Examines the continuing obligations regime imposed on listed public companies via the United Kingdom Listing Authority’s Listing Rules, and how far this protects a company’s…
Abstract
Examines the continuing obligations regime imposed on listed public companies via the United Kingdom Listing Authority’s Listing Rules, and how far this protects a company’s shareholders against, for instance, financial misconduct by the company directors. Discusses each of the obligations: disclosure of information, regulation of transactions (including reverse takeovers and related‐party transactions), production of credible financial information, communications with shareholders, directors, and buy‐back of shares. Concludes that the regime is desirable, but there is need to maintain the balance between protection of investors and public without discouraging companies from going public and seeking listing.
Details
Keywords
Owing to the tremendously vast and unprecedented nature of the directly‐conferred statutory powers of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) (under the Financial Services and…
Abstract
Purpose
Owing to the tremendously vast and unprecedented nature of the directly‐conferred statutory powers of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) (under the Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000), there is need for ample accountability on its part. The paper aims to discuss the situation.
Design/methodology/approach
A critical analysis of the Combined Code on corporate governance. The paper argues in favour of obliging the FSA to adopt the Code as a way of making it accountable.
Findings
It is desirable that the FSA be accountable and that this can best be done via the imposition of corporate governance principles. The paper includes a suggestion of election of the FSA's governing board.
Practical implications
The wider re‐drafting (and construction), by Parliament, of section 7 is the most attractive mode of enforcing corporate governance as an accountability mechanism. This is so, as it will give it far greater force than at present by creating a mandatory regime to bind the FSA in this respect. What is required, therefore, is an amendment of s. 7 of the FSMA 2000 to establish a better accountability method to be imposed on the FSA.
Originality/value
The paper proposes, for the first time, the use of corporate governance (especially the Combined Code) to ensure the accountability of the FSA. The paper is valuable to academics, postgraduate research students and legal practitioners in the area of financial services regulation, corporate law and general public body accountability. It is also useful for those interested incorporate governance and the Combined Code on corporate governance.