NORMAN H. CUTHBERT and JOHN R. SPARKES
LOCATION of industry policy in Great Britain has its origins in the Special Areas Act of 1934, which marked the beginning of government's acknowledgment of the need to influence…
Abstract
LOCATION of industry policy in Great Britain has its origins in the Special Areas Act of 1934, which marked the beginning of government's acknowledgment of the need to influence the distribution of industry. Since then, successive governments have continued to accept the need. But ideas on how the need should be met have changed considerably, although almost entirely constrained by the principle of taking the work to the workers. Such changes as have taken place in location policy have often led to companies alleging inconsistency on the part of government since the companies have found themselves left high and dry by a change in policy which, having influenced a decision on location, now by‐passes them.
Norman Cuthbert and Richard Dobbins
Pension funds are rapidly acquiring voting control of UK quoted companies. Who, if anybody, should have the legal right to use the votes attached to pension fund shareholdings �…
Abstract
Pension funds are rapidly acquiring voting control of UK quoted companies. Who, if anybody, should have the legal right to use the votes attached to pension fund shareholdings — pension fund managers, employees, employee representatives, members of the TUC, members of the Government, civil servants, or perhaps members of a stakeholders' council? This article sketches a few scenarios.
Norman Cuthbert and Richard Dobbins
By contrast with industrial democracy, which relates to control of the enterprise, economic democracy is concerned with ownership of the organisation. Participation by employees…
Abstract
By contrast with industrial democracy, which relates to control of the enterprise, economic democracy is concerned with ownership of the organisation. Participation by employees in ownership of the enterprise involves a change in the system or in the pattern of ownership. In the most extreme form, employees themselves, through their trade unions or through employees' share holdings or otherwise, would come to own the enterprise and thence to run it. Thus ownership and control would become inextricably fused. It can be seen that like some systems of industrial democracy through worker directors, economic democracy is power‐centred and policy‐based.
Norman H. Cuthbert and Alan Whitaker
This paper focuses attention upon the current public policy debate on employee participation in managerial decision‐making before the publication of the Bullock Report and, in…
Abstract
This paper focuses attention upon the current public policy debate on employee participation in managerial decision‐making before the publication of the Bullock Report and, in particular, the apparent resurgence of popularity for the concept of joint consultation. In view of joint consultation's relatively unsuccessful history it may be that the implications of this development have been largely unrecognized. Current attitudes towards participation as exemplified in certain of the more important policy statements of management, unions and political parties are analysed in terms of the role allotted to joint consultation within them. Similarly, European experience with joint consultation is considered for its relevance for developments in Britain. The paper closes with discussion of the future role joint consultation could play as a vehicle in the development of employee participation and the key issues involved.
Norman H. Cuthbert and Richard Dobbins
The Changing Pattern of Share Ownership. As indicated elsewhere in these pages, one of the most important economic developments of recent years has been the changing pattern of…
Abstract
The Changing Pattern of Share Ownership. As indicated elsewhere in these pages, one of the most important economic developments of recent years has been the changing pattern of share ownership in UK quoted companies. Ownership of equities gives the holder the legal right to vote at company annual general meetings on such matters as the appointment and removal of directors. When a group of investors owns enough shares to control the board of directors then that group can clearly exert a powerful influence over managerial decision‐making. This is now the case in the United Kingdom with respect to a major group of investors. The combined equity holdings of institutional investors — pension funds, insurance companies, investment trust companies and unit trusts — amounted to 51 per cent of all UK quoted equities at the end of 1980. These financial institutions thus controlled more than half the voting power in British industrial and commercial enterprises, and they continue to acquire a further two per cent of all UK quoted equities each year. This gives considerable power to institutional portfolio managers. It could be suggested that this power, particularly in the case of pension funds which form the largest and fastest growing sector, should be vested in those who contribute the savings which finance the growth of institutional equity holdings, that is employees or their elected representatives.
Richard Dobbins and Norman H. Cuthbert
The Growth of Institutional Shareholdings 1966–1980. Institutional investors, particularly insurance companies and pension funds, are consistent purchasers of company and overseas…
Abstract
The Growth of Institutional Shareholdings 1966–1980. Institutional investors, particularly insurance companies and pension funds, are consistent purchasers of company and overseas securities. Of particular interest is the ownership of U.K. quoted equities, rather than ownership of debentures, preference shares and overseas securities. Ownership of the ordinary share capital is of particular interest because the votes attached to equities give the holders legal powers to influence management through general meetings. The impact of the growth of institutional shareholdings on corporate management and the London Stock Exchange will be discussed in later articles. This article demonstrates the growth of institutional ownership of British industry, comments on the concentration of institutional holdings in large companies, illustrates the avoidance of new issues by financial institutions, and comments on the future pattern of U.K. share ownership.
Richard Dobbins and Norman H. Cuthbert
A comprehensive review of UK share ownership during the 1966–1980 period, with particular reference to the work of Revell and Moyle at the Department of Applied Economics…
Abstract
A comprehensive review of UK share ownership during the 1966–1980 period, with particular reference to the work of Revell and Moyle at the Department of Applied Economics, Cambridge.
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In order to achieve anything, one side in the productivity bargain has to expose its position. The author argues that this side must be the management.
In the last four years, since Volume I of this Bibliography first appeared, there has been an explosion of literature in all the main functional areas of business. This wealth of…
Abstract
In the last four years, since Volume I of this Bibliography first appeared, there has been an explosion of literature in all the main functional areas of business. This wealth of material poses problems for the researcher in management studies — and, of course, for the librarian: uncovering what has been written in any one area is not an easy task. This volume aims to help the librarian and the researcher overcome some of the immediate problems of identification of material. It is an annotated bibliography of management, drawing on the wide variety of literature produced by MCB University Press. Over the last four years, MCB University Press has produced an extensive range of books and serial publications covering most of the established and many of the developing areas of management. This volume, in conjunction with Volume I, provides a guide to all the material published so far.