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This volume initiates a new collaboration between Research in Labor Economics (RLE) published by Elsevier Press and the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). Beginning 2006, the RLE series extends to two volumes per year. One volume will remain in the tradition of the series, consisting of empirical and theoretical contributions in labor economics, while the other volume will focus on specific policy questions. IZA has become one of the largest organizations of labor scholars worldwide while RLE is now a well-established publication containing labor economics research. We hope this new association will be a meaningful development for both IZA fellows and RLE readers.

Arbitration is often used to settle bargaining disputes. Frequently in such disagreements, one party has better information with respect to the surplus to be allocated. This paper considers the impact that the choice of dispute resolution mechanism, conventional or final offer arbitration, has on settlement. This paper shows that theoretically final offer arbitration can systematically favor the informed party by shifting the contract zone towards more profitable allocations while conventional arbitration is theoretically less likely to generate a mutually agreeable settlement. Laboratory results find that the surplus shares are consistent with the predicted favoritism. However, settlement is positively correlated with the width of the contract zone and the data suggest that the location of the contract zone in final offer arbitration generates more disputes.

Social assistance and inactivity traps have long been considered as one of the main causes of the poor employment performance of EU countries. The success of New Labour in the UK has triggered a growing interests in instruments capable of combining the promotion of responsibility and self-sufficiency with solidarity with less skilled workers. Making-work-pay (MWP) policies, consisting of transfers to households with low earning capacity, have quickly emerged as the most politically acceptable instruments in tax-benefit reforms of many Anglo-Saxon countries. This chapter explores the impact of introducing the British Working Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC) in three EU countries with rather different labor market and welfare institutions: Finland, France and Germany. Simulating the reform reveals that, while first-round effects on income distribution is considerable, the interaction of the new instrument with the structural characteristics of the economy and the population may lead to counterproductive second round effects (i.e. changes in economic behavior). The implementation of the reform, in this case, could only be justified if the social inclusion (i.e. transition into activity) of some specific household types (singles and single mothers) is valued more than a rise in the employment per se.

The first Research in Labor Economics (RLE) volume was published in 1977. Its founding editor, Ronald Ehrenberg, saw the need for high quality substantive research papers in the labor/human resource area. Each volume was to contain “original contributions comparable (or exceeding) those found in leading journals.” The articles were of three genres: (1) results from ongoing or completed important research endeavors, (2) critical survey articles, and (3) symposia on policy related topics (RLE, Vol. 1, p. vii). In 1995, Solomon Polachek took over as series editor. Beginning in 2007 RLE affiliated with the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), an international network of about 1,100 labor economists spanning more than 40 countries. Konstantinos Tatsiramos became the IZA coeditor in 2008 after taking over from Olivier Bargain. Finally in 2011 RLE established an editorial board consisting of Orley C. Ashenfelter, Francine D. Blau, Richard Blundell, David Card, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Richard B. Freeman, Daniel S. Hamermesh, James J. Heckman, Alan B. Krueger, Edward P. Lazear, Christopher A. Pissarides, and Klaus F. Zimmermann. Two are Nobel Laureates and all are top labor economists.

The literature on household behavior contains hardly any empirical research on the within-household distributional effects of tax-benefit policies. We simulate this effect in the framework of a collective model of labor supply when shifting from a joint to an individual taxation system in France. We show that the net-of-tax relative earning potential of the wife is a significant determinant of intrahousehold negotiation but with very low elasticity. Consequently, the labor supply responses to the reform are essentially driven by the traditional substitution and income effects as in a unitary model. For some households only, the reform alters the intrahousehold distribution in a way that tends to change normative conclusions. A sensitivity analysis shows that the distributional effects captured by the collective model would be significant only for reforms both radical and of extended scope.

Understanding how worker well-being is distributed across the population is of paramount importance. With such knowledge policy makers can devise efficient strategies to improve social welfare. This volume contains 13 chapters on topics enhancing our comprehension of inequality across workers. The issues addressed deal directly with the economic institutions that affect individual and family earnings distributions. The themes explored include job training, worker and firm mobility, minimum wages, wage arrears, unions, collective bargaining, unemployment insurance, and schooling. Among the questions answered are: To what extent do greater work hours of women mitigate the widening family earnings distribution? To what extent does deunionization widen the distribution of earnings? Do computers really cause a widening of the earnings distribution? How would the Russian wage distribution change if one accounted for wage arrears? How much of job creation and job destruction comes about because of business relocation? To what extent does maternal education increase children's education? Why do increases in the minimum wage fail to substantially decrease employment as economic theory would predict? And, to what extent do job skills matter for low-income workers?

By reducing the real value of nominally fixed tax band limits, deductions and tax credits, inflation can lead to higher real tax burdens (“fiscal drag”). The traditional view is that this reduces aggregate demand and thus acts as an automatic stabiliser. Yet, this familiar reasoning ignores the supply side and, in particular, possible effects of higher tax burdens on labour costs. Recent work on imperfect labour markets has shown that such effects can indeed arise as employees are able to bargain for higher wages that partly compensate for tax increases. In this case, the resulting upwards pressure on real labour costs can be inflationary. To illustrate this mechanism, this article analyses labour tax burdens in four European countries and how they are altered if tax systems are not adjusted for inflation. This is then combined with available results on the effects of tax changes on wages in imperfect labour markets. The results suggest that, in an unadjusted tax system, inflation can produce a moderate upward pressure on wages. It is argued, however, that more detailed empirical work on the role of taxes in the wage-setting process is needed as existing work ignores the substantial heterogeneity of workers and the tax rates they face.

This volume is remarkable as the confluence of three important streams of research. The first is that of micro-simulation. Fifty years ago, Guy Orcutt had a vision of what could be achieved by the application of simulation methods to the economic and social behavior of individuals. At that time, progress was held back by the lack of computing power and by the paucity of micro-data. Both have been transformed in the last quarter of a century, allowing this branch of research to flourish. The development of tax benefit models, for example, has greatly increased the capacity of economists to advise about the implications of proposed reforms. I can remember in the early 1980s advising a Parliamentary Committee, where, each time a new tax benefit reform was proposed, the secretary would spend the weekend calculating the impact on a handful of stylized cases. Now, the ability to do just the arithmetic on a random sample of the population gives a new dimension to the policy debate, to say nothing of the modeling of incentive effects and behavioral responses.