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The purpose of this paper is to examine minority squeeze-outs and their regulation in Germany, a country where majority shareholders have extensively used this tool since its introduction in 2002. Using unique hand-collected data, the authors carry out the first detailed analysis of the German squeeze-out offers from the announcement to the outcome of post-deal litigation, examining also the determinants of the decision to squeeze-out minority investors.

Using unique data on court rulings and compensations, the authors analyze a sample of 324 squeeze-outs of publicly listed companies from 2002 to 2011 to carry out the first detailed analysis of the squeeze-out procedure and the post-deal litigation. The authors employ the event study methodology to assess the stock market reaction around the announcement of the squeeze-out.

Large firms with foreign large shareholders are the most likely to be delisted. Positive stock price performance increases the likelihood of a squeeze-out, but operating performance has the opposite effect. Stock prices react positively to squeeze-out announcements, in particular when the squeeze-out does not follow a previous takeover offer. Post-deal litigation is widespread: nearly all squeeze-outs are legally challenged by minority shareholders. Additional cash compensation is larger in appraisal procedures, but actions of avoidance are completed in less time. Overall, the evidence suggests that starting post-deal litigation by challenging the cash compensation offered in a squeeze-out delivers high returns for minority investors.

The lack of data concerning the identity of minority shareholders in firms undergoing a squeeze-out does not allow a proper investigation of the incentives of the different types of investors.

The paper provides evidence about the incentives of the different players in a squeeze-out offer. The findings of the paper could be helpful in assessing the impact of the squeeze-out rule. The results also contribute to the understanding of minority investors’ incentives to start post-deal litigation.

This paper provides new evidence about post-deal litigation, in particular how investors use the procedures that the system provides them to protect themselves against controlling shareholders. The paper examines all the phases of the squeeze-out procedure and challenges.

Eckbo, Masulis, & Norli (2000) question previous examination of initial public offering (IPO) underperformance with the keen argument that the increase in the number of traded shares and the infusion of equity reduce two significant premia in the stock’s return, namely, liquidity risk and financial risk. The new market for high (expected) growth stock in Germany is examined for evidence of underpricing, underperformance, and liquidity improvements during the first two complete years of operation – 1998 and 1999. The initial trading period examines the offering day and also the first ten days of trading (for the investor who can not get allocation but enters the secondary market). The postissue performance study period is taken as the 5‐day period one‐year after the IPO. Using regression of four underpricing measures upon issuing firm characteristics deemed important from the extant literature, we seek to explain the degree of underpricing discovered. We find that substantial underpricing occurs and performance is high one year later, even adjusted for the German market return for the period or the firm‐specific sector performance for the same period. Trading dwindles for most stocks after the offering day. One year later, the trading of the stock is even lower. We do find that the more active the trading in the initial period, the greater the returns and trading one year after.