequately incentivized monitoring parties is essential to guarantee sufficient and appropriate ICS and overall corporate governance quality.

The findings should prompt legislators and firms to ensure a deeper collaboration between audit committees, internal auditors and external auditors to generate synergy effects and economies of scale within the integrative monitoring process. Legislators should develop stricter requirements for competencies of audit committees and auditors. These should include a holistic triad of sustainability, fraud and digital expertise as well as mandatory forensic procedures performed by all monitoring bodies.

The authors contribute to prior research by highlighting the importance of an integrative three-party coalition of monitoring authorities to ensure corporate governance quality and to generate synergy effects within a dynamic multilateral monitoring process. Furthermore, the authors offer cutting-edge implications by stressing the need for consideration of sustainability and fraud aspects in the traditional work and profiles of audit committees and auditors.

Although principal–agent theory has gained a prominent place in research, its negative image of self-serving managers is frequently criticized. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to examine how existing theories of agency and stewardship can be combined by using behavioral characteristics.

This study reviewed articles on the behavior of agents and stewards from the domains of finance, economics, management, corporate governance and organizational research. Additional theoretical and meta-analytical empirical literature from the fields of psychology and sociology was used to account for general patterns of human behavior.

The results indicate that goal congruency and the perception of fairness can serve as moderators distinguishing agency theory and stewardship theory. Goal congruency can be achieved by stipulating psychological ownership. The perception of distributive and procedural fairness is demonstrated by two major corporate governance mechanisms: performance-based compensation and board monitoring. The results are summarized in six hypotheses that allow a situational, customized corporate governance. These hypotheses can be tested in future research.

Prior work either focused on the merits of principal-agent theory or advocates the utilization of positive management theories, such as stewardship theory. However, little work has been done on bridging the gap between both constructs and develop a more extensive view of management theory.