Search results

With increasing pressure on firms to deliver shareholder value, there has been a renewed emphasis on devising measures of corporate financial performance and incentive compensation plans that encourage managers to increase shareholder wealth. One professedly recent innovation in the field of internal and external performance measurement is a trade‐marked variant of residual income known as economic value‐added (EVA). This paper attempts to provide a synoptic survey of EVA's conceptual underpinnings and the comparatively few empirical analyses of value‐added performance measures. Special attention is given to the GAAP‐related accounting adjustments involved in EVA‐type calculations.

This study focused on analysing the effect of acquisition characteristics on post‐acquisition operating performance for 83 bids consisting of 83 public listed bidders acquiring 80 private, 2 public listed and 1 non‐public listed targets in Malaysia during the period 1988–1992. The specific bid characteristics analysed are business relatedness, management turnover, the relative size of targets to bidders, the method of payment offered and board of directors' ownership structure. Since the specific feature of the current sample is that it consists mainly of privately owned targets, the characteristics of disciplinary bids found in acquisitions of public listed targets were not expected in agreed bids between the bidders and targets in this study. The results indicate that the target directors' turnover and the directors' share ownership do not have a significant effect on the post‐acquisition performance. Rather it appears that, if anything, retention of existing management is more likely to lead to performance improvement. Further analysis shows that replacement of target management has no impact on post‐acquisition performance regardless of the relatedness line of business. The latter findings reinforce the unique characteristics of the data set used in the current analysis of acquisitions of privately owned Malaysian companies in which unique skills of previous directors may often be retained post‐acquisition regardless of the business relatedness. The study also provides evidence that acquisitions of highly related business between target and acquiring firm, large relative size of target to bidders and payment for the acquisition by shares have a significant positive impact on post‐acquisition control‐adjusted performance. However, highly related business between target and bidder and payment by shares are the only significant acquisition characteristics that have a significant positive impact on the post‐acquisition control‐adjusted performance when multiple regression is used.

During recent years, financial economists have made a significant contribution to the rapid development of a vibrant and growing literature on organization structure and corporate governance. In reviewing the development of this literature, it becomes easy to see how the seminal contributions of Ronald Coase (awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991) have become the cornerstone of a new institutional economics. In particular, researchers following in Coase’s footsteps have clarified the conditions under which voluntary contracts between private agents can resolve a wide variety of so-called “agency problems.” More than just representing an important discovery of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy, Coase’s work has become an important foundation for the theory of contracts and for the whole field of “organization economics.”

This paper analyses the mechanisms through which profit-sharing schemes may induce debt constrained firms to improve technical efficiency over time to guarantee positive profits. This hypothesis is first formalised in a partial equilibrium framework and then is tested on a sample of Italian traditional and cooperative firms. Technical efficiency change indexes are computed by DEA. These are regressed on a measure of finance constraints to analyse their impact on firms’ efficiency growth. The results support the hypothesis that a restriction in the availability of financial resources can affect positively the growth in efficiency in firms with profit-sharing schemes.

We study the implications of ownership and its induced incentives on firm survival on the stock market for young and high‐tech firms. Using a unique data set of all 341 firms listed on the Neuer Markt, the German equivalent of the NASDAQ, our results differ from studies on more traditional firms. Ownership by CEOs has no influence on firm survival when introducing measurements of human capital and intellectual property rights. This confirms assumptions that firms in the knowledge based industries differ in their governance structure from traditional firms.

I am interested in clarifying the discussion of how researchers might try to isolate real option effects to identify whether managerial decisions are guided by a real option heuristic. If we are to claim that the theory of real options illuminates managerial behavior, then as a field, we must converge on an understanding as to what constitutes a real option effect, and what does not. The discussion centers on hypothesis development, measurement issues, and research methodology.

This paper explores how two understudied characteristics of a firm's product portfolio, namely, aging of products and (non)innovativeness of products, affect firm survival. The influence of these product portfolio characteristics on organizational mortality can be observed both at the firm and at the industry levels. Paradoxically, the portfolio's influence at the firm and at the industry levels may go in opposite directions. Specifically, I predict that portfolios with aging products make their firms weaker competitors and survivors. However by weakening these firms, “aging” portfolios reduce competitive pressures at the industry level and, therefore, improve firm survival indirectly by changing industry vital rates. In contrast, firms with innovative product portfolios should be stronger survivors. At the same time, they are likely to intensify competition in the industry and, as a result, diminish survival chances of all firms, including those with innovative products. The analyses of all firms’ product portfolios in the worldwide optical disk drive industry, 1983–1999, support these predictions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of capital structure on the performance of microfinance institutions.

Panel data covering the ten‐year period 1995‐2004 were analyzed within the framework of fixed‐ and random‐effects techniques.

Most of the microfinance institutions employ high leverage and finance their operations with long‐term as against short‐term debt. Also, highly leveraged microfinance institutions perform better by reaching out to more clientele, enjoy scale economies, and therefore are better able to deal with moral hazard and adverse selection, enhancing their ability to deal with risk.

This is the first study of its kind in the sector, especially within sub‐Saharan Africa.

Insights into the origins of entrepreneurial activity are gained through a study of alternative mechanisms implicated in the tendency for children of the self-employed to be substantially more likely than other children to enter into self-employment themselves. I use unique life history data to examine the impact of parental self-employment on the transition to self-employment in Denmark and assess the different mechanisms identified in the literature. The results suggest that parental role modeling is an important source of the transmission of self-employment. However, there is little evidence to suggest that children of the self-employed enter self-employment because they have privileged access to their parent's financial or social capital, or because their parents’ self-employment allows them to develop superior entrepreneurial abilities.

This paper attempts to investigate what kind of firms is more likely to use capital structure to signal; and in particular to investigate the impacts of corporate ownership structures on firms' capital structure signalling decisions.

The paper develops theoretical models and then uses OLS multiple regression, piecewise regression and logistic regression analysis on a set of data derived from 327 UK firms listed in the FTSE ALL share index to test the hypotheses.

The empirical results show that capital structure is not homogeneously used as a signalling tool; and firms with insider ownerships less or equal to 1.14 per cent are more likely the signallers.

Although other variables have been examined, this paper focuses on the impacts of insider ownership on capital structure signalling. Further work is required to investigate other variables that are mentioned but they are outside the scope of this paper.

This paper provides useful practical insights to both managers and investors to help them better understand and interpret firms' capital structure signals.

Before this paper, most people commonly agreed that capital structure contains signalling values. However, the findings suggest that it is not always the case.